Li Lu: Value Investing in China, Full Transcript

Li Lu gave a wonderful talk at the 13th Annual Columbia China Business Conference last week. The fireside chat was chock full of great insights into value investing and its application in China.

I felt this talk, more than most, would benefit from being transcribed. And no doubt, the wisdom of Li Lu jumps off the page.

I would like to thank Li Lu, Bruce Greenwald, the Columbia Business School, and the Greater China Society for putting on this talk and making it available to the general public.

For more details about this conference, visit cbs-china.org.

I hope you all enjoy!

(Note: Throughout the transcript I made minor grammatical fixes to improve clarity, but beyond that, transcribed it as accurately as possible.)

Start of Transcript

Bruce Greenwald: I think this is going to be a rare privilege for everybody. I’ve known Li Lu now for more than 20 years, and not only is he a great investor, but he’s a great conversationalist. So why don’t we just start out by talking about how your investment philosophy has changed? Because value investing is, after all, always an evolving field since you began the field, literally, I think I would say, 25 years ago, 20 years ago?

Li Lu: More like 28 now. Time really flies.

Bruce Greenwald: So how has it evolved? So how have you been influenced by people like Charlie Munger?

Li Lu: Well, so before I started, I just want to first of all, thank you and all the organizers of this great conferences. Look at the way the speaker are just really unbelievable. So the quality of the student has dramatically improved since I was a student there. So thank you all for that wonderful work of putting together these great conferences. And it just really gives me such a pleasure to be on the same panel as my professor, Bruce Greenwald. In fact, I got into this field really because of Professor Greenwald’s class. I think, you know, basically you got Buffett to come to speak to the students roughly 28 years ago. And it was really out of that first lecture that we got into this field. So thank you so much. And of course, later, as a business school student, I took all of the courses that Professor Greenwald offered and learned a great deal and made a lot of money, too. So thank you.

So the philosophy is relatively simple. The practice is really hard. So I wouldn’t say the philosophy really evolved all that much for me. Before I got really exposed to value investing through Buffet’s lecture at Bruce Greenwald’s class, I think my whole approach to life was pretty much a set along similar lines. And so there was not much of a jump for me. The idea of buying something at a discount of something that is really worth more is simply intelligent. So (I would assume) that all intelligent investing involves some kind of value investing. And now the difference is, is that your focus on value evolves over time and two different individuals they tend to focus on different areas of that.

For me, when I first started as a value investor, this is now 27, 28 years ago when I bought my first stock. I didn’t really know much about business. I was born and raised in China during the Cultural Revolution. There was not much of a private business or market economy back then, so I had to learn everything new. So at the beginning, obviously look for value primarily on the balance sheet in the classic style of Benjamin Graham, looking for a cigarette-butt, looking for the last puff basically. Looking for a statistically cheap businesses and ignore what the business really is. And that served me well.

Then over time, I evolved into understanding smaller businesses. Because I was just intensively curious about how business run. So much so, actually I evolved to help funding or co-created a dozen or so early-stage startup companies. And that experience has taught me a lot about how business is run, what constitutes bad or mediocre businesses. And so over time I evolved into looking for really good businesses, small maybe, but really good businesses. And then that leads me to look for good businesses in Asia, and eventually for businesses with an enduring competitive advantage with a long growth trajectory ahead of it. And so the places where we’re looking for value evolves over time, but the basic philosophy I have pretty much remained the same. But it’s just our core competence expanded over time.

Now, I have been very fortunate to be influenced at the very beginning by the investment giant Buffett and Munger and later on I was really, really lucky. It was just a stroke of luck that you can’t even make up in fiction, that I struck a good connection with Charlie Munger and he became an investor in 2003, 2004. And we’ve been partners since then basically. He has been a mentor, an investor, a business partner and a great friend all these years. And for many, many years we have dinner every Tuesday night. So that’s my version of Tuesday night with Charlie, every week. That lasted for years until just around a pandemic. And we talk a lot more. So obviously, I had a great deal of influence by him. But I have to say that the greatest influence from Charlie was really beyond just investment.

It was more of a role model in the way he conducted himself in real life. Now I think for every profession, for everybody, it is wonderful to have role models in life. And often the role model is among the eminent dead because it’s safer. So it’s pretty risky to pick a role model that’s still alive. And it is always a risk of disappointing. But in my case, I got really, really lucky in the sense that my role model never failed and instead continued to inspire me, right into his 97th year, basically. And so mostly it’s really based on his attitude towards life and his ability to keep equanimity in a sense, in the face of ups and downs, successes or setbacks. And I’ve witnessed quite a bit of them over the 17 years or so we’ve been working closely to maintain that rational composure, commonsensical approach to all problems in investment or life. That is extraordinarily hard, and it is a bit against our natural tendencies. And I’ve really watched up close and personal, how Charlie has conducted himself. And it is in that regard that he’s probably the most influential person in my life. And I have been very, very lucky in that regard.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok, so, in this concentration, in sort of now investing in great businesses, can you be specific about what kind of business you look for? What are the characteristics of a great business in particular, what detailed characteristics you look for and how you put a value on those businesses?

Li Lu: Yeah, well, great businesses are the ones who really have above average returns on invested capital. But that kind of a business traditionally attract imitators, competitors, everybody wants to have above average returns on reinvested capital. And so truly good businesses are the ones who can fend off competitors, who can really have an enduring competitive advantage and have that higher than average return on invested capital and hopefully also have a long run-rate of continuous growth. Those are the businesses we’re looking for. And they could really come in all industries, in all shapes and forms. But they’re rare. They’re really, really rare to have a business that generates above average returns over a long time on a compounded fashion is, again is really against the natural order of things. It’s really only a small slice of all businesses (that) belong to that category.

So if you’re really lucky enough to really find one of those long-term compounders, all you have to do is really to own them for the longest period of time. Now, it helps when you really buy them at the time when they happen to be traded at a discount to their intrinsic value so that if you were wrong about them, you won’t lose money, and if you’re right, you have more returns over time. But over the longest period of time, if you do own them through the ups and downs, your return roughly approximates basically the actual business return to actual capital invested in the business itself over the long term. The two tend to really converge pretty closely.

And so understanding and studying the nature of that business, the dynamic of the competition is of really the most important thing as the investor, and as a student of the business. And as I said, there isn’t really a set of things that really made them that way. Every business really build their fortress slightly different, and you just have to really actually be honest with yourself and study them from every possible angle until you’re really convinced that they are actually currently enjoying truly enduring (competitive advantages), and they truly have a long runway ahead of them. And if they prove to be exactly as you predicted over the years, we really want to stay on them through the up and down, thick and thin, not to be really dissuaded easily.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok, can I actually talk a little bit about those businesses, I mean, in limiting competition and I think Charlie Munger is the master of this, we’re really interested in moat’s. That is the barriers to entry into the business because it’s keeping people out. That’s going to limit competition. If you think about a moat, there are probably only two elements to that moat. So think of it from the point of view of a company trying to get into the business.

One is economies of scale. How big do you have to get? How big a market share do you have to capture in order to be viable as a competitor? So in automobiles, in the global automobile market, it’s really large. And if you have got 1-2% share, you’re going to be fine. In other markets, like, for example, local distribution of caffeinated soft drinks, you’ve got to get to 20-25% of the market to support the infrastructure that you need to compete. So the first thing is economies of scale.

The second thing I think and again, I’m sort of thinking about Charlie Munger here, is how hard is it to get that market share? Which is all about customer captivity in a contested environment where unique technology will help you with that and so on. So suppose you’ve got to get to 25% share, we know for caffeinated soft drinks that two tenths of a percent share changes hands every year in a contested market. So to get to 25% you’re talking about a 125-year moat.

Do you do a calculation like that for the companies you’re looking at? Do you look at those two elements explicitly?

Li Lu: Well, that and more.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok. So what’s ‘the more’?

Li Lu: Scale is important in there, actually, there is a scale economies in those businesses, not everything actually has a scale. Sometimes that scale becomes a counterpoint, they could actually be more difficult to really manage. But in a scale economy, scale does really become a competitive advantage. But the dynamic will change after a certain scale, you mentioned automobiles, that’s an interesting example, you know what happens at different phases of the industry. The consumer side is also important in a sense that if you have quite a bit of consumer addiction to certain products and brand loyalty, obviously that is important and they’re good for a long time until they’re not good. Things do change. New product categories would come along, and brands get tired and old, and not refreshed. The new generations really don’t like to have the same taste as their parents and grandparents. So that’s really the most interesting aspect of businesses is, (the) only constant is the constant change. All great business changes over time. And (there’s) absolutely no business that can really maintain that competitive edge for forever. But some of the businesses can really keep it for a very, very long time. And of course, when it changes it’s really upon the management team to be able to really reallocate capital towards those businesses, (that are) actually now enjoying a robust competitive advantage.

Take example with Berkshire. It started out as a lousy business, losing business of textile in New England. And Warren and Charlie’s skill is that they took the last bit of the cash flow and skillfully invested in some other businesses, really on the right side of the trajectory. But over time, some of those businesses began to lose its competitive advantage and then they took that capital and allocated to the ones that…so obviously the management capability of allocating capital also plays a very important role. And, of course, that the culture of a company in the industry that’s rapidly changing so that you are always a few steps ahead of your competitors, which allows you to always (inaudible) on the edge, that also becomes enduring competitive advantage if that culture endures. So in every specific businesses, what really make them successful are very, very different and they change over time. And so that is the most fascinating aspect of the competitive dynamics and those are the most fascinating aspect of being an investor as well.

Bruce Greenwald: As of today, how do you view this differently, would you say from most other investors? Are there things that you look at specifically? Are there ways that you approach companies?

Now, I’ll tell you the thing that when I started investing with you, and I’m honored to say that I made a lot of money doing it, that appealed to me was what you mentioned in your introduction, which is small…markets are necessarily markets where you have to get a big share because one firm can dominate. And that’s not something that most investors look at. So in what other ways do you do things differently from most other value investors and investors?

Li Lu: Well, you’re right. You invested with me or you begin to invest in me. Thank God you’re still with me. So thank you for your continued trust and confidence. No, back then we were looking for smaller businesses because those are the businesses I feel I can understand them. And as we evolve, we began to look for big businesses that we can also understand. That bigger business does come with a whole set of advantages, that if they are right in a sense, they also come in with a whole bunch of problems. And so we’re not really looking at just big or medium or small. Size is one consideration, but it’s not the most important, certainly not a determining factor is when we’re looking for businesses. There are big businesses that because of a certain dynamic, are still growing at a robust pace that are becoming even more entrenched as they become bigger. And they still have long runs of growth. So that just exist. You know, the most recent phenomenon of the technology platform, because of the network effect, some of the business are fitting that characteristics. Now, they don’t necessarily always grow forever, but they have been growing for a long, long time and likely to continue for some time. And so just the size itself is certainly not the most determining factor.

Bruce Greenwald: But then what other dimensions do you do things differently today than other investors who are less successful?

Li Lu: I don’t spend my time studying a hundred people doing that. We spend most of our time studying industries, study specific companies. We’re looking for the ones who are already successful. Try to answer what really make them successful. Can that success be continued? And some of the time we have answers and some of the time we don’t. We just continue to really study them and continue at it, until we have an answer. I think one thing that really that is always important for us is this intellectual honesty, basically knowing what we really don’t know. What we do know and what we don’t. In other words, if we claim a circle of confidence, we have to understand the edge of the competence. You have to know what falls in and what falls out. You have to be very honest with yourself. So we really insist on knowing inside and out a particular businesses, to the point we’re able to predict it’s outcome, for example, in the next 10 years. At least I want to know, at worst case scenario, what the business would look like 10 years from now. And so we do have a long-term horizon in terms. We can’t really predict it forever, but I want to see whether I can predict with a very high degree of confidence, 90% of confidence, that at a minimum what the business will look like in 10 years under all different contingencies. And most of the time by the way, we don’t have an answer and we just keep study and keep at it. Sometimes we study for years and years before we see, ok, we really get it. And then we wait for the price to come to our striking zone, and a lot of the time they don’t. And so that makes our selection very, very difficult. And so when we do select them, we tend to own them for a very, very long time because the businesses that are really good and we really fully understand are very rare. (Inaudible) So anything that we would buy a lot more as they go down.

Li Lu: If they go down 50% to 60% we buy more, so that really gives you a measure of our definition of when we understand them.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok, so what about the market today? I mean, it seems highly valued. I mean, if you look at fixed income, it seems unprecedented. That said, does the market today remind you of any historical periods you lived through in good ways or bad? And would you have advice for anybody I’m having now?

Li Lu: Well, we usually don’t study too much about the market except when they are really extreme. And this happens to be one of the more extreme periods of time. It is truly, in many ways, somewhere in unchartered territory. The amount of liquidity that’s been printed, the level of interest rates, and also the slow pace of growth. All of those are quite really remarkable in this period of time. So how do you really deal with them. We don’t necessarily think that history would repeat. And so every time is slightly different. Instead of guessing the patterns of history and whether they would repeat, we focus on selecting companies that can really live through the thick and thin, whatever the environment, business will continue. Somebody will do well. So we just want to really be invested in those companies who are capable of dealing with those extraordinary set of uncertainties. (Inaudible)

Bruce Greenwald: And how much is management a part of that. And how do you look for managements that have that capability?

Li Lu: Well, in a lot of the companies, the management will make a big difference. The culture of the management will make a big difference. But in a small set of experiences, management really matters almost nothing. The strength of the business itself really has a dynamic of its own that really almost anybody can run it and run it well, relatively. Now, those businesses are really rare, not that many. You can probably put them in one hand or two hands. And so…again, I come back to the situation, each time is different. You have to really look for each specific company in specific ways and ask all kinds of probing questions and study them over a long period of time in order to really honestly say that you actually understand them. Understand them enough that you could predict the outcome in 10 years, even given all the up and downs in the macro environment.

Bruce Greenwald: So you’ve lived through in your 23 years running Himalaya, a number of major financial crises, the Asia crisis in ’97, the tech bust in 2000, the financial crisis in 2008 and actually last year, the covid-19 situation. Are there specific things you learn about managements or companies that you look for in those crises?

Li Lu: Yeah, well, so as you said, in my 24 years of managing Himalaya Capital, we have gone through several of those big crises. Each time when that happens, it was billed as once in a century crisis. It probably was, except it happens on the time frame of every 5 to 10 years. So a financial market boom and bust has been a constant phenomenon since the beginning of the financial market several hundred years ago. And it was driven by human nature, as long human nature remains that way, it will never change. It will always be with us. As a product of evolution, we humans are basically run not necessarily in a very rational way. Now we’re very good at rationalization, but we’re really not very good at being rational…In a sense, we’re governed by some set of hard wired, hard coded instincts. And looking for a zero sum and we’re looking for fast money, and they’re really totally scared when things goes against you. So that’s basic sense of greed and fear, it will always drive the financial market up and down. Particularly when it comes to money, humans are very funny. They tend to evoke a primal part of human nature. And so particularly as it relates to financial markets, a security market, money, that that human tendency of the extreme instincts become more amplified and more extreme. And that’s why the financial market from the very beginning has always been characterized by boom and bust and will remain so. And how do you deal with such an environment that will be constant? One way to deal with that is to anticipate that it’s always on the corner at all times. And that’s basically our attitude, that financial crisis will happen all the time. People will always be driven by fear, by euphoria, by this extreme kind of ups and downs. And so we’re looking for businesses that are capable of living through that and even businesses that could really thrive in that environment. In a sense, have a certain characteristic of antifragile and so that up and down becomes somewhat friendly for us. In the sense that when our favorite company is on sale discounted by 50, 60, 70 percent, if we have money, will buy more of it. If we don’t have the money, it is the hallmark of a good investor, you can sit through watching your portfolio down by 50% and not being affected at all.

On the other hand, the other side of the coin is that you’re equally unaffected when everybody around you are making fast money, fast and furious, a lot of them. Now you’re really seemingly totally left behind. And that’s really part of the temperament that most people don’t have. And that’s why not everybody can succeed in this game of investment. And so to succeed in this game requires a certain temperament and a certain understanding of human nature. Also a certain commonsensical approach. Knowing that your investment return eventually will mirror the actual business return by actual business. You know, in real life, real businesses don’t really change by day, by hour, by week, by months. It took years for them to either go up or down. And so you should expect your investment result that come in slowly, gradually over a long period of time. So the short-term phenomena should not really impact you as much, either on the up or on the down. So if you have that basic temperament and basic approaches, what you’re going to find is that most euphoria, as well as the crash, actually can serve you well. And this is really going back to Ben Graham’s basic concept of Mr. Market that is there to serve you, not instruct you. Except in the real game of investment, those phenomena, those on the up and down tend to be quite extreme and testing. And so the other thing that will be very testing is that we really do need to understand the business itself. And if you really try to pretend you understand and you are really driven by something else other than deep understanding, you’ll be tested. And so that’s the salient nature of the of the financial market. I sometimes almost feel that they exist to really catch human weakness. That if you really don’t understand something that you pretend to, you will be busted at some point. But if you truly understand, you will be able to add when the security will be down 50, 60, 70%.

Bruce Greenwald: Can I actually talk a little bit about a specific example there and maybe get you to talk about an example? Because one of the things that you talked about was the stability of these companies and their managements in the face of a crisis. So a crisis tells you a lot. And the one company that obviously recently has done extremely well and you could see it is John Deere.

So if you looked at John Deere in 2000, demand fell by 5% and their profit margins fell to zero. If you look at what happens to them in ’13, ’14, demand falls 35% and their profit margin stays at roughly half of what it was before, which is higher than it had been historically. So clearly, that’s a company that’s changed and in the face of sort of catastrophic external conditions, has gone from doing quite badly to doing much better. Do you have examples of that from the companies you’ve invested in, where you’ve seen them perform through a crisis?

Li Lu: I do in my 27, 28 years of investment, that’s the kind of things you’ll collect. But normally we don’t talk about specific companies.

Bruce Greenwald: But could you share maybe a historical experience of that so that the students in the audience might have a sense of what to look for in looking for this stability?

Li Lu: Well, Bruce, we’ve tried this multiple times in your class. I’m not going to change.

Bruce Greenwald: I know, it’s very familiar to me.

Li Lu: And there is a simple logic, a reason why we don’t do that. Once you achieve a certain notoriety in a certain field that people tend to really copy that. And that’s not the kind of behavior we want to encourage. Instead of giving people fish, it is much better to really teach people how to fish.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok, so let me do one last question. Do you prefer to be a generalist or a specialist investor and would one work better in the Chinese market than another?

Li Lu: Well, in a sense, you always want to be a generalist in terms of a student of businesses that you’re interested…To be good at this game, you have to have the innate intensive curiosity about a business, all kinds of businesses. It doesn’t mean you’re going to really, really get to the bottom of it. Oftentimes you don’t if you’re honest with yourself. But by the time you really get into the companies you really decided to invest, you really better become a true specialist. And to the point of really know, hopefully better than anybody in the world you can find, including the top management team. And the top management team, because they manage the company, they tend to be deeply personally vested in their own biases and may not be able to look at the business as objectively, rationally as you do. And so that’s really the test.

So you want to be a true specialist in the company you chose to really invest. You want to be a generalist always of business in general, so that your core competence, your circle of competence is constantly evolving and enlarging over time. If I still really know what I knew when I started my first took your class or when you first invested with me, we would not have…anywhere near the results that we both enjoyed, so luckily we continue to expand and we continue to learn. But on the other hand, it is fascinating to see that how business evolved over the last few decades will continue to evolve in the next few decades. And that really makes me feel that boy I am lucky to choose this field that I get paid to really satisfy my curiosity and to learn all those great people and great enterprises serving society. So I feel happy every day doing what I do.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok, so let’s talk about the evolution of markets and in particular at a 2010 panel at Columbia Business School, you mentioned that Asia’s role in the global financial system was becoming increasingly important. Looking back, how has Asia’s role evolved in the last 10 years, and what about China’s role going forward in both the world’s business economy and in the financial?

Li Lu: (Inaudible) turned out exactly as we predicted, Asia indeed became a lot more important, in particularly China in it, has becomes even more important. As I look at in the next few decades, I would say that the Chinese market, and Asia in general, will become even more important. The set of dynamics that are already set in place, will continue to play out in a robust way, so the Chinese security market in general and Asia economy, that will become increasingly a very, very important, evermore important component of the global market.

Bruce Greenwald: Well, all right, so let me give you some data that I don’t think is widely appreciated. I mean, the Chinese numbers are obviously very difficult to interpret, at least the official numbers. And whenever you see that from a company, the data you really want to look at is the data where there’s a reliable counterparty, and the trade data is where there’s reliable counterparty, because every Chinese export has to be an import from another country and every Chinese import has to be an export from another country.

Over the last 8 to 10 years, China trade has grown by only about 2.5% per year. That’s less than 1% faster than US trade. What does that say about Chinese growth? I mean, that’s clearly much slower than the trade growth prior to 2010, 2011, and it’s fluctuated obviously, but if anything, it’s been slowing down. What does that say about China’s future?

Li Lu: It tells you about the characteristics of the Chinese economy has changed fundamentally. You know, up until 10 years ago, what really propels the Chinese growth…was international trade to a certain extent. And I would say back in 2010, the net trade, meaning the export/import netted out, was roughly about 9% of GDP. And so China’s economy was heavily dependent on the global market…And they were growing really double-digit growth at the time when the rest of the global economy was growing at much, much less, a fraction of that. And so at a certain point, once you become the largest trading nation, you can’t really grow, the rest of the world wouldn’t be able to keep up. And the other thing that is happening is after the citizens become middle classes, their demand changes from basically just work, saving, into really work and saving and consumption. It’s just also human nature.

So roughly around 10 years ago, as you point out, the Chinese economy has slowly evolved into more of a consumer driven economy to the point that interestingly, last year was a watershed year in a sense that the retail sales, the total volume of retail sales for the first time overtaking the United States. China was the largest retail market in the whole world at a $6 trillion. The US was roughly $5.5 trillion. Now grant it that was a special year in the sense that a global pandemic hit other countries harder than China, it’s (also said) that China did a better job in managing the pandemic. But basically the trend is there. China is emerging to become the most dynamic, fastest growing consumer market in the whole world, and that is likely to continue for many, many more decades to come. And so that really makes China even more attractive to the global economy in terms of people who want to sell to the consumers, to the middle class in China. And the characteristic of the economy would change and would also really provide unique and interesting opportunities for global investors.

Bruce Greenwald: Let me just talk a little bit about that. I mean, the thing about retail sales is that it’s selling goods. The thing about the developed economies is that they’re overwhelmingly service economies, they’re not goods economies. And on that dimension, it doesn’t look like China’s doing particularly well. And as I say, the export data, you could understand that would slowdown, but the fact that the import data has slowed down just as much or more tells you something about the nature of domestic growth in China. What about the challenges in the service sector in China?

Li Lu: Well, you’re certainly right that at the current stage, the service sector has yet to become as powerful and dominant as most of the matured and developed economies in the West. And that’s really (inaudible) a new set of opportunities for the decades ahead of them. And that’s, by the way, not that much different than all the other developed economies at a comparable stage in the development of, say, $10,000, $11,000 per capita GDP, which is where China is today.

But if you look at the underlying dynamics of the various different businesses, different performance, both consumption, retailers and the services are basically the ones that are growing the fastest. And overall, trade internationally is still growing at a robust rate, but not nearly as much as the domestic side of the economy. And so that’s why their share of the GDP has gradually began to shrink. So domestic consumption becomes far more important, both goods and the services, as you point out. So that just tells you that a different stage of the economy where it is today.

Bruce Greenwald: So where do you see the unique challenges and opportunities in sort of finding value investment opportunities in China?

Li Lu: Well, China remains, I think, one of the best market, if you were a value investor. In a sense, the market is still somewhat underdeveloped. The market today is not as representative as the real economy the way, for example, the United States is. And so there’s a lot of the development in that regard. And the trading and the investors are still not as mature. And there’s still a mentality of fast trading, high turnovers, which actually render some of the companies, again, go through a faster pace of this boom and bust. Again, that usually provides opportunities for those mature patient investors who truly know what they’re doing. And also, as you said, in the service sector of the economy when it comes to financial services, is still yet to be developed. And China was really right at this stage in the financial services industry, actually is about to take off in a big way for many reasons. And it just so happens that the Chinese government is quite keen in making macroeconomic policies quite conducive for the development of the financial services industry. And they’ve begun to open up to the global firms as well in a way that they’ve never done that before. So all those confluence of factors really make the market that much more attractive today than it was before.

Bruce Greenwald: Yeah, can I say something about that? Financial services is probably the fifth and sixth largest service sector. The biggest is housing by far. The second biggest is medical care. The third biggest is education. And the fourth and fifth biggest are like wholesale and retail distribution and personal services and then financial services, although in the US it’s a little higher than that. What about those sectors in China.

Li Lu: That sector is also growing…

Bruce Greenwald: Right, but do you see opportunities in housing…

Li Lu: Virtually every industry are going through robust growing stage, some more than the others. And even if industry, they’re not growing as fast, you can still find interesting companies, values. And I don’t have to…you’re the guru for this field. So different people tend to focus on different aspects of the industries and different aspects of the growth profile, some looking at value and high growth companies, some looking for values at moderate growth companies. Some look for value in places that don’t grow at all. In fact, they’re probably declined and therefore they find even bigger markets. And so if you are a true good investor in that sense, you can find value everywhere. But you will probably be more capable of finding values in dynamically growing economies such as China. They are still growing at multiple times of the matured economy in the West, and there’s still enormous amount of inefficiency in this securities market. So that combination of those two really make it enticing.

On top of that one, a whole series of government reform will make those inefficiencies gradually be more efficient. And so that transition offers even more interesting opportunities. So this is a good time for global investors and certainly for U.S. investors as well.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok, in those terms that as Chinese financial markets are developing. Do you have certain reforms or other things you’d be interested in seeing implemented? You sort of have a top development that you like to see happen in the China financial markets or even in the China economy?

Li Lu: Well in a sense, it’s already happening. That’s what I mean by the Chinese government regulator has been very keen to develop the Chinese security market. For years and years the Chinese security market is not very representative of China’s economy, partially because really the of the IPO rules are based on what they call approval model. You have to go through…layers of approval process in order to be listed. And so the ones who are listed are the ones who really approved by government, for whatever reason, often not really market driven. Compare with other markets such as the United States, that it is registration based. And so it is market driven. As a result…the security markets here are quite representative of the true economy. And as the Chinese economy moving from an export import driven economy into more of consumer demand economy, the entrepreneurial companies with market driven dynamics are increasingly playing a larger role. And therefore the financial markets have to reflect the changing dynamics and the Chinese government is determined to reform this IPO process from one of approval process model into one that is much like the United States of registration-based model.

And so we are probably still early in that process. But as that process began to play out, we’ll see the financial market become more reflective of the real economy. And the other big changes that is happening is that most of the financing are done through the banking sectors up to the point, 80 plus percent. And over time, the financing is best to really do through what they call ‘direct financing’, mostly through market driven dynamics of fixed income, equity, etc. And so we see the overall financing model, the Chinese economy, from one that is more indirect, into more direct. And so thus is the reason for opening up this financial service industry, both for domestic players and global players. As we’re seeing that dynamic play out over the next decade or so there will be a lot more opportunities and the financial market will become more mature and there will be more institutional players coming into it. And the financial markets will become much, much bigger than what it is today. So those area really all bode well for investors who truly understand what they’re doing in China.

Bruce Greenwald: Now, let me ask another question in that connection. I mean, the thing about a service economy is that services are overwhelmingly locally produced and consumed. There are very few global universities, for example, there are very few global high schools, very few global hospitals. That means that typically if you look at developed economies like the United States with big service sectors, the firms which tend to be local, the service firms that tend to be local, tend to be locally financed. So I assume you know that local banks in the United States are much more profitable than the big global banks. Do you see a comparable trend developing in China that you can take advantage of?

Li Lu: Some yes and some no. I wouldn’t say that…

Bruce Greenwald: No, I’m just thinking in terms of local experts within China (inaudible) local service businesses, that would include, of course, local banks.

Li Lu: Yeah, well, they tend to really know their local area. But the Chinese regulation in banking is slightly different. So there are only roughly about 15 banks that really have the mandate of being able to take deposit on a national basis. And all the rest of the financial institutions are able to really take deposits in a very, very small, well-defined local region. Whether they’re a town, or villages, or the cities, etc. And so it is a heavily, heavily regulated business. And so that really gives them almost an oligopoly type of a status in terms of taking deposit, which is very important and of course, in terms of the source of capital.

So that dynamic is a slightly different than the United States, for example. That the license ability to really be able to open a bank is much, much more relaxed in the United States than in China. As a result, basically the dynamics of the larger national versus local or regional banks and other financial institutions, are more driven by basically the business dynamics and market dynamics. And this is very different than in China. It is driven first and foremost by the regulation regime. And so, that makes the comparison of the banks really quite different in China than the United States.

Bruce Greenwald: So somebody investing in banks in China have to be an expert in Chinese regulation?

Li Lu: Absolutely.

Bruce Greenwald: A specialist?

Li Lu: Yes. (Inaudible) if you invest anything, I recommend you better become the most knowledgeable specialist on the planet before you really invest and hold it through the ups and downs and the thick and thins. And if you do understand them and they are good, it is far more profitable to hold over the long period of time.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok, so why don’t we talk more broadly about new trends in value investing? So among them many popular and rising technological fields such as 5G, Bitcoin, AI, has any of that attracted your interest as a value investor and why?

Li Lu: Well, as I said, if you’re an investor, you really want to find out what really influenced the change of your companies. The one big forces that are really quite prominent is the fast acceleration of technological changes. And of course, you need to be well aware of those mega technological trend. This current wave that started 40, 50 years since the invention of the semiconductor, particularly the integrated circuit, that really ultimately led to personal computer and computational proliferation, the computation power to ordinary citizens. And from there, there’s also the evolution of communication technologies and then the invention of the internet somewhere 25, 30 years ago. From there, the mobile internet.

So the intersections of computing as well as the omnipresent and instantaneous communication really led to this new phenomena of artificial intelligence and the data economy as a result of it. And so this wave of technological change over the last 40 years has fundamentally altered the business landscape of all kinds, basically. And so whatever kind of investor you are, we do need to be aware of these huge changes. And how do you deal with that in a sense? Well you’re investing in businesses that are either well insulated from those technological change or in companies whose management team is quite capable of adapting to those technological changes better than their competitors. Or in companies that are leading those changes or enabling changes so that those changes are really on your side. And so, now do you have to be a true expert to the point of an engineer? I don’t think you do, but you do need to be broadly aware of all of us have big technology changes. Now, if you happen to be a venture capitalist in those fields then of course you do, but if you’re a generalist and study all the businesses, you need to be aware of those trends. How does it really impact in the industry, in the companies that you’re invested in? So we are still really in the middle of that gigantic wave that started with the invention of the semiconductor.

Bruce Greenwald: By the way, do you know when the transistor was invented?

Li Lu: Well, that’s a longer I know that.

Bruce Greenwald: That was 1942.

Li Lu: Yes, yes, yes.

Bruce Greenwald: And the first (integrated circuit) was 1961.

Li Lu: Yes, yes. You’re referring to the time (technology) really gets integrated into industry. So that really started this whole revolution that we’re actually still in the middle of it. And the current wave of neural network based artificial intelligence is just kind of the recent iteration. And the data economy that as a result of it is the newest adaptation by industries in response to that new technology. We’re going to see more of it as time evolves from here.

Bruce Greenwald: Do you see opportunities to invest in new technologies? Do you have an example, maybe in your past where you did invest successfully in a new technology?

Li Lu: We have, in a sense, back in the days I was trying to learn about businesses, I invested in a number of startups. And so I am fascinated about the technologies. And today we have somewhat smaller exposure to that. But it is fascinating. It’s not really that (I’m) not interested in technology. It’s just that it’s not that easy to predict their impact because of the pace of change. It does require a different aptitude, different domain expertise, etc. The other things is we chose to have other set of easier opportunities. We just happened to be lucky.

Bruce Greenwald: All right. So let’s talk about a specific example. A lot of smart people believe that renewable energy is the next big revolution. And you’ve done a lot of work on battery technology and BYD. So is that something that you think about beyond batteries? What’s your outlook for the electrical vehicle industry say in the next five years, or is it overheated now? Where is Tesla going?

Li Lu: So the car industry is simultaneously kind of being impacted by you know, four or five big megatrends. Electrification, ride sharing, autonomous driving, and the intelligent design. All of those really going into the industry simultaneously. And so that really attracted more entrants and that really heated the competition. Also, against the broad background of climate change, the carbon neutral revolution in the sense. So as a result of the industry that really has last for 100 years is really being turned upside down. On the other side, it is a gigantic industry. So other than housing, that’s probably one of the biggest industry. So the prize is also in the end. In the process though, the competition is going to become very, very intense. Still it does still have that characteristic of being a scale economy, as we talked about it in the beginning of our dialogue. So the survivors or the winners do need to have a certain scale in order to be able to win in the end. So it is still early to predict who will be the ultimate winner, but it is not early at all to predict those mega trends are here to stay.

So five years there will be far more electric cars sold. We have seen the European countries began to declare a deadline to stop basically gasoline powered cars. China is following that up, I think, in due course. And we are going to see those megatrends here to stay. And five years from now, that trend will become even more prominent than what it is today. But it is very difficult to predict the ultimate winner…and it continues to attract new entrants at this point. But I do think that the ones that really possess unique technology, have the scale, and have the right strategic focus ultimately will do well.

Bruce Greenwald: Do you have a sense of which companies will do well?

Li Lu: Well I bet once. So I let my money speaker for itself. But we’re not going to be the only ones, there will be a few. It is a gigantic industry.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok, so in terms of value investing education, you actually played a big role in promoting and advocating value investing from the books to actually you underwrote this class that we talked about where I went to Peking University and I think it still survives. What’s your vision for the kind of education that a new investor should embrace and where that education might be available?

Li Lu: Well, first of all, thank you Bruce for coming to teach at the Peking University value investing classes that my colleague Jing Chang and I started six years ago. And now it’s six year and it’s still running and running very well. And you have played an important role to that. And I think our original inspiration for that class was really based on pretty much your class and your class was pretty much inspired and a continuation of Ben Graham’s class…Graham and Dodd, which had, among others, Warren Buffett as a student. And I’m your student. (There’ll) be many more much brighter investors coming after us. And that’s a good thing. So we’re trying to really do our part to pass on both the philosophy, the thinking, and the practical art of investing to the next generation, in a sense. So in terms of the younger students when you start today. So I think a few things will be important. When I talk to young students and people who started out trying to get into the field, I say several things that are important.

‘A’ to always adopt an owners mentality. And so I like to really ask a student or analyst at our firm basically to imagine that all of a sudden that one of your unknown uncles died and handed over 100% ownership of the company to you. And that’s the business you were going to study. So any company, think starting point that way. And once you really kind of think you own 100 percent of it, your mentality is totally different. So you never know that business existed, now you own 100%. You have no idea how to run it. You don’t know the people who run it. What do you do? You want to know everything, everything you can possibly get your hands on.

And a lot of the things you know, you don’t really understand. You just know the facts. You don’t understand it. But that’s OK. You’re going to continue to learn until you get a handle of it. And even if then because of the constant change, you’re going to continue to evolve your knowledge of it. Now, if you adopt that mentality, study any businesses, you have really started the process of becoming a real value investor. So that’s the first thing.

The second thing is you really want to maintain intellectual honesty. And that is very, very important. You have to be really honest about what you know, what you assume…what you pretend…subconsciously…and what you don’t know. How do you know that? One of the things that Charlie has talked about that I think makes the most sense is, (he’s) said that “I’m never entitled to have a view until I can find the smartest people on the planet who took the other side of that view and I can argue better the opposition than he does. When I can do that, I would be entitled to have a view.” The same thing applies to investing in a sense. That intellectual honesty is a good life philosophy to begin with. It is critical. It is vital when it comes to investment. Because, as I said, the security market almost exists to really find your weaknesses, your dishonesty, your pretension, your mushy knowledges. And if you do not really possess that fundamental attitude of intellectual honesty, you’ll get destroyed at some point during your career by the financial market. It was almost designed that way to catch you.

Bruce Greenwald: Can I say something about that? Because it is better than designed that way. Every time you buy a security thinking it’s going to do well, somebody else is selling you that security, thinking it’s going to do badly, and vice versa. And one of you is always wrong. So you better be sure that you’re the one that’s on the right side of that transaction.

Li Lu: Well, there is some zero-sum aspect, but not always.

Bruce Greenwald: Oh no! It’s 100% zero sum. The average return to all investors in any asset class and therefore in all those asset classes is the average return to all those assets.

Li Lu: Hey Bruce, I take a slightly different view. But I’m never going to argue against my professor, so let’s just agree to disagree on that point.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok. That’s fair. Keep going.

Li Lu: That is a fair point. Fair point. And another thing I want to say is that you want to really devote as much time as possible to study of the history of  businesses and the history of great businessmen in the past. The more you study more companies, the better you are when it comes to judgment on good opportunities and the judgment about the fundamental characteristic of the company you’re interested in. And so I say all three things are important. To start with the 100% owner mentality, to continue to train yourself, to have a high degree of intellectual honesty. And lastly, to be a very thorough student of the history of the businesses. All three things are really going to be very helpful if you are beginning to get into the field of investment or really want to improve your game. So that’s my advice to your students.

Bruce Greenwald: Good advice. I’m not going to argue with that. When you look back over your own career. Are there things that, whether at Columbia Business School or in your career since then, you would have done differently that would have helped you get to where you are today sort of more quickly and more easily?

Li Lu: Yeah, well looking back I feel I’m extraordinarily lucky and I feel nothing but gratitude. I feel lucky to accidentally step into Buffett’s lecture at your class, basically. The first time he came. I feel extraordinarily lucky that I got into the business and to strike a relationship with Charlie Munger. I feel extraordinarily fortunate to live in a period of time when both the United States and China are going through a fundamental economic growth and providing enormous amount of opportunity and that I happen to really know both markets well. And so looking back at my career, nothing I regret. I feel nothing but really gratitude. But in terms on the transition from U.S. to China. I think a lot of people, myself included, went through a period of time to really try to understand the nature of the Chinese economy and the nature of the Chinese market, the nature of the Chinese company…investment in Chinese companies.

So one of the key learnings that I have, and it is not that obvious, is the role that the Chinese government played in that whole equation. If you have been successful investor in the United States, for example, or in the developed market, you tend to come with a set of assumptions about the role of the government and the role of the market participants. And when you really look into the Chinese market, that assumptions, you will see a lot of challenges.

And so you might really, from time to time, arrive to views that are inconsistent with your own experiences, partially because historically the Chinese government and the U.S. Government, Western governments, perform very different roles. And that’s one of the key aspect of really investing in China that really requires much deeper understanding and also a systematic comparison to get rid of those biases. And that’s why that you could really get rid of this typical global investor (inaudible) fear or enthusiasm or basically pessimistic kind of ‘coming collapse of a China’ type of mentality when things are not going to at all. And so that is the education of most of the international investors, particularly when it comes to China that they have to go through. And that is important. But bearing in mind the other aspect to understand to the Chinese economy is that the nature of the modern economy is its ability to generate sustained, compounded economic growth, something that is only recently emerged as the human phenomena. And this is where we talk about the zero-sum versus win-win type of mentality.

Now for the longest period of time that almost all natural or human affairs are characterized by cycles in the sense that everything goes up cycles. You know, we’re born and then we grow old, and we die, or the trees it goes up and they die. So entropy basically, is always increased. Energy goes from hot to cold things. From order to disorder. Great businesses eventually loses its edge. So that is the nature of things. And economy goes from boom and bust.

But something unique happened over several hundred years ago with the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. We began to see this phenomenon of continued, sustained, compounded economic growth. And that is really when value investing become very important. And that’s why you begin to have a phenomenal record such as the one produced by Warren Buffett and now by a few other people as well. The basic logic behind that, as I said, over the long term, your investment returns are likely to approximate the actual business returns of the company you’ve invested in. And so the fact that you were capable of generating that long term results is a reflection of a changing nature of the economy. What really drives that phenomenon is something that is utterly fascinating. I literally spent 30, 40 years thinking about that. Until I think I come to a certain knowledge, I wouldn’t say really know it all, but I think what really produced in that phenomena is, is a combination of free market enterprise, way of organizing social economic affairs. And combine that one with the invention of modern science and technology, a combination of those two produced a modern form of economy. And it’s a paradigm shift.

So what has happened in China is that roughly around 40 years ago, China has really stumbled finally into that magic formula of free market economy. Now, with Chinese characteristic, of course, along with modern science and technology. And any economy that has really strike that magic formula, begins to produce the phenomenon of compounding economic performance. Now that has to be combined with the stability of overall political environment to allow the market force that a new economy to really release that power. And that is when a sustained investment record can be possible in China. It’s not always there, it’s not always possible. And often it was a zero sum. But I think from that period on, that a sustained win-win type of a compounded investment return becomes possible. And notice that I didn’t really include the political component of it. Most of the Western observers believe that political democracy has to be part of the equation, except they forgot that political democracy wasn’t there when that phenomenon began to take place in the West. In fact, the political democracy happened later, almost as a result, but not because of it. Anyways, so that is another layer of understanding the phenomena of investment opportunities in China that could be interesting.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok, so what about, let’s just talk briefly in these last eight or so minutes about your personal interest. So you’ve devoted efforts to improving equality and welfare for Asian-Americans. And given the recent elevated attention on this community, what are you doing and planning to do or you think ought to be done for that community?

Li Lu: Well, I was really, like many people around the Asian-American community in America, just utterly dismayed, heartbroken over the last year and a half. Particularly since the later years of the Trump administration, it got worsened because of the pandemic, this new wave of anti-Asian hate crimes. And by all statistics that instance of racial discrimination against Asian-Americans has dramatically increased over the last year and a half. For a variety of different reasons. The pandemic, the Trump policies, the U.S./China tension, and the systematic historical root. Suffice to say that many people in Asian-American community are living in fears, literally physical fears today after being here for so many years, of being such an important part of the American experiment. Particularly to the Chinese American community. After 150 years, it feels like the Chinese Exclusion Act has come back again. And so I have been thinking long and hard at what can we do to change the paradigm? Now I had a different experiences when I came to America. I had a wonderful, wonderful experiences. America embraced me with open, warm heart. And I have gotten an enormous amount of opportunities like Columbia University and all the great people I met along the way. And the opportunity I was given to be successful way beyond my wildest dreams when I first came here as an immigrant. Not a penny and nobody to speak the language, to be where I am today.

And so one thing that I always believed about America is this. I think America is not defined by geography. It is not defined by race. It is not defined by a culture. Not defined by religion. America is defined by a set of ideas and ideals. Anyone, no matter your race, religion, culture, background, if you sign up to that set of ideas, ideals, can be America. I was one of those who believe in those ideas and ideals that became a successful American. And I want that experiment to really continue. And obviously, when you look at history, it was never a perfect experiment. In that it was often marked by the (inaudible), and sometimes actually outright cruel, malicious, if you think about it, experiences with the African Americans and all the other minorities. But I think America remains the only country on Earth, so inspired and such constructed. And for that experiment to continue, it calls constantly to our better angels inside each one of us. And to really restrict the worst instincts of all of us. And throughout a different period of time, people need to rise up to counter those worst instinct and fight them and face them down.

And this is one of those periods again. So I think the entire community of Asian-Americans have to come together. The entire American community need to really come together to really fight this wave of Anti-Asian discrimination. So along with a number of wonderful colleagues, we are cofounding a new national organization whose mission is to serve Asian-Americans in their pursuit of belonging and prosperity. Free from discrimination, slander or violence. And one of the things that our (inaudible) needs is, an enormous amount of funding. The statistics tell us that only 0.2% of all philanthropy in America goes to Asian-American causes. And we want to fundamentally change that. And hopefully with this new organization, new group of people, we really want to fundamentally change that picture.

And the other thing is that with the global economy, the center of the global economy shifting from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, Asian American, 20 million strong are going to play an increasingly important role to position America as the new Pacific economic power. And that group of people more than other ones, if fully integrated as the very fabric of American society, could help lead America to better integrated with the better economic ties in Asia.

Bruce Greenwald: Ok Li Lu. That’s terrific. It’s a great note to end on. Unfortunately, we have two minutes left. Thank you very much for this really encyclopedic and enlightening talk. I think I have to turn it back over, however, to the M.C. For the last two minutes.

Li Lu: Ok. Thank you for really having that class 28 years ago, without that class I wouldn’t know what I’m doing today, so thank you.

End of Transcript

Thank you for reading. I hope you all thoroughly enjoyed the transcript. If you found any errors, kindly let me know and I will fix them. Furthermore, if you’d like to be informed of future posts, transcripts, or events, please subscribe.

Sincerely,

Richard Lewis, CFA
White Stork Asset Management LLC
Partner, Investments

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Charlie Munger: Full Transcript of Daily Journal Annual Meeting 2019

Last month I had the great pleasure of hearing Charlie Munger speak at the Daily Journal Annual Meeting for the fourth time.  Once again, the wit and wisdom of Charlie Munger was on full display at the deceptively youthful age of 95.

In addition to the transcript provided below, you may also watch the entire meeting on YouTube, or listen to it through my audio recording on SoundCloud.

I would like to thank Mr. Munger for energetically entertaining our questions and graciously sharing his wisdom, insights, and time with all of us.

I hope you all enjoy!

(Note: You will find that I frequently summarized the questions from the audience, but as for anything that Charlie, Gerry, or Peter said, I translated them verbatim and as accurately as possible.)

Start of Transcript

Charlie: Gerry, is there anything else that I’m suppose to do?

Gerry Salzman: That’s it Charlie.

Charlie: It’s very burdensome. (laughter) So many of you have come from such great distances (that) I’m going to speak briefly on a number of topics that may interest you and then I’m going to take questions.

It’s amazing the number of people at the meeting of the little Daily Journal Corporation which after all is a pretty small operation. We’ve got two businesses one a steadily declining legal newspaper which now earns about a million in a year pre-tax and shrinking, and a computer software business where we’re trying to automate courts and justice agencies and various other governmental departments. And that is now bigger by far in terms of prospects and customers and employees and so forth than our shrinking newspaper business. It hardly can be imagined how hard it is to deal with a whole bunch of different courts in different states and their advisers and the RFP process and the bureaucracy. This is a part of the software business that the giants tend to hate. They like a business where you just stamp out an extra copy of something and 98 percent of the revenues go immediately into the till as cash and there’s no extra work. And that is not handling a bunch of justice agencies, attorney generals, state courts, federal courts, and so forth all over the country with different requirements, different consultants, and of course steady and aggressive competition. The nature of our business it’s more like technical consulting than it is just stamping out software. It’s a very high service business. It’s very difficult. The computer science is time consuming and difficult. But just dealing with that much bureaucracy over that many different fields with the political realities…it’s just immensely difficult. So it’s a very slow grinding business and that’s the nature of the game. We have always liked it because a business like this requires a company that’s very rich and very determined and is willing to keep plugging. And of course that’s what the Daily Journal has done.

How are we doing? Well that’s hard to judge, but I would say watching it quite closely that it’s like a pharmaceutical company with seven wonderful drugs in the pipeline. We have a lot in the pipeline that is very very important to us. Australia, Canada, California. We’re talking big big markets.

Our main competitor is Tyler Technologies which is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and of course they’ve been at it a long time and are way bigger, but we are getting some significant volume and we have some very pleased customers. How in the hell does the little Daily Journal Corporation attract the Government of Australia? Australia is a big place. But I’ve gotten to love the Australians and I think it’s going to succeed in Australia, mightily. And so it takes a long time and it’s hard work and it’s also very difficult work. Not everybody can do this. Just the mass of complexity. We would never be where we are if we didn’t have Gerry Salzman to do everything he’s done over the last ten years. Anybody else would have failed at this. Now Gerry is 80 and he and I have one thing in common, we both use canes. When I’m not in a wheelchair I use a cane. So the idea of taking on the whole world when the chairman is 95 and the vice chairman is 89 and the chief executive that does all the work is 80 and uses a cane…It’s a very peculiar place that you people have come a long way to. What the hell are you thinking about? (laughter)

It’s weird and what’s happened of course is that we’re standing a bit for some combination of basic morality and sturdy common sense. And it’s amazing how well Berkshire Hathaway, and the Daily Journal for that matter, have succeeded with nothing more than basic morality and sturdy common sense. But of course when people talk about common sense they mean ‘uncommon sense’. Every time you hear that somebody has a lot of common sense it means he’s got uncommon sense. And it is much harder to have common sense than it is generally thought.

Let me give you an interesting example. The investment world involves an enormous amount of high IQ people trying to be more skillful than normal. You can hardly imagine another activity that gets so much attention. And weird things have happened. Years ago one of our local investment counseling shops, a very big one, they were looking for a way to get an advantage over other investment counseling shops. And they reasoned as follows. We’ve got all these brilliant young people from Wharton and Harvard and so forth and they work so hard trying to understand business and market trends and everything else. And if we just ask each one of our most brilliant men for their single best idea then created a formula with this collection of best ideas, we would outperform averages by a big amount. And that seem plausible to them because they were ill-educated. That’s what happens when you go to Harvard and Wharton. So they tried it out, and of course it failed utterly. So they tried it again and it failed utterly. And they tried it a third time and it also failed. Of course what they were looking for is the equivalent of the alchemists of centuries ago who wanted to turn lead into gold. They thought if you could just buy a lot of led and waive your magic wand over and it turned into gold, that would be a good way to make money. This counseling shop was looking for the equivalent of turning lead into gold and of course it didn’t work. I could’ve told them but they didn’t ask me. Nothing.

The interesting thing about this situation is that this is a very intelligent group of people that’s come from all over the world. You’ve got a lot of bright people from China where people tend to average out a little smarter. And the issue is very simple. It’s a simple question. Why did that plausible idea fail? Just think about it for a minute. You’ve all been to fancy educational institutions. I’ll bet you there’s hardly one in the audience who knows why that thing failed. That’s a pretty ridiculous demonstration I’m making. How could you not know that? It’s one of the main activity of America with an obvious and important failure. Surely we can explain it! You have to have stayed awake in your freshman college courses to answer that question. But if you ask that question at a Department of Finance at a leading place, the professors wouldn’t answer it right. Now I’m going to leave you that question because I want you perplexed. (Laughter) And I will go on to another issue.

But that’s one you should be able to answer. It shows how hard it is to be rational on something very simple. How hard it is…How many kind of crazy ideas people have and don’t work, and you don’t even know why they don’t work even though it’s perfectly obvious if you’ve been properly educated. And by the way my definition of being properly educated is being right when the professor is wrong. Anybody can spit back what the professor tells you. The trick is to know when he’s right and when he’s wrong. That’s the properly educated person. And of course they’re frequently wrong particularly in the soft sciences. In fact if you look at a modern elite institution, it’s fair to say that a lot of the faculty are a little crazy. It’s so left wing now in the humanities and it’s very peculiar. That’s another thing. Why should 90 percent of the college professors in the humanities be very left wing? I leave that question for you too. But it happens.

Another issue of course that’s happened in the world of stock picking, where all this money and effort goes into trying to be rational, is that we’ve had a really horrible thing happen to the investment counseling class. And that is these index funds have come along and they basically beat everybody. And not only that, the amount by which they beat everybody is roughly the amount of cost of running the operation and making the changes in investments. So you have a whole profession that is basically being paid for accomplishing practically nothing. This is very peculiar. This is not the case with bowel surgery or even the criminal defense bar in the law or something. They have a whole profession where the chosen activity they’ve selected they can’t do anything.

Now in the old days the people in the profession always had some of this problem and they rationalized as follows. ‘We are saving our clients from the insurance salesman and the stock broker, the standard stock broker that serves the active trader.’ And they were saving people from the life insurance salesman and the hustling stockbroker who liked active trading. And I suppose in a sense that the investing class is still saving those people from an even worse fate.

But it is very peculiar when a whole profession that works so hard, and is so admirable, and the members of which we are delighted when they marry into our families, and they just can’t do what their profession is really trying to do, which is get better than average results. How is that profession handling this terrible situation, as index investing gets more and more popular and including a lot of fancy places?

Well it’s a very simple answer, they’re handling it with denial. They have a horrible problem they can’t fix, so they just treat it as nonexistent. This is a very stupid way to handle a problem. Now it may be good when you’re thinking about your own death which you can’t fix and it’s just denial all the way to the end. But in all the practical fields of life, this problem thoroughly understood is half solved or better coped with.

So it’s wrong to have all these people in just a state of denial and doing what they always did year after year and hoping that the world would keep paying them for it even though an unmanaged index is virtually certain to do better. It’s a very serious problem. And think of how much New York say needs a flow of money from finance. Think what would happen to Manhattan if there weren’t any fees for investment management or trading spreads and so on. So it’s a weird situation and of course it’s unpleasant. Big investment counseling shops, some of them shrink and some go out of business. And the value investors, of course who many of I know because we came from that tradition, the value investors who were honorable are quitting. Boom. Boom. Boom. And what worked for them for years stopped working and they’re honorable people they just quit. And they’re also rich which makes it easy. But those who aren’t rich have a hell of a problem. And it costs about fifty thousand dollars in the city of Manhattan to send your kid to pre-school. Non-deductible. And that’s just the start of an endless procession of years of vast expanse. So if your game is money management you have a serious problem. I don’t have any solution for this problem. I do think that index investing, if everybody did it won’t work. But for another considerable period, index investing is going to work better than active stock picking where you try and know a lot.

Now at a place like Berkshire Hathaway or even the Daily Journal, we’ve done better than average. And now there’s a question, why has that happened? Why has that happened? And the answer is pretty simple. We tried to do less. We never had the illusion we could just hire a bunch of bright young people and they would know more than anybody about canned soup and aerospace and utilities and so on and so on and so on. We never had that dream. We never thought we could get really useful information on all subjects like Jim Cramer pretends to have. (laughter) We always realized that if we worked very hard we can find a few things where we were right. And that a few things were enough. And that that was a reasonable expectation. That is a very different way to approach the process. And if you had asked Warren Buffett the same thing that this investment counseling did, “Give me your best idea this year.”, and you had just followed Warren’s best idea, you would find it worked beautifully. But he wasn’t trying to know the whole…he would give you one or two stocks. He had more limited ambitions.

I had a grandfather who was very useful to me, my mother’s grandfather, and he was a pioneer. He came out to Iowa with no money but youth and health and took it away from the Indians. He fought in the Black Hawk…he was a Captain in the Black Hawk Wars, and he stayed there and he bought cheap land and he was aggressive and intelligent and so forth and eventually he was the richest man in the town and owned the bank, and highly regarded, and a huge family, and a very happy life. He had the attitude…having come out to Iowa when the land was not much more than a dollar an acre, and having stayed there until that black topsoil created a modern rich civilization, and some of the best land in the world…His attitude was that in a favored life like his, when you were located in the right place, you just got a few opportunities if you lived to be about 90. And that the trick in coming out well was seizing a few opportunities that were your fair share that came along when they did. And he told that story over and over again to the grandchildren that hung around him all summer, and my mother who had no interest in money remembered the story and told it to me. But I’m not my mother’s natural imitator and I knew Grandpa Ingham  was right. And so I always knew from…when I was a little boy that the opportunities that were important…that were gonna come to me…were few and the trick was to prepare myself for seizing the few that came. This is not the attitude that they have at a big investment counseling thing. They think if they study a million things they can know a million things. And of course the result is that almost nobody can outperform an index. Whereas I sit here with my Daily Journal stock, my Berkshire Hathaway stock, my holdings in Li Lu’s Asian fund, my Costco stock, and of course I’m outperforming everybody. (laughter) And I’m ninety-five years old. And I practically never have a transaction. And the answer is that I’m right and they’re wrong. And that’s why it’s worked for me and not for them. And now the question is do you want to be more like me or more like them?

The idea of diversification makes sense to a point if you don’t know what you’re doing and you want the standard result and not be embarrassed, why course you can widely diverse. Nobody’s entitled to a lot of money for recognizing that because it’s a truism it’s like knowing that two and two equals four. But the investment professionals think they’re helping you by arranging diversification. An idiot could diversify a portfolio! Or a computer for that matter. But the whole trick of the game is to have a few times when you know that something is better than average and to invest only where you have that extra knowledge. And then if you get just a few opportunities that’s enough. What the hell do you care if you own three securities and J.P. Morgan Chase owns a hundred? What’s wrong with owning a few securities? Warren always says that if you lived in a growing town and you owned stock in three of the best enterprises in the town, isn’t that diversified enough? The answer is of course it is…if they’re all wonderful places. And that Fortune’s formula which got so famous which was a formula to tell people how much to bet on each transaction if you had an edge. And of course the bigger your edge, the more close the transaction was to a certain winner, the more you should bet…And of course there’s mathematics behind it…But of course it’s true. It’s perfectly possible to buy only one thing because the opportunity is so great and it’s such a cinch. There are only two or three. So the whole idea of diversification when you’re looking for excellence, is totally ridiculous. It doesn’t work. It gives you an impossible task. What fun is it to do an impossible task over and over again? I find it agony. Who would want to do it? And I don’t see a way…

My father had a client, he was a lawyer in Omaha, he had a client whose husband had a little soap company. The guy died and my father’s sold the soap company. This woman was one of the richest people in town in the middle of the depression, and what she had was a little soap company and the biggest mansion in Omaha’s best neighborhood. When they sold the soap company she had a mansion in the best neighborhood and three hundred thousand dollars. But three hundred thousand dollars in nineteen thirty something was an incredible amount of money. A little hamburger it was a nickel a big hamburger was a dime, and the all you can eat cafe in Omaha would feed you all needed to stay alive for two bits a day. I mean 300,000… Well she didn’t hire an investment counselor, she didn’t do anything, she’s a wonderful old woman. She just took that, she divided it into five chunks, and she bought five stocks. I remember three of them because I probated her estate. One of them was General Electric, one was Dow, one was Dupont, and I forget the other two. Then she never changed those stocks. She never paid any adviser. She never did anything, and she bought some municipal bonds, she never spent her income, and she bought some municipal bonds from time to time with the (inaudible). By the time she died in the 50s she had a million and a half dollars. No cost. No expenses. I said, “How did you decide to do that?” And “Well…” she said, “I thought electricity and chemistry were the coming things.” She just chucked it all in and sat on her ass. I always liked that little old woman. My kind of a girl. But it’s rare!

But if you stop to think about it, think of all the expense and palaver that she didn’t have to listen to and all the trouble she avoided, and zero costs. And of course what people don’t realize, because they’re so mathematically illiterate, is if you make 5 percent and pay 2 of it to your advisors, you’re not losing 40 percent of your future you’re losing 90 percent. Because over a long period of time that little difference causes a 90 percent disadvantage to you. So it’s hugely important for somebody who’s a long term holder not to be paying a big annual toll out of the performance. And of course there are a few big time advisors now who are using indexation very heavily. And of course they’re prospering mightily. And of course every time they get somebody it’s just agony for the rest of the investment counseling business. This is a very serious problem. And I think these people who were used to winning as old-time value investors who are now just quitting the profession. That’s a very understandable thing to do. I regarded it as more noble than staying in…you know…playing along with the denial. It’s an interesting problem.

You can see I’m not trying to make your morning. I’m just trying to describe things the way they are. But this business… Why does Li Lu succeed so mightily? Well partly he’s sort of a Chinese Warren Buffet. That really helps. And partly he’s fishing in China! Not in this over-searched, over-populated, highly competitive American market, and there’s still pockets of ignorance and lassitude in China that gave him so unusual opportunities. The first rule in fishing has always been fish where the fish are. And the second rule of fishing has always been ‘Don’t forget rule number one’. And Li Lu just went where the fishing was good and the rest of us are like cod fishermen who are trying to catch cod where the fish have been fished out. It doesn’t matter how much you work, when there’s that much competition. Every little idea I see in the world some are going after. I sat once on an investment committee at the University of Michigan and in came one of their successful investors located in London. And what had this investor done in London? He decided to invest in sub-Saharan Africa. And the only marginal securities were a few banks that traded in the Pink Sheets, so he would buy very tiny quantities of these banks. And every time some poor person got tired of having their money in the mattress and put it in a bank he did a little better. And of course he made a lot of money. Nobody else was investing in little tiny banks in Africa. But the niche was soon filled. What the hell do you do for an encore after you put your client’s money in a bunch of little tiny banks in sub-Saharan Africa? The niche gets filled quickly. How many wonderful niches are there going to be when some guy in London is buying all these tiny little bank stocks in Africa? It’s hard.

Then if you take the modern world where people are trying to teach you how to come in and trade actively in stocks. Well I regard that as roughly equivalent to trying to induce a bunch of young people to start off on heroin. It is really stupid. And when you’re already rich to make your money by encouraging people to get rich by trading? And then there are people on the TV, another wonderful place, and they say, “I have this book that will teach you how to make 300 percent a year. All you have to do is pay for shipping and I will mail it to you!” (laughter) How likely is it that a person who suddenly found a way to make 300 percent a year would be trying to sell books on the internet to you! (laughter) It’s ridiculous. And yet I’ve described modern commerce. And the people who do this all day think they’re useful citizens. The advertising agents who invent the lingo. In insurance they say, “Well” they say, “the two people who shifted from Geico to the Glotz insurance company save four hundred dollars each.” But what they don’t tell is that there are only two such people in the whole United States and they were both nuts. But they mislead you on purpose. I get tired of it and I don’t think it’s right that we deliberately mislead people as much as we do.

Let me tell you another story that I think is an interesting one about the modern life, but this goes back to a different time. This man has this wonderful horse. And it’s just a marvelous horse. It’s got an easy gait, good looking, and everything. It just works wonderfully. But also occasionally it just gets so he’s dangerous and vicious and causes enormous damage and trouble and breaks arms and legs for his rider and so on. And he goes to vet and says, “What can I do about this horse?” And the vet says, “That’s a very easy problem and I’m glad to help you.” And he says, “What should I do?” And the man says, “The next time your horse is behaving well, sell it.” (laughter) Think about it immoral that is. And haven’t I just described what private equity has to do? (laughter) When private equity has to sell something that’s really troublesome, they hire an investment banker. And what does investment banker do? He makes a projection! I have never seen such expertise in my whole life, as is created in making projections in investment banking. There is no business so lousy that it can’t get a wonderful projection. But is that a great way to make a living to have phony projections and use it to make money out of people you look right into their eyes of? I would say no.

By and large Warren and I, we never tried to make money out…stupidity of our dumb buyers. We tried to make money by buying, and if we were selling horseshit we didn’t want to pretend it was a cure for arthritis. (laughter) And I think it’s better to go through life our way instead of theirs. I think it’s always been this way, I think there’s always been chicanery. Think of the carnivals, the carny operator. Think of how much trickery there is in a carny operation. People just seek out the weaknesses of their fellow man and take advantage. And you have to get wise enough so you avoid them all. And you can’t avoid them if they’re in your family. I have no solution to that one. (laughter) But where you have a fair choice, there are just so many people that should be avoided.

My father had this best friend and client and he also had this other client who is a big blowhard and he was always working for the big blowhard and he wasn’t ever working for his wonderful client whom I admired. And I said, “Why do you do this?” And he said, “Charlie you idiot…” He says, “the big blowhard is an endless source of legal troubles. He’s always in trouble. Overreaching and misbehaving and so forth. Whereas Grant McFadden treats everybody right. The employees, the customers, everything. And if he gets involved with some psychotic he walks over there and makes a graceful exit immediately. A man like that doesn’t need a lawyer.” My father was trying to teach me something and it really worked. I spent my whole life trying to be like Grant McFadden and I want to tell you it works. It really works. Peter Kaufman is always telling me if the crooks only knew how much money you could make by being honest, they’d all behave differently. Warren has a wonderful saying that I like, he says, “You take the high road. It’s never crowded.” And it’s worked.

Take the Daily Journal Corporation. We made quite a few millions of dollars out of the foreclosure boom because we published legal notices and we dominated the publication of foreclosure notices in the worst real estate depression in the history of modern times. And we could have raised our prices at the time and made more tens of millions of dollars. But we didn’t do it. You know what your fellow citizens are losing their damn houses in the worst recession…’Charlie Munger billionaire raises prices’. It would look lousy on the front page of the paper (if people read the story). Should you do it? And the answer is no of course not. Warren always said it’s probably always a mistake to marry for money and it’s really stupid if you’re already rich.

And it’s really stupid when you’re already rich to get a reputation of being a total nogoodnik. Rick Guerin always loved the story about the guy who had been a total miscreant all his life, and (when) he died the minister said, “Now is the time in the funeral ceremony when somebody says something nice about the deceased.” And nobody came forward and nobody came forward and nobody came forward. Finally one guy stood up and he said, “Well” he said, “His brother was worse.” (laughter) Well you can laugh but there are people like that. When Harry Cohn died here the saying was that everybody went to the funeral to make sure he was dead.

So there are a few simple truths that really work. And when it gets to this difficult business the Daily Journal is in, I wouldn’t say it is a real pleasure to be serving these courts and agencies. They need the automation. Other people are trying to take advantage of them in ways that we aren’t. And we’re struggling against the odds (being) a little tiny company. And we’re taking a lot of territory. It’s slow going but the prospects are good. And of course the nice thing about being rich is that it doesn’t matter if it’s a little slow. And how do we get rich? Well we remembered Grandpa Ingham, and when one of the few opportunities came along we reached out and seized it. Think of how your life works?

In my life, to give another example, the Mungers would have twice the assets they now have if I hadn’t made one mistake of omission back in nineteen 70s. And…really stupid. I blew an opportunity that would have doubled my present net worth. That is a normal life. You get one or two. And how things work out…We all know people that are out married, I mean their spouses are so much better. Think of what a good decision that was for them. And what a lucky decision. Way more important than money. A lot of them did it when they were young, they just stumbled into it. Now you don’t have to stumble into it, you can be very careful. A lot of people are wearing signs, “Danger. Danger. Do not touch.” And people just charged right ahead. (laughter) That’s a mistake. Well you can laugh but it’s still a horrible mistake.

It’s been fun for the people on this board to know one another and work on these oddball things and handle life’s vicissitudes. Of course it’s very peculiar that we’re so old. I mean imagine a place where Gary Wilcox is one of the young men. The guy’s wife is still in golf champion. But that’s (not because she’s good when she’s old.) I mean it’s an amazing group. That’s an interesting example too. Imagine me as an old and as impaired as I am and having a pretty good time. How does that happen? Well you…That is another story.

I’ll tell a couple of other stories too because you like stories. Here’s an apocryphal story that is very instructive. A young man comes to visit Mozart. And he says, “Mozart” he says, “I want to write symphonies”. And Mozart says, “How old are you?” The man says, “I’m 23.” And Mozart says, “You’re too young to write symphonies.” And he says, “But Mozart you were writing symphonies when you were 10 years old.” And Mozart says, “Yes but I wasn’t asking other people how to do it.” Now there’s another Mozart story. Here’s the greatest musical talent maybe that ever lived. And what was his life like? Well he was bitterly unhappy and he died young. That’s the life of Mozart. What the hell did Mozart do to screw it up? Well he did two things that are guaranteed to create a lot of misery. He overspent his income scrupulously, that’s number one. That is really stupid. And the other thing was he was full of jealousies and resentments. If you over-spend your income and be full of jealousy and resentments, you’re going to have a lousy unhappy life and die young. All you’ve got to do is learn from Mozart. You can also learn from that young man who was asking Mozart how to write symphonies. The truth of the matter is that not everybody can learn everything. Some people are way they hell better. And of course no matter how hard you try there’s always some guy who achieves more. Some guy or gal. My attitude is ‘so what?’. Does any of us need to be the very top of the whole world? It’s ridiculous.

Another thing that people do that I regard as amazing is they build these enormous mausoleums. I think they figure they want people to walk by that mausoleum and say, “Gosh I wish I were in there!”. (laughter)

Anyway. You can see we’ve have had some fun as we go along and it’s worked so well. But if you actually figure out how many decisions were made in the history of the Daily Journal Corporation or the history of Berkshire Hathaway it wasn’t very many per year that were meaningful. It’s a game of being there all the time and recognizing the rare opportunity when it comes and recognizing that the normal human allotment is to not have very many. Now it’s a very competent bunch of people who sell securities who act as though they’ve got an endless supply of wonderful opportunities. Well those people are the equivalent of the race track tout. They’re not even respectable. It’s not a good way to live your life to pretend to know a lot of stuff you don’t know and pretend to furnish a lot of opportunities you’re not furnishing. And my advice to you is avoid those people, but not if you’re running a stock brokerage firm. You need them. But it’s not the right way to make money. This business of controlling the costs and living simply, that was the secret. Warren and I had tiny little bits of money. We always underspent our incomes and invested. And if you live long enough you end up rich. It’s not very complicated.

Now there is a part of life which is, how do you scramble out of your mistakes without them costing too much? And we’ve done some of that too. If you look at Berkshire Hathaway, think of its founding businesses. A doomed department store, doomed New England textile company, and a doomed trading stamp company. Out of that came Berkshire Hathaway. Now we handled those losing hands pretty well when we bought into them very cheaply. But of course the success came from changing our ways and getting into the better businesses. It isn’t that we were so good at doing things that were difficult. We were good at avoid things that were difficult. Finding things that are easy.

By the way, when we bought the Daily Journal that was easy. What we’re doing now in this software business is difficult. But due to the accident of these good associations and the fact that these old colleagues have lived so long, we’re doing pretty well in the new business. It has potential. And it’s fun to do. How many declining newspapers have hundreds of millions of marketable securities lying around and a new business with some promise? We’re like the last of the Mohicans. (laughter)

Well I’ll take some questions now. We need some system of order.

Question 1: In the book outsiders William Thorndike lists eight CEOs that achieved superlative performance to the S&P 500 and their peers, so other than Mr. Buffett and Mr. Murphy, did Berkshire or you invest in the other six companies? And if not, why?

Charlie: Well I can’t answer that question, I don’t know the others six companies. But I would say, generally speaking as things have gotten tougher, we’ve been better at sitting on our asses with what we have than we have in buying new ones. It’s been hard to buy new ones. We haven’t bought a whole company of any size since we bought the truck stop operator. So if you’re having trouble with the present time with anything, join the club.

Question 2: Could you please comment on proposed legislation in Washington to restrict or tax share buybacks.

Charlie: Oh…(laughter)…Well. Rick tells a story about an old Irishman that used to steal from the church and drunk all the time. And when he’s dying the priest asked him to renounce the devil. And he said I can’t do that because in my condition I shouldn’t offend anybody. And I don’t think I should…If you get me started on politicians, I may be impolitic. So let’s go on to another subject.

Question 3: My question is about smaller banks. If you look at banks with assets greater than about a billion dollars in the U.S. and go up and stop at the super regional level, there’s about 250 of those banks. And my question is, is that a hunting ground that you would think, applying the principles of value investing, is likely to yield one or two great businesses?

Charlie: Well thank you for answering that question, the answer is yes.

Question 4: You and Warren have advocated for decades that CEOs should tell shareholders everything they need to know to value a business. From visiting and calling courthouses around the country, I’ve personally seen the success that you’ve had being awarded contracts against larger competitors for JTI. However your opaqueness regarding contracts that have been awarded but not completed leaves a wide range that an estimated value could fall for. So if a shareholder unwilling to cold call 50 courts around the country to find these contracts that haven’t been accepted yet, could you please provide a little bit of detail for us shareholders as far as the willingness for courts to accept these? Have you had any contracts that haven’t been accepted after you put in the work?

Charlie: Well we’ve got contracts or possible contracts at every stage you could imagine. And it’s very complicated and I don’t purport to understand each one because I’ve trusted Gerry and the people who are doing it. But generally speaking I can see that the trend is favorable. But more than that I can only say you would be horrified if you watched it up close how difficult it is. It’s difficult. But in spite of its difficulties we’re doing pretty well. But we haven’t got any magic wand. If you read all the reports…If I read all the reports in great detail and spent all my effort trying to understand it, I wouldn’t understand it very well. So I think your chances are very poor.

Question 5: One of my favorite lines from you is you want to hire the guy with the IQ of 130 that thinks it’s 120 and the guy with an IQ of 150 who thinks it’s 170 will just kill you.

Charlie: You must be thinking about Elon Musk.

Question 5 (continued…): How do you assess someone when making a hiring decision?

Charlie: Of course I want the guy who understands his limitations instead of the guy who doesn’t. On the other hand I’ve learned something terribly important in life. I learned that from Howard Ahmanson. You know what he used to say? “Never underestimate the man who overestimates himself.” These weird guys who overestimate themselves occasionally knock it right out of the park. And that is a very unhappy part of modern life. But I’ve learned to adjust to it. I have no alternative. It happens all the time. But I don’t want my personal life to be a bunch of guys who are living in a state of delusion, who happen occasionally to win big. I want the prudent person.

Question 6: What did you see in Li Lu versus other investors in China? Because in his biography it looks like he’s more of an outsider. And how similar or different is he versus Todd Combs and Ted Weschler? And Is there any reason why you gave that interview last year with Li Lu in China?

Charlie: Well I did it because he asked me and I sometimes do that, I am foolish that way. And I said what I believed when they asked me the questions. The answer is Li Lu is not a normal…He’s the Chinese Warren Buffet. He’s very talented. Of course I’ve enjoyed bagging him, but it’s interesting that way…I’m ninety five years…I’ve given Munger money to some outsider to run once in ninety five years. And it’s Li Lu, and of course he’s hit it out of the park. It’s very remarkable but it’s also pretty picky. And of course once I’ve got Li Lu if I’m comparing to him, who else am I going to pick? And by the way that’s a good way to make decisions and that’s what we do. If we’ve got one thing we can do more of, we’re not interested in anything that’s not better than that. That simplifies life a great deal because there aren’t that many people better than Li Lu. So I just sit. It’s amazing how intelligent it is to spend some time just sitting. A lot of people are way too active.

Question 7: Good morning Mr. Munger. You said in the past that you expect the U.S. to adopt a single payer health care system or Medicare for all the next time that Democrats control all three branches of government…

Charlie: I Do, yes.

Question 7 (continued): What will this mean for health insurers, hospitals, and medical device companies?

Charlie: Well it will be a hell of a mess. It’ll still be a big business but it will be a hell of a mess. The existing system is so over expensive and over complicated and has so much unnecessary cost. So much unnecessary overtreatment of the dying. So much overtreatment of items that would be best left alone. So much unnecessary expense. Yet on the other hand it’s the best system there is in the world in terms of the quality at the top. So it’s a very complicated subject, but it’s a hell of a mess. I find it demoralizing to see in Singapore they spend 20 percent of what we spend in America on medical care and their system is way better. And what they’re doing is just the most elemental common sense. But of course it was created by one Chinese guy who was in control. Of course it’s more intelligent than the outcome of our political process.

That Singapore system was created by Lee Kuan Yew. Of course it works better. But to have it cost 20 percent and work better in an advanced place likes Singapore…So there’s a lot to be demoralized about in terms of the potential of our medical care system. And of course it isn’t that our politicians are good at fixing systems like that. So if you don’t like it now, I confidently predict you won’t like it later either. (laughter)

Question 8: I read a lot of the stoic philosophers last year. Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius…

Charlie: Well I can see why you would. There’s a lot to be stoic about. (laughter)

Question 8 (Continued): And as I glean lessons from them there was one name that kept coming to mind, that is Munger, Munger, Munger….

Charlie: Well some people think that Marcus Aurelius is all right. (laughter)

Question 8: Can you talk to me about the influence that the Stoics had on you and some of your favorite advice from them.

Charlie: A lot. A lot have had (a lot of influence) on me, including Epictetus who started as a slave. No I like those old Stoics. And part of the secret of a long life that’s worked as well as mine is not to expect too much of human nature. It’s almost bound to be a lot of defects and problems. And to have your life full of seething resentments and hatreds, it’s counterproductive. You’re punishing yourself and not fixing the world. Can you think of anything much more stupid than trying to fix the world in a way that ruins yourself and doesn’t fix the world? It’s pretty stupid. I just don’t do it. I have a rule for politicians. It’s a stoic rule…I always reflect that politicians are never so bad, you don’t live to want them back. When I was young, the California legislature was full of small time insurance brokers and lawyers looking for an unfair advantage. They were being entertained by restaurants with prostitutes and bars, by racetracks, and liquor distributors and so on and so on. Fade in fade out. We have a different kind of a legislature now, and I just want all those old crooks and lobbyists and prostitutes back. (laughter) You laugh but you young people, you’re going to live to wish…Nancy Pelosi and Donald Trump we’re immortal. (laughter)

Question 9: Could you share a reading recommendation for us, potentially a new one, that maybe fundamentally change your viewpoint on something?

Charlie: Well there are very few ninety-five year olds that are changing their viewpoint on things. But I do find that there are amusing anecdotes and so forth that I occasionally read and like. But I like the old anecdotes pretty well too. Like that one about the vet and the horse. It’s so obvious though, some of these pithy stories. The storytelling really works to get messages around. One of the interesting things is look at our modern politicians and then think about Abraham Lincoln. (Which) modern politician reminds you of Abraham Lincoln? In either party? Lincoln at one time was hired by some guy whose partner had died, leaving practically no money to a wife and three children. And he owed some money to his surviving partner and the surviving partner came to Lincoln and said, “I want you to collect this money.” And Lincoln said to this guy, he says, “Well” he says, “You look like an enterprising fellow who could get that much money back pretty easily through a little effort. And if you want to ring a little money out of this poor widow and her three children then you’ll have to get a different kind of lawyer.” Does that remind you of any of our modern politicians? That was Abraham Lincoln. What a story. No wonder he’s remembered.

And you know who deserves the credit for Abraham Lincoln and never gets it? It’s his stepmother! Abraham Lincoln was the child of two illiterates. But the step mother, who his father just married in desperation to help raise the children, she took a shine to Lincoln and saw he was bookish and she helped him all the way along. I am going to donate a picture of that stepmother eventually to a particular place because I admire what that stepmother accomplished in life. Imagine being responsible more than any other person for the life of Abraham Lincoln.

Question 10: My question is about the intellectual property because you are a lawyer by training. Given the complicated landscape in this field, is there a better way to share intellectual property across nations, especially in the case of Huawei, is there better legal framework to handle intellectual properties?

Charlie: Well you know, I don’t know that much about the world of intellectual property. I made my way i n insurance, and furniture stores, and little legal newspapers and so on. So other people are good at intellectual property. I’m good at avoiding subjects which I’m not good at. And one of them is intellectual property. I’m not surprised that the Chinese are stealing a little intellectual property. We Americans did it all the time. We stole Dicken’s work. We just reprinted his copyrighted stuff. We stole the technology from the English textile manufacturers. It isn’t as though people haven’t been pretty aggressive about wanting to know other people’s ideas. This is an old problem. I do think that allowing intellectual property to have these profits is desirable. But the exact complexities of how you handle it, I don’t spend much time thinking about.

Question 11: In last year’s Daily Journal meeting, you talked about one of the five aces of a money manager was a long runway.

Charlie: Yes.

Question 11 (continued…): I’m young and have at least hopefully a 40 year runway ahead of me.

Charlie: How are your legs? (laughter).

Question 11 (continued…): I passed my physical with flying colors, so thanks a lot. I’d like to compound my money at the highest rate and then give most of it away at the end. Which money managers would you recommend besides you and Warren?

Charlie: Well I just said I’ve only hired one myself in a lifetime, I don’t think that makes me an expert. Although I must say that one did work out rather well. No I can’t help you. Everybody would like to have some money manager that would make him rich. Of course we all would want that. I would like to be able to turn lead into gold. But it’s hard. It’s very hard. And if you’re finding it difficult that just shows you understand it.

Question 12: Charlie and Peter Kaufman. I don’t have a question, I just want to thank you both for putting together Poor Charlie’s Almanac. It has been an incredibly foundational book in my life and it has really helped inflect my thinking on many different things. So thank you both very much for your work on that.

Charlie: It was really Peter Kaufman’s idea. He did the whole damn thing, and he paid for it himself, being a rich and eccentric man. I just wish there was one change in Peter Kaufman. Peter Kaufman has made me adored in India and China. I wish the hell he could do more for me in Los Angeles. (laughter) The Chinese version of Poor Charlie’s Almanac has been pirated enormously in China. Totally pirated. But the legal sales are three hundred forty thousand or something. Peter has made me very popular in China but he does nothing for me in Los Angeles. (laughter)

Question 13: You’ve paraphrased Ben Graham in saying that good ideas are wonderful but you can suffered terribly if you overdo them.

Charlie: Yes.

Question 13 (continued…): How do you balance that against the risk that you potentially forego an opportunity altogether? Or are late to an opportunity for fear that a good idea has been overdone?

Charlie: The problem that is thoroughly understood is half solved. The minute you point out there’s a big tension between good ideas yet over done so much they’re dangerous, and good ideas that still have a lot of runway ahead, once you have that construct in your head and start classifying opportunities into one category or the other. You’ve got the problem half solved. You don’t need me. You’ve already figured it out. You’ve got to be aware of both potentialities and the tensions.

Question 14: In your letter on Berkshire’s past and future, you wrote about the principles that have made Berkshire successful over the years. My question is, why is it that Berkshire’s organizational principles as a holding company have not been copied more by others given its incredible success and track record?

Charlie: Well it’s a good question. I think the main reason is that it looks impossible. If you were in Procter and Gamble, with its culture and its bureaucracy, and you sat down to figure out, ‘How can I make Procter and Gamble more like Berkshire Hathaway?’, it wouldn’t go immediately to the ‘too hard pile’. It’s just too hard. There’s too much momentum.

But you raise by your question a very interesting thing that deserves more attention than it gets. One of the reasons that Berkshire has been so successful is there’s practically nobody at headquarters. We have almost no corporate bureaucracy. We have a few internal auditors who go out from there and check this or that. But basically we have no bureaucracy. Having no bureaucracy is a huge advantage if the people who are running are sensible people. Think of how poorly all of us have behaved in big bureaucracy even though we have a lot of talent because we couldn’t change anything.

So bureaucracy has a standard bunch of evils on a standard and bunch of stupid wastes and so forth, and avoiding it is hugely important. Of course there’s a tendency of successful places, particularly successful governments, is to have more and more bureaucracy. Of course it’s terribly counterproductive. And of course the bureaucracy, the individual bureaucrats they’re benefiting from more assistance, more meetings, more this, more that. So what looks like poison to us from the outside, because the decisions are so terrible, looks wonderful for them, it’s opportunity. I’ve just described the great tragedy of modern life. Modern life creates successful bureaucracy and successful bureaucracy breeds failure and stupidity. How can it be otherwise. That’s the big tension of modern life. And some of these places that go into a stupid bureaucracy and fire a third of the people and then place works better? They’re doing the Lord’s work. But you wouldn’t think so if you were working there. But there’s a lot of horror and waste in bureaucracy and its inevitable. It’s as natural as old age and death. With that cheerful thought, we can go on to the next one.

Question 15: I’m researching personality psychology and what makes partnerships successful, such as you and Warren. What are your thoughts on that?

Charlie: Well I’ll tell you what makes a partnership successful. Two talented people working well the together. Of course that works better.

Question 16: In the past you’ve praised the significance of cultures at firms like Glenair, Kiewit, and Costco. What are your views on the culture at Daily Journal and in particular Journal Technologies and similar to your Berkshire 50 year essay, can you share a multi-decade vision for Journal Technologies.

Charlie: Well you got to remember that I was old when Journal Technologies came into being. I guess I had a weak moment when…Guerin talked me into it. And it worked because Gerry took a hold of it and work miracles. So I don’t deserve much credit. It’s Guerin and Salzman who are responsible for Journal Technologies. I just clap. I’m good at clapping.

Question 17: You speak about the importance of fishing in waters with ample fish. If you were starting out today, what sea would you be fishing in, other than China of course.

Charlie: Well other than China, but…if there’s one good place in the world that’s more than my share. There are others I’m sure, but it’s hard for me to believe that any can get better for the Mungers than China. So I can’t help you. I’ve solved my problem. You’ll have to solve yours. By the way, the water’s fine in China. Some very smart people are wading in. And in due course I think more will wade in. The great companies of China are cheaper than the great companies of the United States.

Question 18: I have a question regarding long term investment and compound interest. In the last few years with very low interest rates out there it’s been difficult to find opportunities for having a long term compound interest based strategy. So beyond investing in Berkshire, Value Investing, or index funding, where would you invite us to find opportunities for long term investment where compound interest is really that force?

Charlie: Well, my advice for a seeker of compound interest that works ideally is to reduce your expectations. Because I think it’s going to be tougher for a while. And it helps to have realistic expectations. Makes you less crazy. I think that…you know they say that common stocks from the aftermath of the Great Depression, which was the worst in the English speaking world in hundreds of years, to the present time may be an index that’s produced 10 percent. Well that’s pre-inflation. After inflation it may be 7 percent or something. And the difference between 7 and 10 in terms of its consequences are just hugely dramatic over that long period of time. And if that’s 7 in real terms, but achieved starting at a perfect period and through the greatest boom in history, starting now it could well be 3 percent or 2 percent in real terms. It’s not unthinkable you’d have 5 percent returns and 3 percent inflation or some ghastly consequences like that. The ideal way to cope with that is to say, “If that happens, I can have a happy life.” Because why shouldn’t you be happy in spite of the fact that civilization wasn’t quite as easy as it was for my generation. Now beyond that, when it gets more difficult, how should you do it? Well the answer is, because it’s going to be very difficult, you should work at it. And if all that gets you is 6 percent for a lifetime of work instead of 5, you should be cheerful about it. If you want to hit it out of the park easily, you should talk to Jim Cramer. (laughter)

Question 19: Building on the question about the corporate culture at Daily Journal Corporation, could we ask the other board members about the long term succession plan for the board.

Charlie: I don’t think we want to go to another speaker. (laughter)

Question 20: Has the Berkshire Hathaway equity portfolio outperformed the S&P over the last five or ten years? And if it has not, why wouldn’t Berkshire just invest in the S&P for its equity portfolio?

Charlie: I think Warren, who is after all a mere boy of 89, thinks that Berkshire can do a little better than the S&P. From this point. I don’t think many people can, but he may be right about himself and the team he has in place. It won’t be by huge margins, that I confidently predict.

Question 21: How do you think about downside protection and how do you know when to exit an investment?

Charlie: Well you’re not talking to a great ‘exiter’. My Berkshire I bought it in 1966. My Costco I bought… I mean I’ve been a good picker. But other people know more exiting. I’m trying never to have to exit. So you’re talking to the wrong…I think there are working styles of investments that work well with constant exits. It just hasn’t happened been my forte. So I’m no good at exits. I don’t like even looking for exits. I’m looking for holds. Think of the pleasure I’ve got from watching Costco march ahead. Such an utter meritocracy and it does so well. Why would I trade that experience for a series of transactions that make me a little…In the first place, I’d be less rich not more after taxes. The second place is it’s a much less satisfactory life than rooting for people I like and admire. So I say find Costco’s, not good exits.

Question 22: You mentioned that in an interview with CNBC on May 2018, Berkshire too restrained on buying more Apple stock. Do you still believe so?

Charlie: No I don’t. I don’t think the world would be improved by more comments from me on Apple. You know, I’m a very opinionated man and I know a lot, but I don’t know everything. I like Apple but I don’t have the feeling that I’m the big expert.

Question 23: Last year you said that you wish you had more of Apple stock, but now its price has declined by a lot, so what is your opinion about its moat or the competitive advantage. Why do you think it has declined?

Charlie: Well I don’t know why Apple stock is going up or down. I know enough about it so I admire the place, but I don’t know enough to have any big opinion about why it’s going up and down recently. Part of our secret is that we don’t attempt to know a lot of things. I have a pile on my desk that solves most of my problems, it’s called the ‘too hard’ pile. And I just keep shifting things ‘too hard’ pile. And everyone once in a while an easy decision comes along and I make it. That’s my system. Everything was the ‘too hard’ pile, except for a few easy decisions which I make, promptly.

Question 24: When you’re assessing the quality of a business do you place more emphasis on quantitative metrics such as return on invested capital or qualitative ideas like brand strength or quality of management?

Charlie: Well we pay attention to qualitative metrics and we also pay attention to other factors. Generally we like to pay attention to whatever’s important in the particular situation and that varies from situation to situation. We’re just trying to have that ‘uncommon sense’ I’m talking about. And part of our uncommon sense is just to refer a lot of stuff to the ‘too hard’ pile.

Question 25: The simple life is the obvious right answer, but most of America ends up like Mozart, in debt and overspending. How did you maintain the discipline to live the simple life in the face of all these other temptations?

Charlie: I was born this way. (laughter)

Question 26: I’m an engineer at BYD, and I was interested to hear your perspective on the current state of infrastructure in the U.S. and some areas of growth that you might see in the future for infrastructure.

Charlie: Well I think infrastructure will be a big deal. Practically everybody…in China where BYD is so active, by the way the Daily Journal owns some BYD, but BYD is going to be huge electric vehicles. They are already huge. And they’re going to be much more huge. And then they’re going to be huge in monorails which is also a business whose time has come. And they’re also huge in these lithium batteries, and the lithium batteries are being improved…materially improved. And the place is full of fanatics, and by the way they’re a big supplier to Apple and Huawei. And they’re a very satisfactory supplier to those things. So I am terribly impressed with BYD and its been one of the real pleasures of my life to…Wang Chuanfu is the eighth son of a peasant. An older brother recognizing a genius had been born into the family, he just gave up everything in life to nurture that little brother genius. Now that’s Confucianism. And by the way Confucianism will do a lot better for civilization than the Ford Foundation did. Confucianism with a strong family ethos like that is a really constructive thing. And Confucianism partly created BYD. That older brother of Wang Chuanfu was a hero. And of course what Wang Chuanfu has done is a miracle. And of course that was a venture capital type investment. We bought marketable securities, not Berkshire, but Li Lu did. And it’s been a wonderful investment and it’s been a very admirable company. And I like being part of something that’s inventing better lithium batteries and better monorails and so on and so on. So if you work for BYD, you’re a very fortunate person and you’re gonna have a wonderful life watching and participating. You could hardly have a better employer. At least if you like demanding achievement and 80 hour weeks.

Question 27: You mentioned earlier that when you had an opportunity to raise prices you didn’t want to raise them during the Great Recession because it didn’t seem right for Charlie Munger to be raising prices on people that were losing their houses. So I wanted to thank you for that as well.

Charlie: Nobody else ever has.

Question 27 (continued…): I wanted to ask you about the causes of the Great Recession, specifically the credit ratings agencies, and your twenty four standard causes of human misjudgment. I think they hit them pretty much all. Pavlovian Association, denial,…

Charlie: You’re right about that. The financial behavior in our leading financial institutions was inexcusably awful. When other people were making money in a disreputable stupid fashion, everybody piled in because they didn’t want somebody else to be making money and they’re not participating. The standards in lending, the standards in managing…It was disgusting intellectually, disgusting morally, and of course it caused a whirlwind that could have taken the whole civilization down into a Great Depression. That’s a pretty major sin. And none of those people’s been punished. It’s usual that I agree so thoroughly with Elizabeth Warren, but it was wrong to have that big of a mess and have nobody punished.

Question 27 (continued…): I’ve written a blueprint for a nonprofit credit ratings agency and I’d love to get your feedback.

Charlie: Things that far out I usually leave to other people and not because Berkshire Hathaway owns a big chunk of one of the credit rating agencies. But I can see why the existing situation would draw your concern. But there are some human problems I don’t want to bother with. And you have just produced one. But you’re right it wasn’t perfect.

Question 28: My question relates to the country’s national debt. We’ve just recently passed twenty two trillion dollars and our debt to GDP is above 100 percent now. At a time when our GDP may be near a peak and interest rates may be rising. It seems to me that politicians seem fine running the deficit because there when the crisis comes, and consumers are happy to take a deficit because it’s better to consume now than tomorrow. My question is, do you think that there’s something we can do about this? And if so, what should be done? Or is human psychology such that until the crisis is upon us, it’s hard to imagine anything it’s done?

Charlie: Well that’s a very interesting question. The whole science of economics had no idea 15 years ago that it would be possible to print money on the present scale, and get so awash in internal debt as we have. And certainly in a place like Japan, which is way more extreme, nobody dreamed that was possible. And the people who did dream what was possible…and they were few…they would not have predicted 20 years of stasis in spite of everything the Japanese did which was very extreme.

There’s a lot that’s peculiar in what we’re doing and eventually if you try and solve all your problems by printing money there’ll be some disaster. When it’s coming and how bad it will be, nobody knows. Nobody dreamed 15 years ago we could do as much as we have now with as little bad consequence. Churchill use to say that Clement Attlee had a lot to be modest about. Well that’s the way I feel about the economics profession. They have a lot to be modest about. They thought they knew a lot, but turned out not to be so. There was a Greek philosopher that said, “No man steps in the same river twice.” You know the river is different the second time he comes in and so is the man. And that’s the way with economics. It’s not like physics where the same damn principles are going to apply. You do the same damn thing at a different time and you get a different result. It’s complicated.

And of course you’re raising a very important question. And of course nobody really knows the answer. Who knows how much of this we can get by with. My personal bet is that these democracies will eventually borrow too much and cause some real troubles. I don’t know when.

Question 29: A lot of people ask how you determine what investment or deal to do, and you tell people that you can do this fairly quickly. My question is how do you tell if a money manager or management of a company has the right character or the right integrity? How long does it take you to do that and what are some traits that you look for?

Charlie: Well now that I found Li Lu I don’t look for anybody else. So I’m the wrong person. What are my chances I’m going to get somebody better than Li Lu. So it’s very easy for me. What you need is a Li Lu and I don’t know how to get you one.

Question 30: Last year we saw a record amount of share repurchases, and now we’re hearing rhetoric out of Washington D.C. specifically legislation to curb stock buybacks. What’s your take on stock buybacks and do you think politicians should be telling companies what to do?

Charlie: Well generally speaking I’m restrained in my enthusiasm for politicians telling corporations what they should do. But I will say this. When it was a very good idea for companies to buy back their stock they didn’t do very much. And when the stocks got so high price that it’s frequently a bad idea, they’re doing a lot. Welcome to adult life. This is the way it is. But it’s questionable at the present levels whether a lot of it is smart. Was Eddie Lambert smart to buy back so much Sears Roebuck? No. And there’s a lot of that kind of mistake that’s been made.

Question 31: Similar to your Mozart anecdote, I wanted to ask you, what advice would you have for someone my age looking to live a long successful life like yourself.

Charlie: Well I haven’t had that much success changing any of my children. And I don’t think I can give helpful advice to a perfect stranger. It’s hard to improve the next generation, and the standard result is going to be mediocre. Some people are going to succeed. They’re going to be few. That’s the way human significance is allotted. Human significance will always go to the few. There’s no way of creating enough (few in significance), to meet the demand. I think personal discipline, personal morality, good colleagues, good ideas, all the simple stuff. I’d say, if you want to carry one message from Charlie Munger it’s this, “If it’s trite it’s right.” All those old virtues, they all work.

Question 32: You point out a great deal of human folly, but you don’t seem to be that upset about it. Has that always been the case and is that a correct perception

Charlie: That’s a very correct perception. It’s my system. I’ve copied it from the Jews. I saw it work well from them, and it was my natural inclination anyway. And so, humor is my way of coping.

Question 33: What is your proudest accomplishment in life and why?

Charlie: I don’t have a single accomplishment in life that I’m all that proud of. I set out to try and have more uncommon sense than most. Pretty limited objective. I am pleased I did as well as I did in that game. If I had to do it all over again, I think it’d be a lot harder. I think part of my success was being born in the right place at the right time. So, I’m not particularly proud of success that came from being born in the right place at the right time. I’m pleased but not proud.

Question 34: Mr. Salzman. I have a question for you. Could please comment on how Journal Technologies implements the invariant strategy principles? Things like trust, getting employees to go all in, positive sum, and win/win relationships.

Charlie: Gerry that’s a simple question. How do you solve the problems of God?

Gerry Salzman: First of all you have to deal with each individual because each individual, each employee, each independent contractor that we have to work with, each client is different. And so you have to relate to their specific circumstance. You do not handle it because it’s in a checklist or something.

Question 35: This question is for both of Charlie and Peter. Charlie once said any year that you don’t destroy one of your best loved ideas is probably a wasted year. Have either of you destroyed any of your beloved ideas in 2018? And if so, what are they?

Charlie: Guerin have you destroyed any good ideas 2018?

Rick Guerin: …Probably unbeknownst to me.

Gerry Salzman: We always think into the future, we’re not worried about the past. It’s just that simple. The day ends, we’re on to something different. It’s a different challenge every day. And the good part about my job, it changes every day. So I face something different. I’m more like a newspaper editor. I start with the blank page every day. Well how do I go to the next situation? How do I solve a particular problem? That’s my day. That’s what I do.

Question 36: In October 2008, a month after Lehman filed bankruptcy and in the depths of the abyss, Mr. Buffett famously wrote an editorial saying that he was buying stocks and he was bullish on America. You’re famous for bottom ticking Wells Fargo in March of 2009. What made you decide to buy Wells Fargo in March of 2009 instead of October of 2008?

Charlie: Well I had the money in the later period. And the stock was cheaper. Those are two very important parts of the purchase.

Question 37: I’ve heard that you started some new real estate developments. What are you developing now and what’s going to be the key to its success?

Charlie: No I bought some apartment houses for my grandchildren. It seemed like a good idea at the time. By the way that phrase, ‘It seemed like a good idea at the time.’, came to me from a man I knew many years ago. In five minutes between trains he managed to conceive an illegitimate child by somebody he met in the bar car. And my father was asked by the young man’s father, he had a nice wife and three children, “What the hell were you thinking about?” And you know what the young man said? “It seemed like a good idea at the time.” (laughter)

Question 38: Herb Kelleher passed away recently and I’m hoping that maybe you have some anecdotes about Herb that you would like to share with us?

Charlie: Yeah well. Well he was a very remarkable business man. I never knew him, but he was an original and he created an amazingly sound company while drinking one hell of a lot of whiskey and smoking a hell of a lot of cigarettes. This is not my personal style. To do as well as he did with so much Bourbon and so many cigarettes, it set a new record in human life. So, we should all remember Herb Kelleher. And we should all wish we could have so much strength that we could abuse it so much and still perform. I didn’t get such a hand. I regarded it as a miracle.

Question 39: If you didn’t have access to Li Lu and to the Chinese exchanges through him, like many Americans don’t, would you feel comfortable investing in the American Depository Shares of most Chinese companies that are comprised of a V.I.E. Structure and offer shareholders few rights and minimal protections from the Chinese government?

Charlie: I don’t know much about depository shares. I tend to be suspicious of all investment products created by professionals. I tend to go where nothing is being hawked aggressively or merchandise…sold aggressively. So you’re talking about a world in which I don’t even enter. So I can’t help you. You’re talking about a territory I avoid.

Question 40: The derivative portfolios of major U.S. banks are getting quite large on the balance sheets. S.E.C. reporting doesn’t require much transparency. So do you worry about this kind of stuff in the banks that you own? And do you worry about other banks as well?

Charlie: All intelligent investors worry about banks because banks present temptations to their managers to do dumb things. There’s so many things you can easily do in a bank that looks like a cinch way of reporting more earnings soon, where it’s a mistake to do it, long-term considerations being properly considered. As Warren puts it, “The trouble with banking is there are more banks than there are good bankers.” And he’s right about that. So I would say that if you invest in banks you have to go in at a time when you got a lot going for you. Because there’ll be a fair amount of stupidity that creeps into banking.

Question 41: When you don’t have the luxury of picking your negotiation counter parties, what’s your best recommendation for dealing with somebody who, not only won’t negotiate rationally but will also criticize you for trying to negotiate rationally?

Charlie: You’re talking about a situation I try and solve by avoidance. If I can solve that problem I’d have a line around the block. I mean you wouldn’t be able to squeeze in here. Everybody who has an insoluble problem with a difficult person…Think of what we’d all do to solve that one? I’m afraid I don’t have a solution to that one. Avoidance is my general principle method.

Question 42: I have two questions. Both you and Mr. Buffett worked in Buffett’s grandpa’s grocery store during your teenage years. Do you think that your early working experience helped give you a strong advantage in this investing profession?

Charlie: Absolutely. I was able to learn from my dead great grandfather when I was a little boy. What I learned at a very young age when I was just a kid, I could see some of the adults around me were nuts and yet they were very talented. I could see how much irrationality there was in very talented people.

So I got interested in seeking out the patterns and understanding why it happened and learning tricks to cope and so on. And I did that when I was a little kid. And of course it helped me. Who is not helped by an early start in a promising activity? And what activity could be more promising than in diagnosing stupidity?

Question 43: What level of discount would you be applying to potential investments today?

Charlie: Well generally speaking, I think the professional investors have to accept less than they were used to getting under different conditions. Just as an old man expects less out of his sex life than he had when he was 20.

Question 44: I want to come back to William Thorndike books, and I now have the list of the eight companies. It is General Dynamics, Berkshire Hathaway, The Washington Post, DCI, Capital Cities, Teledyne, General Cinema, and Ralston Purina. I know that Berkshire Hathaway had the long-term investment in the Washington Post and Capital Cities and have been invested in companies of John Malone. But why did Berkshire not have a long-term investment into General Dynamics, Teledyne, General Cinema, or Ralston Purina?

Charlie: Well we did have a huge investment in General Dynamics for a long time and we made an enormous amount of money with it. After the defense business contracted, nobody else was willing to sell anything except for General Dynamics, which kept selling at higher and higher prices. And Warren noticed that. We had a huge position in general dynamics and made a fortune. We always admired the founder of Teledyne who was a genius. Henry Singleton. But we admired him from afar, we never invested. It’s just one of many mistakes of omission.

Question 45: I was happy to see you at this meeting turned 90, now you’re ninety-five…

Charlie: You think you’re happy, think of the way I feel! (laughter)

Question 45 (continued…): Well I hope you live to be 120 and I always thank you for your positive influence on our lives. My question is related to stress and sleep and longevity. In business, there are what I call ‘criminal competitors’. You’re honest and ethical but the competitor across the street is beating you by cheating and running a massive insurance fraud. Business and life can cause a lot of stress, but you’ve always seemed to stay cool. What mental tools do you use to de-focus and keep your equanimity for ninety-five years? How do you detach? And even during the Salomon Brothers scandal were you always able to get eight hours of sleep at night?

Charlie: Well that is not true. As a matter of fact, I had more difficulty sleeping when I was young, but I do have a tip that I’ve learned late in life. I never consciously blanked out my mind when I tried to go to sleep, so I allowed my mind to wrestle through my problems and keep me awake very very late while I lay in bed wrestling with problems. And then if I didn’t sleep well one night I figured, “What the hell I’ll sleep the next night.” But that was pretty stupid. But now I actually deliberately blank out my mind I can go to sleep rather easily and I recommend it to all of you. It really works. I don’t know why the hell I didn’t get to it before 93. (laughter)

Question 47: You gave Robert Cialdini one share of Berkshire for writing influence, and a twenty thousand dollar check to Atul Gawande for writing a New Yorker article on health care. Are there any other writers you gave something to for their writing or ideas?

Charlie: I’ve forgotten, but there aren’t many. Atul Gawande is a very remarkable person and so is Cialdini. So I do that kind of weird stuff occasionally, but I don’t do it all the time. I’m proud of those two by the way.

Question 48: If someone can invent a time machine and you can go back and have dinner with your 41 year old self, what piece of advice would you give your former self?

Charlie: Well I’d avoid that one mistake of omission that cost me half of the net worth I would now have if I’d been smarter. We can all go back and make some decision better. But it’s the nature of thing that you’re going to blow one occasionally. My general idea is there’s no point in fretting too much about what you can’t fix. It’s a big mistake to fill yourself with resentments and hatreds and so on. It’s such a simple idea but so many people ruin their lives unnecessarily. Envy is such a stupid thing to have because you can’t possibly have any fun with that particular sin. Who in the hell ever had any fun in envy? What good could envy possibly do for you? And somebody is always going to be doing better than you are. It’s really stupid. So my system at life is to figure out what’s really stupid and avoid it. It doesn’t make me popular, but it prevents a lot of trouble.

Question 49: Could you comment on why there’s so little health care in the Berkshire portfolio?

Charlie: I think we don’t understand it well enough and we don’t like a lot that we do understand. Those are two pretty good reasons for not investing.

Question 50: Do you have any thoughts on a winner-take-all business model, and have you seen it in the 50’s and 60′?

Charlie: That’s ideal if you can find one in advance and predict it accurately. It’s perfect. Winner take all. It’s obviously perfect. It’s very difficult to do because everyone’s looking for the same thing.

Question 51: I’m at a point in my life where I don’t really know my circle of competence, so I would like to know how you found yours.

Charlie: Well it’s a hugely important thing, knowing the edge. It’s hardly a competence if you don’t know the edge of it. You know, if you have a misapprehension regarding your own competency that means you lack competence, you’re going to make terrible mistakes. I think you’ve got to constantly measure what you achieve against other people of achievement, and you have to keep being determinedly rational, and avoiding a lot of self-delusion. But after a lifetime of observing it, I think the tendency to be pretty rational about one’s own competency is largely genetic. I think people like Warren and I were just born this way. Now it took a lot of education. But I think we were born with the right temperament to do what we did. And I have no way of taking you back and rebirthing you.

Question 52: In spite of being partners for so long, why is Warren so much richer than you?

Charlie: Well. He got an earlier start. He’s probably a little smarter. He works harder. There are not a lot of reasons. Why was Albert Einstein poorer than I was? (laughter)

We are coming to the end of our allotted time. I’ll take one more question and then we’ll quite

Question 53: You’ve been very positive on the investment prospects for China and you’ve said that most of Americans are missing out on China. What do you think we’re missing? And what should we be aware of when we invest in China?

Charlie: Well what you’re missing is that there’s more opportunities there than there is here. And I don’t see how I can guide you any more firmly than that. Are you finding things so easy here you don’t need China?

Well with that we’re through.

Gerry Salzman: Thank you all for attending the Daily Journal shareholder meeting this year. We welcome you all back for next year.

End of Transcript

Thank you for reading. I hope you all thoroughly enjoyed the transcript. If you found any errors, kindly let me know and I will fix them.

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Sincerely,

Richard Lewis, CFA
White Stork Asset Management LLC
Partner, Investments

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Peter Kaufman on The Multidisciplinary Approach to Thinking: Transcript

Last week I had the great pleasure of attending a talk by Peter Kaufman on the Multidisciplinary Approach to Thinking.  I would like to thank Mr. Kaufman for delivering such an engaging and insightful talk.

Mr. Kaufman does not normally allow his talks to be on the record, but is making a rare exception in this case.  He believes the message within this talk – that it is possible to succeed in business, yet fail in life – is critical for anyone interested in living a full, meaningful life, with minimal regret in later years.  He hopes that “going positive and going first”, “win/win”, and “going far by going together” are ideas that aspiring money managers will take to heart in their own lives.

I transcribed the full event from my audio recording which you may listen to on SoundCloud.  Throughout the transcript you will find;

  1. Time stamps, each linked to its corresponding recording location.
  2. Links to relevant supporting information.

Furthermore, I’d like to thank Spencer Hoff, President of the Cal Poly Pomona Economics Club, who graciously invited the Latticework Investing Community to attend.  I would also like to thank the Cal Poly Pomona Economics Club for hosting such a great event.

Transcript: Peter Kaufman on The Multidisciplinary Approach to Thinking

0:00 Talk Begins

Spencer Hoff: Thank you for coming. Today we’ve got Mr. Peter Kaufman, CEO of Glenair, who wrote this book, Poor Charlie’s Almanack about Charlie Munger. It’s an excellent book, the best book I’ve ever read, by far, in my life. He serves on the board of Daily Journal with Mr. Charlie Munger and he’s going to give us a few words today. So please welcome Mr. Peter Kaufman everybody.

0:26

Peter Kaufman: Thank you. Now I’m happy to talk about a subject. I was asked to talk about the multidisciplinary approach to thinking. So I’ll start out with that. But if you guys get bored or something and say ‘Well I thought we were supposed to have fun listening to this today.’ You can raise your hand and say ‘Could you talk about leadership or team building or business strategy or ethics or something else?’ I gave a talk recently at Google, in fact I’ve given three talks at Google. And the first talk I gave they said ‘What are you going to talk about?’ And I said, ‘Well, what do you want to talk about?’ They said, ‘About whatever you want. What do you usually talk about?’ Well I usually talk about leadership, culture, team building, strategy, ethics. And they said, ‘We don’t want to hear about that team building crap. We get that all the time. We want to hear about self-improvement.’ So I will mix in with our multidisciplinary topic a little bit of self-improvement as well. Is that OK? OK.

So why is it important to be a multidisciplinary thinker? The answer comes from the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (link 1, 2, 3) who said, ‘To understand is to know what to do.’ Could there be anything that sounds simpler than that? And yet it’s a genius line, to understand is to know what to do. How many mistakes do you make when you understand something? You don’t make any mistakes. Where do mistakes come from? They come from blind spots, a lack of understanding. Why do you need to be multidisciplinary in your thinking? Because as the Japanese proverb says, ‘The frog in the well knows nothing of the mighty ocean.’ You may know everything there is to know about your specialty, your silo, your “well”, but how are you going to make any good decisions in life…the complex systems of life, the dynamic system of life…if all you know is one well?

2:33

So I tried to learn what Munger calls, ‘the big ideas’ from all the different disciplines. Right up front I want to tell you what my trick was, because if you try to do it the way he did it, you don’t have enough time in your life to do it. It’s impossible. Because the fields are too big and the books are too thick. So my trick to learn the big ideas of science, biology, etc., was I found this science magazine called Discover Magazine. Show of hands, anybody here ever heard of Discover magazine? A few people. OK. And I found that this magazine every month had a really good interview with somebody from some aspect of science. Every month. And it was six or seven pages long. It was all in layperson’s terms. The person who was trying to get their ideas across would do so using good stories, clear language, and they would never fail to get all their big ideas into the interview. I mean if you’re given the chance to be interviewed by Discover Magazine and your field is nanoparticles or something, aren’t you going to try your very best to get all the good ideas into the interview with the best stories etc. OK. So I discovered that on the Internet there were 12 years of Discover Magazine articles available in the archives. So I printed out 12 years times 12 months of these interviews. I had 144 of these interviews. And I put them in these big three ring binders. Filled up three big binders. And for the next six months I went to the coffee shop for an hour or two every morning and I read these. And I read them index fund style, which means I read them all. I didn’t pick and choose. This is the universe and I’m going to own the whole universe. I read every single one. Now I will tell you that out of 144 articles, if I’d have been selecting my reading material, I probably would have read about 14 of them. And the other 130? I would never in a million years read six pages on nanoparticles. Guess what I had at the end of six months? I had inside my head every single big idea from every single domain of science and biology. It only took me 6 months. And it wasn’t that hard because it was written in layperson’s terms. And really, what did I really get? Just like an index fund, I captured all the parabolic ideas that no one else has. And why doesn’t anybody else have these ideas? Because who in the world would read an interview on nanoparticles? And yet that’s where I got my best ideas. I would read some arcane subject and, oh my god, I saw, ‘That’s exactly how this works over here in biology.’ or ‘That’s exactly how this works over here in human nature.’ You have to know all these big ideas. Or there is an alternative, find somebody who did what I did and just get all the ideas from them. Now when I was your age and I was in school I thought the asymmetry of it was very unfair because I had to do all the work. So every time I go back and meet with a group of students I change the asymmetry around. I did all the work for you…

6:15

I have (multiple examples) of models that I derived from what I call my ‘three buckets’. Let’s see if I’ve got my three buckets in here. I do. I do have my three buckets. Ok. So this is how I use ideas that no one else in the world uses and yet I can be comfortable that they’re right. A statistician’s best friend is what? A large, relevant sample size. And why? Because a principle derived from a large relevant sample size can’t be wrong can it? The only way it could be wrong is if the sample size is too small or the sample itself is not relevant. So I want to tell you what my three buckets are where I derive my models, my multidisciplinary models. Number one is 13.7 billion years. Is that a large sample? It’s the largest one in the whole universe. There is no larger sample. Because what is it? It’s the inorganic universe. Physics. Geology. Anything that’s not living goes in my bucket number 1. 13.7 billion years.

Bucket number 2 is 3.5 billion years. It’s biology on the planet Earth. Is that a big sample size? Is it relevant? We’re biological creatures. Let me ask you this, inorganic, bucket number one, is it relevant? We live in it. So bucket number one we live in, 13.7 billion years. Bucket number two is what we’re part of, biology. 3.5 billion years. And number three is 20,000 years of recorded human history. That’s the most relevant of all. That’s our story. That’s who we are.

So we’re going to take a couple of examples here of multidisciplinary thinking. We’ll ask this question, is there a simple two word description that accurately describes how everything in the world works? That would be very useful wouldn’t it if you know how everything works in just two words? So we go to bucket number one. How does everything work? We go to Newton’s Third Law of Motion. We’re getting very multidisciplinary here. Does anybody in the room know what Newton’s Third Law of Motion says? (Answer: “For every action there will always be an equal and opposite reaction.”) That’s beautiful. He wins one of my pens here for answering that question correctly. I always give out rewards. It’s like operant conditioning from psychology, right? So there you go.

Yes if I put this bottle of water on this table, Newton’s Third Law of Motion says that if the bottle pushes down on the table with ‘force x’, and it also strangely says that the table pushes back with equal ‘force x’. That’s very strange. But you know how long that’s been true? 13.7 billion years that’s been true. Now what if I push down twice as hard, what does the table do? Well if I push down twenty one and a half times as hard? What does the table do? Twenty one and a half! OK. Now is there a good word, a catchall word to describe what we’re talking about here when this pushes down and this thing pushes back? Yeah, it’s reciprocation isn’t it? But it’s not mere reciprocation. It’s perfectly mirrored reciprocation. The harder I push, the harder it pushes back. Does everybody buy that? That’s bucket number one. That’s how the world works. It’s mirrored reciprocation. Everything in the inorganic universe works that way.

We go to bucket number 2. I’m going to introduce a little humor into this. Even though this is a dog, pretend it’s a cat. OK? This is a cat for the time being. Mark Twain said that a man who picks up a cat by its tail will learn a lesson he can learn in no other way. What is this cat going to try to do? It’s going to do what? (Answer: “Attack you.”) Yeah it’s going to try and scratch me with its sharp claws. And why? It doesn’t find being picked up by its tail very agreeable does it? Now what if I start swinging this cat around by its tail. What does the cat do now? Now it’s trying to scratch my eyes out. It said, ‘You escalated on me pal, I’m going to escalate back on you.’ Does that sound a lot like mirrored reciprocation? But what if instead of doing something disagreeable with this cat we do something very agreeable with this cat? And this cat’s sitting here and we come over and we gently pick it up by its tummy and we put it in the crook of our elbow and we gently stroke it. Does the cat try and scratch us? What does it do? It licks our hands. And as long as I sit here and stroke it, it’s going to continue to try and lick my hand. It wants to show me what? ‘I like this. This is agreeable. You’re a good guy. Keep it up man!’ It is mirrored reciprocation isn’t it? If I act in a disagreeable way to the cat, the cat acts in a disagreeable way back, and mirrored. If I act in an agreeable way, what do you think we’re going to find when we go to bucket number three? It’s exactly the same thing isn’t it? Your entire life. Every interaction you have with another human being is merely mirrored reciprocation. Now you’re going to say to yourself ‘This is too simple. It can’t be this simple.’ It is this simple! It doesn’t mean it’s not sophisticated. This is a very sophisticated model we just derived isn’t it? We did it in a multidisciplinary fashion didn’t we? We looked into the three largest sample sizes that exist, the three most relevant, and they all said exactly the same thing. Do you think we can bank on that? 100 percent we can bank on that.

13:04

So, if you think about things being complex as being sophisticated like most people do, you think the more complex it is, the more sophisticated it is. I want you to remember, as best you can, what I’m about to say. It’s very, very important. Albert Einstein once listed what he said were the five ascending levels of cognitive prowess. Now there’s nobody in this room that doesn’t want to be level number one. Right? That’s why we’re here. You don’t want to be level number five. You want to be level number one. Wait until you hear what these levels are, it’s going to blow your mind. So number 5 he said, at the very bottom, was smart. OK. That’s the lowest level of cognitive prowess is being smart. The next level up, level 4, is intelligent. Level 3, next up, is brilliant. Next level up, level 2 he said is genius. What? What’s higher than genius? He must have that backward. No he doesn’t. Wait until you hear what number one is according to Albert Einstein. We just demonstrated it. Number one is simple. Simple transcends genius.

Why is simple, the right kind of simple, better than genius? Because you can understand it! I bought this book I usually take it when I’m giving a talk like this. It’s the Ethics by Spinoza. Spinoza’s ethics book was written by a true genius. And guess what? You can’t understand anything in it. But can you understand what I walked you through, mirrored reciprocation? OK.

14:59

Now, because this is an economics club, right, everybody here is interested in economics? So let’s give an example of a model derived, multidisciplinary, same way we did before, but is just about as pure an economic model as you can find. So now we’re going to ask the question, what’s the most powerful force that we as human beings, both as individuals and groups, can potentially harness towards achieving our ends in life?

Ok. We go to bucket number one. We ask, what’s the most powerful force in bucket number one? I’m going to quote Albert Einstein again. He said, ‘The most powerful force in the universe is compound interest.’ But that’s not all he said about compound interest. He not only said that it’s the most powerful force in the universe, he said it’s the greatest mathematical discovery of all time. He said it’s the eighth wonder of the world. And he said that those who understand it get paid by it and those who don’t pay for it. He said all these things, Albert Einstein, about compound interest. Now what’s a good working definition of compound interest? I will propose one. You can have your own, but this is mine. I say compound interest is dogged incremental constant progress over a very long time frame. Is that a fair definition? Alright? I think that’s the answer from bucket number 1. The most powerful force that could be potentially harnessed is dogged incremental constant progress over a very long time frame.

We go to bucket number 2. 3.5 billion years of biology. What’s the most powerful force in three and a half billion years of biology? It’s the machine of evolution. How does it work? Dogged incremental constant progress over a long time frame. This is the beauty of deriving things multidisciplinary. You can’t be wrong! You see these things lined up there like three bars on a slot machine. Boy do you hit the jackpot.  

What do you think we’re going to find when we go to bucket number three? 20,000 years of human experience on earth. You want to win a gold medal in the Olympics. You want to learn a musical instrument. You want to learn a foreign language. You want to build Berkshire Hathaway. What’s the formula? Dogged incremental constant progress over a very long time frame. Look how simple this is. This is above genius. It’s absolutely above genius because you can understand it. This isn’t somebody drawing all these formulas and things up here about, you know, how numbers multiply and amplify over time. The problem that human beings have is we don’t like to be constant. Think of each one of those terms. Dogged incremental constant progress over a very long time frame. Nobody wants to be constant. We’re the functional equivalent of Sisyphus pushing his boulder up the mountain. You push it up half way, and you go, ‘Aw, I’ll come back and do this another time.’ It goes back down. ‘I’ve got this great idea, I’m going to really work hard on it.’ You push it up half way and,’ Aw, you know I’ll get back to this next month.’ This is the human condition. In geometric terms this is called variance drain. Whenever you interrupt the constant increase above a certain level of threshold you lose compounding, you’re no longer on the log curve. You fall back onto a linear curve or God forbid a step curve down. You have to be constant. How many people do you know that are constant and what they do? I know a couple. Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. Everybody wants to be rich like Warren Buffett Charlie Munger. I’m telling you how they got rich. They were constant. They were not intermittent.

19:37

Let me give you an example of why intermittency is perhaps the most important thing in your lives whether you realize it or not. We’ll begin with the example of bringing home a puppy from the pet shop. Brand spanking new puppy from the pet shop. And the kids are so excited, they’re so excited. What’s your goal of bringing home this puppy to your household? I say it’s to have an engaged, contributing, all-in, new member of your household. And night number one, how are we doing? It’s a disaster. This thing’s over in the corner shaking like a leaf. It’s anything but engaged. It’s anything but contributing and it’s anything but all-in. It’s shaking like a leaf. Human beings are really good at solving this problem. We know we need to create a calm, reassuring, secure, and safe environment.

We know that even though this puppy can’t understand what we’re saying, we need to communicate in soothing tones. And we also know that we need to provide food and water for this puppy. But underlying all these things, stitching them all together, we really know we have to be constant don’t we? You can’t not feed the puppy one day or what happens? Well, the puppy freaks out. The puppy becomes a neurotic puppy. It doesn’t know whether it can trust you or not. This trust that this puppy needs to go all-in is dependent upon you being constant in these behaviors. Does everybody accept that? So, if we are constant, usually in about seven days more or less, if we are constant this little puppy will trot over to our side and it will attach itself to us. And for the rest of its life it will be willing to die for us. That puppy just went all-in, didn’t it? Now did it go all-in because it’s our idea that we want an engaged contributing all-in new member of our household? It doesn’t even know what our idea is, does it? Why did it just go all in? It was the puppy’s idea!

21:57

Now let me tie this to your lives. I did this at Google and they really couldn’t figure out what I was doing. And then afterwards they said ‘You know that was really good. Your eight dollar crystal ball that’s really a good trick. So I’ll do my eight dollar crystal ball trick. And I told them…I had rows bigger than this one, full of the smartest people in the world. And I said guess what I’m going to do with my eight dollar crystal ball? I said, I’m going to do a psychic reading of anybody in this room. Anybody. And I said to Google, ‘If you think that I’ve got a stooge in the room where I’ve got this prearranged. I don’t. Go out in the corridor and bring somebody in. I’ll do the psychic reading.’ This eight dollars I spent on Amazon is the best money I ever spent. So I’m going to select you. What’s your name? (Answer: “Emily”) We’re going to take Emily, we’re going to do a psychic reading of Emily right in front of you. You’re not going to believe this. I’m going to nail this. You’re all going ‘This guy’s a nutcase.’ Spencer’s going, ‘Man why did I invite this guy?’ Just be patient Spencer, this is good stuff. I’ll pull it off. So I’m going to tell Emily what she’s been looking for her whole life. Is there anybody here who thinks I can do this? Well wait until you hear my answer and then for the rest of your life you’re all going to go, ‘I know what everybody in the world is looking for.’ Emily, your entire life you’ve been on a quest, an odyssey, a search for that individual that you can 100 percent absolutely and completely trust. But who’s not just trustworthy, but principled, and courageous, and competent, and kind, and loyal, and understanding, and forgiving, and unselfish. I’m right aren’t I? (Answer: “Dead on”) You know what else my eight dollar Crystal Ball tells me? If you ever think you may have encountered this person, you are going to probe and probe and test and test to make sure that they are real, that you’re not being fooled. And the paradox is that it looks like you’re probing for weakness but you’re not. You’re probing for strength. And the worst day of your life is if instead of strength you get back weakness. And now you feel betrayed. You know why? You’ve got to start your search all over again. It’s the worst thing in the whole world isn’t it? Does everybody here agree with me on this? Look how simple this is.

24:53

Here’s your 22 second course in leadership. That’s all it takes. You don’t have to go to business school. You don’t need books. You don’t need guest speakers. All you have to do is take that list that’s in Emily’s head, and every single other person in this room, every single other person in the whole world, has this list in their head – trustworthy, principled, courageous, competent, loyal, kind, understanding, forgiving, unselfish, and in every single one of your interactions with others, be the list!  Remember how that puppy went all in? You do this with the other human beings you encounter in life. They’re all going all-in and not because it’s your idea. Most people spend all day long trying to get other people to like them. They do it wrong. You do this list, you won’t be able to keep the people away. Everybody’s going to want to attach to you. And be willing to do what? Just like them puppy, they’d be willing to die for you. Because you are what they’ve been looking for their whole lives. This is pretty profound isn’t it?

Look at this picture. I love this picture. Does this woman look like she’s having a good time? OK. So I helped teach this high school class in Los Angeles, and the first class of each semester, a brand new group just like you guys, and I make them go through the following exercise. And believe me just like my eight dollar crystal ball, afterwards you’re going to go ‘I’m really glad I heard that. Because now I really understand things at a level I didn’t understand them before.’ And to understand is to what? To know what to do.

This will clear up all your blind spots about yourself and other human beings. I asked the group, show of hands, how many of you think all human beings are alike? Why? (Answer: “We all have the same basic needs. We express them differently. Tremendous diversity in how we go about meeting them, but ultimately we all have the same needs.”) You get two pens! That’s a beautiful answer. So we’re going to identify what those needs are. What’s your name? (Answer: “Craig”) Craig nailed it. Show of hands. How many of you want to be paid attention to? I mean is there really anybody here who doesn’t want to be paid attention to? You’re a different kind of human being if you are. OK. How many of you want to be listened to? How many of you want to be respected? How many of you want meaning satisfaction fulfillment in your life in the sense that you matter? And then I tell the high school kids, number five. I put it number five, even though it’s the most important of the five I put it last, because if I put it first you wouldn’t raise your hands because it’s awkward. They’re just going to think I’m weird. But then they do raise their hand because I soften them up. How many you want to be loved? Everybody’s exactly the same. The only difference is, as Craig said, is the strategy the that they’re employing to try to get to fulfill those needs. OK.

28:30

Now I’m going to tell you the strategy that dogs use. The dog is going to be very unhappy with me for telling you this. I’m ratting them out. So when your dog is in the backyard and he goes to the fence between your house and the next house and he talks to the dog next door, I’m going to tell you what he says, no one has ever divulged this before. You’re the first group to hear this. Your dog says to the dog next door, ‘Can you believe how easy it is to manipulate human beings and get them to do whatever you want them to do for you?’ And the dog next door goes, ‘I know it’s a piece of cake.’ And your dog says ‘Yeah. All you have to do is every single time they come home, you greet them at the door with the biggest unconditional show of attention that they’ve ever gotten in their whole life. And you only have to do it for like 15 seconds and then you can go back to doing whatever you were doing before and completely ignore them for the rest of the evening.’

However, you do have to do this every single time they come home. And what will the person do? They’ll take care of them. They’ll do anything for this dog. OK? Now do you think that this woman feels she’s being paid attention to? And listened to? And respected? Do you think she’s getting meaning, satisfaction, and fulfillment? Do you think she matters to this dog? And do you think she thinks this dog loves her? And what does the dog get in return? Everything.

All you have to do, if you want everything in life from everybody else, is first pay attention, listen to them, show them respect, give them meaning, satisfaction, and fulfillment. Convey to them that they matter to you. And show you love them. But you have to go first. And what are you going to get back. Mirrored reciprocation. Right? See how we tie this all together? The world is so damn simple. It’s not complicated at all! Every single person on this planet is looking for the same thing. Now why is it that we don’t act on these very simple things?

31:08

So I have an example I use with the class, my elevator example. I’m famous for my elevator story. You’re standing in front of an elevator. The doors open. And inside the elevator is one solitary stranger, you’ve never met this person before in your whole life. You walk into the elevator you have three choices for how you’re going to behave as you walk into this elevator. Choice number one you can smile say ‘good morning’. And I say, at least in California, if you do that 98 percent of the time the person will smile say good morning back. You can test it. OK. My guess is you’re going to find that 98 percent of the time that people say ‘good morning’. Choice number two, you can walk in and you can scowl and hiss at this stranger in the elevator. And they have no idea why you’re scowling and hissing at them. And I say 98 percent of the time, they may not hiss back at you, but they will scowl back at you. And option number three. This is where the wisdom comes. You can walk into the elevator and you can do nothing. And what do you get 98 percent of the time if you walk into an elevator and you do nothing from that stranger in the elevator? Nothing. It’s mirrored reciprocation isn’t it? But what did you have to do? You have to go first. And you’re going to get back whatever you put out there.

This is why these bars are full of people at 2:00 a.m. drowning their sorrows. Knocking down these drinks. ‘When’s the world going to give me something man? When am I going to get mine?’ Well what did you ever do? Did you ever get up of the morning and smile at the world? No. You either did nothing or you scowled and hissed at the world. You’re getting back exactly what you would expect to get back if you understood how the world really works. Which is why we study multidisciplinary things right? We can’t be wrong on this can we? It’s all mirrored reciprocation. So what do you want to do? You want to go positive, you want to go first. What’s the obstacle? There’s a big obstacle. This is an economics club. Certainly you have all heard of Daniel Kahneman, Nobel Prize winner in economics. Behavioral economics. And what did he win his Nobel Prize for? For answering the question, why would people not go positive and not go first when there’s a 98 percent chance you’re going to benefit from it, and only a 2 percent chance the person’s going to tell you to ‘screw off’ and you’re going to feel horrible, lose face, and all the rest of that. And that’s real. That’s why we don’t do it. He said there’s huge asymmetry between the standard human desire for gain and the standard human desire to avoid loss. Which one do you think is more powerful? 98 percent versus 2!

34:14

Now I gave this same talk at Fairfax up in Toronto, Prem Watsa’s outfit. It’s the Berkshire Hathaway of Canada. And I said ‘Of all people in the whole world, you guys should not be making this mistake.’ Why? Because you’re in the insurance business. How does insurance work? You’re supposed to spend 2 percent to protect 98 percent, right? Look what you’re doing. You’re spending 98 percent to protect against the 2 percent probability that somebody makes you look foolish. Lou Brock set the Major League record for stolen bases with the St. Louis Cardinals many years ago. And he once said, ‘Show me a man who is afraid of appearing foolish and I’ll show you a man who can be beat every time.’ And if you’re getting beat in life, chances are it’s because you’re afraid of appearing foolish. So what do I do with my life? I risk the two percent. I was so proud the other day, I was reading Bono on Bono. Bono’s the lead singer of U2. He’s the only other person I’ve ever encountered in my entire life, and I asked all my cronies, ‘Has anybody else ever encountered this elevator model before?’ ‘No. No that’s yours Peter.’ And I said, ‘You know how I said 98-2? Guess who’s got the exact same model? Bono! Well he doesn’t have 98-2, he’s got 90-10.’ Those are his numbers 90-10. Can I be wrong on this? That guy is really squared away. I hope some day I’m as squared away as he is. It’s incredible to think, he figured it out. That’s why that guy’s had such a great life. He goes, ‘You know, I know 10 percent of people are going to screw me. That’s OK. If I’m not willing to be vulnerable and expose myself to that 10%, I’m going to miss the other 90%.’ Does that make sense? Now Charlie Munger one day, you know he turned my whole life upside down. I was over at his house one day and he said, ‘Peter, I’ve been hearing about you going around giving all these talks. You don’t have to go around the country telling people how to make more money.’ I said, ‘Well that’s not what I do Charlie.’ I was very nimble on my feet. I said there’s a catch. I do tell how to make more money but, by the way, if you do these things that get people all-in and whatnot, you’ll make all the money there is to be made. You really will. That’s not why I’m here. I’m here to give you the second half of the message, which is how to be a good person!  What’s your name? (Answer: “Albert”) Albert, How many lifetimes do you have Albert? (Answer: “One”) That’s correct, you get a pen. You see Albert lucked out, he got an easy question. Is your lifetime important to you Albert? (Answer: “One of the most important. Absolutely)

37:15

Now what do we know in economics, it’s an economics model, what do we know we need to use as our decision making prism whenever something is both finite, like one, and important like your life? How do we have to make decisions? You had Mankiw here right? He didn’t talk about opportunity cost? Have you all heard of opportunity cost? It’s the classic illustration of opportunity cost. You have a finite number of something, it’s important. If you’re doing ‘A’ with it, it means what? It means you’re not doing B or C or D or E. What do you have to do? You have to evaluate all the different alternatives and pick the one that’s most optimal. Is that fair? So you’ve got one lifetime. How do you want to spend your one lifetime? Do you want to spend your one lifetime like most people do, fighting with everybody around them? No. I just told you how to avoid that. And in exchange have what? A celebratory life. Instead of an antagonistic fighting life. All you have to do is go positive, go first, be patient enough.  You know we have to be patient for a week with this puppy. Do you know how long it usually takes for a human being to do all the probing and testing that Emily was going to do and to find out that you’re for real? It takes six months. This is why nobody does it. ‘Oh it takes too long.’ Compared to what? Look at the plan B that everybody uses. It’s terrible! It doesn’t work. They spend their whole lives fighting with everybody.

39:01

The three hallmarks of a great investment are superior returns, low risk, and long duration. The whole world concentrates on Category 1. But if you’re a leader of any merit at all, you should be treating these three as what? Co-priorities. How do you get low risk and long duration? Win-Win. This is the biggest blind spot in business. People are actually proud of a win-lose relationship. ‘Yeah we really beat the crap out of our suppliers.’ You know, ‘We’ve got these employees for…you know, we’ve got them on an HB1 visa, they can’t work anywhere else for three years.’ They’re proud of it! Total Win-Lose. You take game theory (link 1, 2) and you insert the word lose in any scenario in game theory and what do you have? A suboptimal outcome. What happens you insert win-win in any game theory scenario, what do you get? Optimal every time. What must you necessarily do if you’re interested in achieving win-win frameworks with your important counterparties in life? You must understand the basic axiom of clinical psychology, which I know because I’m multidisciplinary. I also learned psychology. The basic axiom of clinical psychology reads, ‘If you could see the world the way I see it, you’d understand why I behave the way I do.’ That’s pretty good isn’t it? Now there’s two corollaries to that axiom. And I say if you buy the axiom, which you should, you must buy the two corollaries as well because they’re logical extensions. They’re undeniable. Corollary number one, if that axiom is true and you want to understand the way someone’s behaving, you must see the world as they see it. But corollary number two, if you want to change a human being’s behavior and you accept that axiom, you must necessarily, to get them to change, change how they see the world. Now this sounds impossible. It’s not really that hard. You take a business. Most employees of a business see the world as employees. What if you could get them to see the world instead through the eyes of an owner? Do you think that’s going to change how they behave? It totally changes how they behave. Employees don’t care about waste. Owners do. Employees don’t self-police our place. Owners do.

42:05

This is the secret to leadership. The secret to leadership is to see through the eyes of all six important counterparty groups and make sure that everything you do is structured in such a way to be win-win with them. So here are the six. Your customers, your suppliers, your employees, your owners, your regulators, and the communities you operate in. And if you can truly see through the eyes of all six of these counterparty groups and understand their needs, their aspirations, their insecurities, their time horizons. How many blind spots do you have now? Zero. How many mistakes are you going to make? You’re going to make zero. People don’t think this is possible. It’s really easy. To understand is to know what to do. So I’m going to wrap up here because I’ve only got two minutes. There’s this great African proverb. It’s the definition of win-win. ‘If you want to go quickly go alone, if you want to go far, go together.’ Live your life to go far together. Don’t live it to go quickly alone. Most people grow up wanting to go quickly alone. It doesn’t work. You wind up like Ebenezer Scrooge in A Christmas Carol. You get to the end of your life. Yeah you’re rich, you’re powerful, you’re famous, and you want a do over because you realize at the end of your life, ‘I didn’t live my life right.’ I don’t have what really matters. What really matters is to have people pay attention to you, listen to you, and respect you, show you that you matter, and to love you. And to have it be genuine, not bought. Does that makes sense?

44:00

And I’ll leave you my last bit of wisdom. There’s another proverb, it’s a Turkish Proverb. ‘No road is long with good company.’ The essence of life is to surround yourself, as continuously as you can, with good company. Like I have today. You’re marvelous company. But how did I get that? I had to earn it, didn’t I? I’m not just some guy you picked off the street. I earned the privilege of coming here and the privilege of being with you. It gives me what? It gives me meaning in my life. It makes me feel I matter. To have people listening to me. This is my strategy for getting those five thing. You can develop your own strategy and I hope it involves going positive and going first. Thank you.

End of Transcript

Thank you for reading. I hope you all thoroughly enjoyed the transcript. If you found any errors, kindly let me know and I will fix them.

Furthermore, if you’d like to be informed of future posts, transcripts, or events, please subscribe.

Sincerely,

Richard Lewis, CFA
White Stork Asset Management LLC
Partner, Investments

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Charlie Munger: Full Transcript of Daily Journal Annual Meeting 2018

Last week I had the great pleasure of hearing Charlie Munger speak at the Daily Journal Annual Meeting for the third time.  For two hours he captivated the audience with an abundance of whit, wisdom, stamina, and kindness.  At 94 years young, Charlie shows no signs of slowing down.

I transcribed the full event from my audio recording which you may listen to on SoundCloud.  Throughout the transcript you will find;

  1. Time stamps, each linked to its corresponding recording location.
  2. Links to relevant supporting information.

I would like to thank Mr. Munger for energetically entertaining our questions and graciously sharing his wisdom, insights, and time with all of us.

I hope you all enjoy!

(Note: You will find that I frequently summarized the questions from the audience, but as for anything that Charlie, Gerry, or Peter said, I translated them verbatim and as accurately as possible.)

2018 Daily Journal Meeting Transcript

0:00 Meeting Begins (Note: Tedious meeting details of the first 4 min. 33 sec. were edited out of the transcript.)

Charlie: We are waiting for some of our directors who are in the restroom. If you have a group of elderly males, they never get together on time. (laughter)  Well I call the meeting to order, I’m Charlie Munger, Chairman, and here’s the rest of the directors… We will now proceed to the formal business of the meeting, and that will be followed by pontification and questions… (laughter)

Ellen Ireland: (Votes for independent accountants)…For the auditors, 1,283,388.  Against, 275.  And Abstaining, 244.

Charlie: That is very interesting.  That is a lot of votes to vote against an auditor.  Some of this stuff is really weird. (laughter)  Maybe they fired somebody who doesn’t like them. (link)

4:33 “Pontification” Begins

Now on to pontification and questions.  I’ll first comment briefly about the general nature of the Daily Journal’s traditional business.  We are surviving but at a very modest profit, and it’s quite interesting what’s going on.  There’s a huge…trove of valuable information burred in the court system that nobody could get out before under the computing power of the procedures of yore.  And of course lawyers want to know what their judge did in all previous cases.  And how many cases the opposing council has won or lost and so forth.  So it’s going to be a big business of delivering more information to people.  But of course there are a horde of people trying to get into that.  Some of them are computer science types and some are just other types.  God knows how it’s going to come out, but we’re doing our part of that struggle.  The chances that we get as dominant a position as we had before when we were the only newspaper that had timely publications and print, all the court opinions of course where lawyers needed to have them is zero.  In other words, our glory days are behind us in this traditional business.  It may well survive creditably, but it’s not going to be a big business.

Most newspapers by the way I think are going to perish.  It’s just a question of when.  I mean they’re all going to die.  You know the New York Times will continue because people will pay $5 for it in an airport.  So there will be a few survivors, but by and large the newspaper business is not doing well.  Berkshire Hathaway owns a lot of them.  And buying them we figured on a certain natural decline rate after which the profits would go to zero. (link)  We underestimated the rate of decline.  It’s going faster than we thought.

On the other side we have this second business in the Daily Journal Company which is this software business.  That of course has taken a lot of treasure and a lot of effort to get started.  But our software business now produces a lot more revenue than our traditional print business, and it’s generally doing quite credibly.  It’s a very competitive business, and it’s difficult.  A lot of people in the software business don’t want to deal with a bunch of government agents.  It’s just too much agony.  They’re use to just printing money automatically…(inaudible)…not being overwhelmed by it, the money rolling in.  And the way we’re making money is slow and hard.  It’s a software business, but it’s a slow hard software business.  We have internal arguments about whether the first real revenue comes four years after the first customer contact or seven.  That’s the kind of business it is, it’s constantly spending money now just to…(inaudible)…returns for a long, long time…before we have a lot of difficult bureaucracies to get through in the mean time.  And the funny thing is, we actually got to kind of like it.  If you do it right, these courts eventually trust us, and district attorney offices, etc. etc.  And it’s a real pleasure just slowly earning the trust of a bunch of customers by doing your job right and scrambling out of your glitches as fast as you can.  I would say that business is doing well.  Jerry would you make a few comments about this new business?

9:00

Gerry Salzman: The new business is slow in coming as Charlie indicated, but (it’s long-term) once you get there.  You have to understand it’ll be quite long because government agencies do not want to spend additional time changing software companies.  It’s very painful.  And one of the problems is always the conversions and the interfaces.  Some of our clients have upwards of 20 different interfaces and an appetite for many more because they recognize that if there’s an interface it probably takes a lot of effort.  And so we have maybe 25 people primarily based in our office in Denver doing nothing but interfaces and conversion.  And implementation of most systems depends on the implementation of the conversions and the interfaces.  That is one of the continuing headaches because most government agencies have old systems and it’s extremely difficult to convert information that went into their system 30 years ago.  That’s one of the problems we face on every single installation.

We have a large number of installations going on.  Most will take upwards of a year, some much longer, depending on the client.  Some clients have very few people that are assigned to work with us on the implementation.  And other clients have upwards of 15 people.  So we find that the 15 people is a great investment from the client’s standpoint because it’s much faster, and they learn how to do it and make changes into the future, and that’s our objective, is to have them be totally familiar with the system, and when their requirements change they are then able to configure it and create documents in a very effective way.  In contrast, historically, the government agencies would ask their IT department to do something, and it would take forever for the IT department to do it.  Now it’s much more efficient and very effective.  And it helps the IT department feel important, and it’s important for us that the IT department feel important because then the IT staff will stick around rather than find greener pastures.  That enables us to get in and out much faster and satisfy the Client.

12:26

Charlie: There are two things that shareholders should know about our software business.  One is that our system is more configurable than that offered by many of our competitors.  That is a hugely good idea on our part.  And the other thing is that we’re slower to recognize revenue when somebody hires us than most of our competitors, and that is also a good thing because if you agree to give somebody selling computer software a lot of pay for developing a system, you can spend a lot of money and get nothing back.  Buyers are very wary.  And we are playing to that by…one of the advantages of being very rich is that we can behave better than other people.  Not only are we very rich, we don’t give a damn about what we report in any given quarter, and that gives us an advantage in saying to these government agencies, “You’re not going to take a big risk with us because you’re not going to pay us until the system is working.”  And I think it’s a very good idea that we’re using conservative accounting and have that attitude towards dealing with our customers.  We want the customers to be right when they trust us.  It’s rather interesting the way it has happened.

I will confess to one thing to this group of shareholders.  I’ve fallen in love with the Justice Agency of South Australia.  We have a contract there, and I think we trust them and they trust us.  And we are going to do a hell of a good job for Australia.  And it gives me an enormous pleasure.  So I’m biased in favor of Australia.  The shareholders will just have live with it.  We may end up with pretty much all of our business in Australia.  If we do, it will because we deserve it.  That’s our system, we try and deserve the business, that’s the way we’re trying to get it. (link)

Well, that’s pretty much…It’s been a long slog to date and there’ll be a long slog ahead.  We’re taking some territory, but it’s not rapid and it it’s never going to be the kind of thing that Google gets into, or Microsoft, where the sky just rains gold.  It’s going to be a long, long slog.  But we have a big pack of money and we have a strong will, and we have a lot of good people working in the system, and I think we’ll end up slogging pretty well.

Now, in addition to our businesses, we have a great bundle of securities.  And I want to try and dispel for the hundredth time, that this is not…we do not have some minor version of Berkshire Hathaway which has a big bundle of securities in its insurance companies, plus a lot of operating business.  We have a big bundle of securities by accident when we made a lot of money out of the foreclosure boom.  And it just happened to come in about the time when the market hit bottom.  And of course we look like a genius now because we put the money into securities because we preferred them to holding cash.  But this is not a Berkshire Hathaway (version), this is a computer software company who has a stable but small print business, and we just have a lot of extra liquidity on hand, which came to us by accident.  But of course when the money came to us by accident, we invested it as shrewdly as we could.  But the chance that we will continually gain at the rate we have in the past 4 or 5 years is zero.  Now having said that, we’re going to report in the next quarter a big increase in net worth because our deferred taxes have gone down thanks to the Trump changes in the tax code.  So we’re going to look like a genius from another accident for one more quarter. (Laughter)

16:55

(Inaudible)…There’s one security in there that is very interesting because BYD has gotten to be a significant position around here.  That with Berkshire Hathaway and the Munger family money that went into it was really a venture capital type play even though it was in the public market.  And BYD has developed into a huge company.  It’s got 250,000 employees more or less. It has a huge electric car business, it has a small gasoline car business, it has a huge battery business, it has a huge new lithium mine coming into production…(Inaudible)…near Tibet, but has a lake full of toxic water that if you drank it, it would kill you.  But it’s perfect for mining lithium.  And it’s a big lake.  One of the biggest in the world.  So we have an interesting venture capital type business, and BYD has gone into a business they were never in before, which is monorails.  And they are selling monorails like you can’t believe.  Boom-diddy, boom-diddy, boom to whole cities in China.  And some even in other countries.  And they’re also selling those big electric buses, etc. etc. and so on.  It’s weird that anybody at Berkshire or in the Munger Family, or the Daily Journal would have anything to do with a little company in China that becomes a big company, but it happened.

And there’s a buried story here that’s wonderful.  The man who founded BYD was like the eighth son of a peasant, and an older brother noticed that he was a genius and then with their Confucian system, the older brother just devoted his life to making sure the genius got educated. (link 1, 2, 3, 4)  And he got to be a PhD engineer, and then he decided to go in to the business of making cell phone batteries, in competition with the Japanese who had all the patents.  And he got $300,000 from the Bank of China, he had a cousin that approved the loan…a very Confucian system.  At any rate, from that tiny start, he created this enormous company.  250,000 employees.  And of course the governments of Shenzhen and this province up in Tibet, love BYD.  It’s not some partially owned joint venture, it’s a Chinese company created by Chinese, it’s high-tech, it does wonderful things.  And it hasn’t disappointed anybody yet, in any significant way.  So it’s heartening for me to watch.  Think of how hard it would be to create a big mono-rail business that suddenly starts to gallop.  Think how few mono-rails there are in the United States.  But of course the Chinese permitting system is totally different from the United States.  If the Chinese want to do something, they just do it.  Of course I love that system.  That’s the Salzman system.  If Gerry wants to do something he just does it.  But there are some varied stories like that, and it’s a pleasure to be affiliated with people who are accomplishing a lot.  And of course it’s good that you have electric buses in place where you can’t breathe the air, which is a lot of places.  And it’s good that we have a new lithium mine up in Tibet, or near Tibet, etc. etc. and so on.  There are some weirdness around here.  I don’t think we were very weird in buying into banks when they were very depressed.

21:00

The Wells Fargo position is interesting, and I know I’ll get questions about that, so I’ll answer them again in advance. (laughter)  Of course Wells Fargo had incentive systems that were too strong in the wrong direction.  And of course they were too slow in reacting properly to bad news when it came.  Practically everybody makes those mistakes. (Note: See Question 16)  I think around here we make fewer than others, but we still make them in the same direction.  I think Wells Fargo will end up better off for having made those mistakes.  Any bank can make a lot of money by making a bunch of gamier loans at higher interest rates or abusing their customers with very aggressive treatments.  And of course banks really shouldn’t do that.  And I think as a result of all the trouble, Wells Fargo’s customers are going to be better off (for) this event, and I think it’s time for the regulators to let up on Wells Fargo.  They’ve learned.  I can’t think of anything else that deserves a lot of comment in our basic businesses.

I’m looking at a bunch of shareholder that really didn’t buy Daily Journal stock because of its prospects.  There’s one exception.  Big exception.  But most of you here for some other reason, you’re groupies. (laughter)  I know a few nerds when I see them, of all ages, and all I can say is, “takes one to know one.” (laughter)  Well I guess that’s enough of the…oh, I might go on.

One of our directors came up with a list of qualities that any investment advisor should have.  And he gave it to a future picker of professional investors, and the picker immediately fire half his picks.  And I thought that was such a peculiar outcome that I’ll let Peter Kaufman share with you his ‘five aces’ system for picking an investment manager.  Peter, go ahead.

23:58

Peter Kaufman: So I came up with this list in giving reference to a very exceptional money manager.  And I not only wanted to give what I thought was the correct reference, I wanted the person that I was giving the reference to, to in turn be able to relate this above to the real shot-caller.  So that a compelling narrative would be transferred from me directly to the ultimate shot-caller.  So I came up with what I call the “five aces”.  The five aces being the highest hand you can have in a wild card poker game.  Ace number one is total integrity.  Ace number two is actual deep deep fluency on whatever it is you say you’re going to do on behalf of the client.  Ace number three is a fee structure that is actually fair in both directions.  Ace number four is an uncrowded investment space.  Ace number five is a long run-way.  Meaning that the manager is reasonable young in age.  I further add that if you ever find a money manager who possesses all five of these characteristics, there are two things you should do.  One, you should put money with them immediately.  And number two, put as much money as you are allowed to put.  Now I know we have money managers in the room, and we have…

Charlie: Do we ever! (laughter)

Peter Kaufman: And we have people who employee money managers who are in the room.  If you employ money managers, this is an excellent formula to evaluate your money managers.

Charlie: Yeah, but it will cost you to fire half those you’ve hired..or you have hired. (laughter)

Peter Kaufman: But perhaps more importantly, if you’re a money manager, this should be your list of five aspirations.  What characteristics should I seek as a money manager to possess?  I should be completely trustworthy.  I should have actual deep fluency in what I claim that I’m going to do.  I should adopt a fee structure that’s generally fair in both directions.  I should seek an uncrowded space because as we all know, in business where there’s mystery, there’s margin.  What kind of margin are you going to have in a crowded space? (Note: See Question 21)  And number 5, many of you in here, you’re very fortunate.  You get to check that box for having a long runway.  Some of the best money managers in history only get four out of these five aces because they don’t qualify for number five.

27:23

Charlie: Those include those who you’re invested with. We do not have a long runway.  That doesn’t mean the company won’t do well, (laughter) but in terms of investment management runway, it’s rather interesting.  Berkshire Hathaway’s peculiar in that its directors are so old and its managers are so old.  The only institution that exceeds Berkshire Hathaway and the Daily Journal in terms of old directors in office is the Mormon Church. (laughter)  The Mormon church is run by a group of people and they have two wonderful qualities.  There’s no paid clergy in the Mormon church.  And the ruling powers in a group of males between about 85 and 100.  And that system is more successful than any other church.  No paid clergy and very old males.  Obviously we are copying that system at Berkshire and the Daily Journal. (laughter)  And we are so much older than the Berkshire directors who are also very old.  Warren says we’re always checking to see how the young fellows are doing at the Daily Journal versus Berkshire.  It is slightly weird.  But the world is…who would have guessed that the church with the best record for keeping people happy and so on and so on…(inaudible)…which is the Mormon church.  Who would have guessed that it had no paid clergy, run only by males who are about 85 and up?  Now that is a very odd result.  I guess I should like odd results, because I’m sure as hell living a life of a lot of odd results.  And I’m very surprised to be here.  Somebody said, an old woman whom I liked, said at her 94th birthday party, “I’m very pleased to be here”, in fact she said, “I’m very pleased to be anywhere.” (laughter)  Well that’s what it is, and it is weird.

I think the incentive structure in investment management is very interesting.  If you look at the people who have a ton of money from the past, like say the Massachusetts Investor Trust (link) or something like that, which pioneered Mutual Fund investing in the early days after Mutual Funds were allowed.  It was certainly a respectable and honorable place.  But once it gets to be $700 billion or whatever it is, and hires a lot of young men and has a big staff and so forth…and young women too…and spreads its investment over 50 securities at least, the chances that it’s going to outperform the S&P average really shrinks to about zero.  And of course they wondered what we’ll keep paying, whatever number of basis points Massachusetts Investor Trust’s management operation charges for the long-term, and they may feel under pressure and that their world is threatened.

Another place that’s threatened.  Suppose you’re charging say 1 and 20, one percent off the top and twenty percent of profits…or even worse, two percent off the top and twenty percent of profits…and you’ve got $30 billion or so under management and an army of young ambitious people, all of whom want to get unreasonably rich very fast.  What are your chances of doing better for your clients?  Well the average entity that charges those fees, the chances the clients will do well is pretty poor.  That’s the reason Warren won that bet against the hedge funds.  Where he bet on the S&P averages and they bet on carefully selected bunch of geniuses charging very high fees.  And of course the high fees will just kill you.  It’s so hard in a competitive world to get big advantages just buying securities, particularly when you’re doing it by the billion, and then you add the burden of very high fees and think that by working hard and reading a lot of sell-side research and so forth, that you’re going to do well.  It’s delusional.  It’s not good to face the world in a delusional way.  And I don’t think, when Berkshire came up, we had an easier world than you people are facing this point forward, and I don’t think you’re going to get the kind of results we got by just doing what we did.  That’s not to say what we did and the attitudes that we had are obsolete or won’t be useful, it’s just that their prospects are worse.  There’s a rule of fishing that’s a very good rule.  The first rule of fishing is “fish where the fish are”, and the second rule of fishing is “don’t forget rule number one.”  And in investing it’s the same thing.  Some places have lots of fish and you don’t have to be that good a fisherman to do pretty well.  Other places are so heavily fished that no matter how good a fisherman you are, you aren’t going to do very well.  And in the world we’re living in now, an awful lot of places are in the second category.  I don’t think that should discourage anyone.  I mean life’s a long game, and there are easy stretches and hard stretches and good opportunities and bad opportunities.  The right way to go at life is to take it as it comes and do the best you can.  And if you live to an old age, you’ll get your share of good opportunities.  It may be two to a lifetime, that may be your full share.  But if you seize one of the two, you’ll be alright.  Well with that pontification done, I’ll take questions.

34:56 Q&A Begins

Question 1: How do you define mid-western values, and how have they influence you?  How much are they embedded into the DNA of Berkshire?

Charlie: Well I think there is some Middle Western values embedded in Berkshire.  I don’t think it would be the same place if it had grown up in the middle of Manhattan island.  There’s just so much buzz and craziness in finance in a place like Manhattan that I think it was actually an advantage for Warren to be brought up in a place out of Omaha. (link 1, 2)  Certainly I have a deep ties of affection and respect for my life in Omaha and my parents and their friends.  And so I like what I think of as Middle Western culture.  And I really don’t like crazy culture.  There’s a lot of it in a lot of places.  So yeah, I…(inaudible)…Mid-Western culture.  I don’t think it’s that bad in the South or the East or the Rocky Mountains, but I have less experience with that culture.  And I go to Montana to fly-fish, and I like Montana when I’m there, but that’s too rugged for me.  I like more intellectualism in the bigger cities.  So Omaha was just right for me.

36:49

Question 2: My question relates to BYD.  Given that you’ve successfully invested in commodities in the past, how do you view investing in things such Cobalt, Lithium, and Helium as technologies of the future?

Charlie: Well I’m hardly an expert in commodity investing, but certainly cobalt is a very interesting metal.  It’s up about 100% from the bottom.  And it could get tighter, but that’s not my game. (link)  I don’t know much about…I haven’t invested in metals in my life much.  I think I bought copper once with a few thousand dollars.  I think that’s my only experience.

37:53

Questions 3: When I reflect on where I am here in my 30’s I often think about the multiple sufferings you went through when you were my age.  I have the image of you walking the streets of Pasadena, shouldering your multiple griefs, alone.  In contrast to that, would you tell us about some of the people and experiences that helped you through that period?  And my friend also has a question…

Question 4: Did you ever have aspirations to be a comedian?  Because your jokes per minute are off the charts. (laughter)

Charlie: Well, I think you understand me best.  I’m really what I call a “gentile Jew”.  You know if you look at the way the world is working and just about 2% of the people provide about 60% of the humor.  And this is weird because this is a group that’s had a lot of trouble.  And so I just like the Jews, I like the humor.  My way of coping.  And by the way, I recommend it to all of you.  There are…I might tell a story about a darling little girl, wispy blonde hair, beautiful curls, charming lisp.  She goes into the pet store, and the pet store owner says, “Oh you little darling blonde haired girl, what can we do for you?”  “Wabbits, I want Wabbits.”  “Oh we’ve got wonderful ‘Wabbits’.  Grey wabbits, white wabbits, brown wabbits.  What kind of wabbits do you want?”  And she said, “I don’t think my lovely big snake is going to give a shit.” (big laughter)  It does help to go through life with a little humor.  One thing that’s nice about the human condition is that people are always doing these utterly ridiculous things.  You don’t lack for new things to crack jokes about. (link)

40:56

Question 5: I have a question about the talk you did about the talk you did back in 1995 at Harvard on “the Standard Causes of Human Misjudgment” (link 1, 2), and I thought you ended it in a very interesting way where you said, “I don’t think it’s good teaching psychology to masses, in fact I think it’s terrible.”  Would you elaborate on that comment?

Charlie: Well it sounds as though I’m somewhat misquoted.  I do think it’s hard to teach the whole reach of psychology the way they do it in academia.  Because the way they do it in academia is they want to do experiments and they want to learn things from the experiments that they can publish.  Therefore the experiments have to be pretty simple, testing one particular triggering factor if they can.  And by doing that over a vast number of triggering factors, they accumulate a big body of experimental events and you can drag some general principles out of it.  The great utility of psychology is when you know those principles as bluntly as you know how to read or something, really fluently.  And you use those principles in synthesis with the rest of knowledge.  The interplay of psychology with the rest of knowledge is a vastly productive area for correct thinking. But the psychology professors can’t do it because they don’t know the rest of knowledge, and there’s no reward in psychology for synthesizing the rest of knowledge with psychology.  The rewards are for doing another experiment and publishing.  And so it’s mis-taught.  It’s a subject that intrinsically works best when you use it in combination with some other discipline.  But academia is not set up for people to get good at using a blend of two disciplines.  So the whole damn system is wrong.  On the other hand it gave great opportunity to me because I always figured when I was young that if my professor didn’t know it, it just didn’t matter I’d figure it out for myself.  I could tell though from the first instance that the big territory was synthesizing psychology with the rest of knowledge.  So I learned psychology so I could do it.  But psychology professors, they just try and learn it the way it’s taught.  There’s no reward if you’re a professor of psychology for synthesizing psychology with the rest of knowledge.  Now you people should follow my example.  Not the example of the psychology professors.  I guarantee you that you won’t make any money doing it their way.  Occasionally you find a group like Thaler’s group, Thaler just won the Nobel prize by the way.  And he’s trying to synthesize the process.  And I say more power to Thaler.  May his tribe increase.  (“Abou Ben Adhem” link 1, 2, 3)  And it’s a good sign that the world has given it to Thaler…the Nobel Prize.  He’s doing exactly what I’m recommending.

45:15

Question 6: Speaking of Munger’s system, if you had to teach the Munger system of mental models to primary children, would you focus on covering all the models or would you focus on teaching them how to figure it out themselves?

Charlie: I’d do both.  Of course if you get the right number of models in your head it helps, and of course you want to get fluency of using the models, there isn’t any real road to getting it done fast.  At least if there is I’ve never found it.  You can keep at it.  But that’s my system.  My whole system in life is keeping at it.  I’m a big admirer of Carlyle’s approach, which was quoted all the time by Sir William Osler, who was one of the most highly regarded physician in the world.  Carlyle says that “The task of man is not to see what lies dimly in the distance, but to do what lies clearly at hand.” (link)  I think that’s right.  I think that most of the time, you should get the work that’s before you done and just let the future fall where it will.

46:33

Question 7: My Question is concerning commercial banks, obviously Berkshire has a very large $60 billion portfolio there, and Daily Journal has a very sizable one.  My question is, as I look at that portfolio, especially the Berkshire portfolio, there are quite a few banks that appear to be at or close to the quality of what’s in that in that portfolio, some of which people like you think highly of.  My question is, I realize they’re pretty fully valued now, maybe 4 to 5 years ago when they weren’t, why aren’t there more of those high quality banks in the Berkshire portfolio?  Is it just the concentration of the portfolio?  Because $60 billion’s a lot.  Or is there some pattern among those banks to make them less attractive to you and Mr. Buffett?

Charlie: Well, banking is a very peculiar business.  The temptations that come to a banking CEO are way…the temptations to do something stupid are way greater in banking than they are in most businesses.  Therefore it’s a dangerous place to invest because there are a lot of way in banking to make the near term future look good by taking risks you really shouldn’t take for the sake of the long-term future.  And so banking is a dangerous place to invest and there are a few exceptions.  And Berkshire has tried to (pick) the exceptions as best it could.  And I haven’t had any more to say on that subject except, I’m sure I’m right.

48:26

Question 8: Your thoughts on the valuation of software companies like Apple, Facebook, Google, Amazon, Alibaba.  Are they over-valued, potentially under-valued, too early to tell?

Charlie: Well my answer is I don’t know. (laughter)  Next question. (laughter)

49:04

Question 9: This question is for Mr. Kauffman.  You mentioned about the “five aces” and aligning the interests with investors with the right fee structure to benefit both.  What have you seen as a good fee structure, both from a start-up fund with say $50 million in assets, and then the larger funds with assets over billion?

Peter Kaufman: I’ll let Charlie answer that because he can describe to you what he thinks is the most fair fee formula that ever existed and that’s the formula in Warren Buffett’s original partnership.

Charlie: Yeah, Buffett copied that from Graham.  And Mohnish Pabrai is probably here…is Mohnish here?  Stand up and wave to them Mohnish.  This man uses the Buffett formula, and always has, he just copied it.  And Mohnish has just completed 10 years…where he was making up for a high water-mark.  So he took nothing off the top at all for 10 years, he sucked his living out of his own capital for ten long years, because that’s what a good money manager should be cheerfully willing to do.  But there aren’t many Mohnish’s.  Everybody else wants to scrape it off the top in gobs.  And it’s a wrong system.  Why shouldn’t a man who has to manage your money whose 40 years of age be already rich?  Why would you want to give your money to somebody who hasn’t accumulated anything by the time he was 40.  If he has some money, why should he on the downside suffer right along with you the investor?  I’m not talking about the employees under the top manager.  But I like the Buffett formula.  Here he is, he’s had these huge successes.  Huge in Buffett’s career.  But who is copying the Buffett formula?  Well we got Mohnish and maybe there are a few others, probably in the room.  But everybody wants to scrape it off the top, because that’s what everybody really needs, is a check every month.  That’s what is comforting to human nature.  And of course half the population, that’s all they have, they’re living pay check to pay check.  The Buffett formula was that he took 25% of the profits over 6% per annum with a high water mark.  So if the investor didn’t get 6%, Buffett would get nothing.  And that’s Mohnish’s system.  And I like that system, but it’s like many things that I like and I think should spread, we get like almost no successes spreading that system.  It’s too hard.  The people who are capable of attracting money on more lenient terms, it just seems too hard.  If it were easier, I think there would be more copying of the Buffett system.  But we still got Mohnish. (laughter)

52:50

Question 10: Why have you chosen to have your friends call you Charlie Munger when you could have instead chosen to go by “Chuck” Munger?

Charlie: The only people who call me “Chuck”, call me blind on the telephone and ask me to invest in oil plays. (laughter)  No I don’t mind being called Charlie.  My Grandfather was Charlie Munger.  When he got appointed as a federal judge he thought it was undignified to be a “Charlie”, so he reversed his initials, then he was T.C. Munger instead of C.T.  But I didn’t follow my grandfather’s practice, I was quite willing to have an undignified name. (laughter)

53:46

Question 11: Two Questions.  Could you give more detail around the Berkshire, J.P. Morgan, Amazon, healthcare partnership and why in the initial press release it said that the model would be spread beyond the employees of the three companies, but then the WSJ reported that the model would only be for the employees of the three companies?  My second question is, can you give your view on ‘what is Li Lu’s talent’?

Charlie: Well those are two unrelated questions but there’s no rule against it.  But three are too much just for the record. (laughter)  On the healthcare system, the existing system runs out of control on the cost side and it causes a lot of behavior which is not only regrettable but it’s evil.  There’s a lot of totally unnecessary crapola that’s crept into the medical system so that people can make more money.  And the costs are just running completely out of control.

And other people have systems that have better statistics that cost maybe a fifth as much, if you talk about Singapore, or half as much if you talk about some liberal European country.  So they’re just concerned about something that’s run out of control because the incentives are wrong and they want to study it and do something…for the three companies.  Of course that’s a very difficult thing to take on.  I don’t know how it will work out.  The man in America that thinks about these subjects in a way that I much admire is Atul Gawande whose a professor of medicine at Harvard.  He’s not only the best writer that I know of in the whole medical profession, he’s also a very honorable and very clear thinking man.  Both his parents were physicians.  This is a man that can check all the boxes.  There’s a lot wrong and these people are looking at it to see if they can do something.  They’re going to find it plenty difficult.

It wouldn’t be hard if you were a benign despot to do something pretty dramatic.  Take macular degeneration of the eye.  Old people who have it, which is a lot, need a shot on a regular (basis).  Well I can give that damn shot.  It’s not that hard to shoot a little gook into an eyeball if you know how to do it.  It draws a lot of pay.  And there are two different substances you use, and one of them costs and fortune and the other costs practically nothing and they both work about equally well.  And of course what’s really being used in a lot of America is the more expensive of the two substances.  There’s a lot wrong with that situation.  It’s just crept in.  A lot of unnecessary costs.  Medicine’s just full of that kind of stuff.

And many a man whose dying is like a carcass in the plains of Africa, in come all the vultures and jackals and hyenas and so on.  A dying old person in many American hospitals looks just like a carcass in Africa.  Where the carnivores come in to feed.  It’s not right to bleed so much money out of our dying people.  And there’s not a hospital in America that doesn’t have people lying in the dialysis ward who have no chance of waking up, who are being dialysized to death.  Easily immoral, stupid conduct.  So the extent that somebody makes some assault on some of these asininities of our present healthcare system, I’m all for it.  On the other hand, I’m glad I’m not doing it because it’s really difficult.  I’m too old for that one.  But I welcome somebody who’s trying to…It’s deeply wrong what’s happening.  It’s deeply wrong.  And some stuff is not getting done that’s very cost effect and a lot of totally unnecessary stuff is being done.  Why shouldn’t we do that?  Well I’m all for somebody trying to figure it out.  But if they asked me to serve on such a panel I’d decline.  It’s really hard going and you’re stepping on a lot of…(inaudible).

The second question was Li Lu.  What was unusual about Li Lu.  Li Lu is one of the most successful investors. (link) Imagine him, he just popped out of somebody’s womb and he just assaulted life the best he could and he ended up pretty good at it.  But he was very good at a lot.  He’s ferociously smart.  It really helps to be intelligent.  He’s very energetic.  That also helps.  And he has a good temperament.  (link)  And he’s very aggressive, and he’s willing to patiently wait and then aggressively pounce. (link)  A very desirable temperament to have.  And if the reverse comes, he takes it well. (link)  Also a good quality to have.  So it’s not very hard to figure out what works.  But there aren’t that many Li Lu’s.  In my life, I’ve given money to one outside manager, and that’s Li Lu.  No others in my whole life.  And I have no feelings that it would be easy to find a second.  It’s not that there aren’t others out there, but they’re hard to find.  It doesn’t help you if a stock is a wonderful thing to buy if you can’t figure it out. (link)

1:00:13

Question 12: My question is really about brands.  In the past, you’ve talked about buying a business with a durable competitive advantage.  You’ve talked at length about great brands with pricing power.  Currently big consumer brands are losing their cache with younger consumers, new emerging brands started online, private label brands like Kirkland Signature are getting better by the day, and in turn big consumer brands are losing sales and pricing power.  In a world where the durable advantage seems to be acquired through scale, like Amazon and Costco, has your view on big consumer brand moats changed?

Charlie: Well the big consumer brands are still very valuable.  But they had an easier time in a former era than they’re going to have in the future era.  So you’re right about that.  And of course Amazon I don’t know that much about except that it’s unbelievably aggressive.  And the man who heads it is ferociously smart.  On the other hand he’s trying to do things that are difficult.  Costco I know a lot about because I’ve been a director for about 20 years and I think Costco will continue to flourish and it’s a damn miracle the way the Kirkland brand keeps getting more and more accepted.  You’re right about that.  So you’re right that it’s going to be harder for the big brands, but they’re still quite valuable.  If you could own say, the Snicker’s Bar trademarks and so forth, it will still be a good asset 60 years from now.  Now it may not be quite as good for the owner as it was in the last 60 years.  But it doesn’t have to be.  But in fact it makes it harder for you investors.  It use to be the groupie could buy Nestle and they’d think, ‘Well, I’ll just sit on…(inaudible)’.  I don’t think it’s quite that simple anymore.  It’s harder.  You’re right.  But you know that.  It was a great question. (laughter)  I just wanted you to breathe it in.  That’s what everybody likes.  You want the answering voice to agree with us.

1:02:37

Question 13: You once said in an interview that you’d prefer that the U.S. would import oil instead of getting it from the ground.  From where I come from, which is the Middle East, Kuwait, oil represents around 85 to 90% of the government’s revenues.  What do you think is the future for oil?

Charlie: Well, I said last year that oil was very interesting in that the great companies like Exxon were producing about a third as much as they use to at the peak, and yet they’re still very prosperous because the price of oil has gone up faster than production has gone down.  But it’s a weird subject, what’s going to happen with oil.  Eventually it’s going to get very hard to have more oil and eventually the price will go very high.  As a chemical feed-stock it’s totally essential, the hydrocarbons.  So it’s never going to go out of vogue, and of course we’re going to need it for energy for a long, long time ahead.  But as an investment I think it’s a difficult subject, and I think you’ll notice that Berkshire in its whole history has had few investments in oil.  Some, but it’s not that many.  The Daily Journal doesn’t have any.  It’s a tough subject and of course as I said here last year, I think the correct policy for the United States would be not to produce our oil so fast.  I think oil is so precious and so desirable over the long pull that I’d be very happy to have more of our oil just stay in the ground and just pay up front to the Arabs to use up theirs.  I think that would be the correct policy for the United States.  Only 99.9% of the rest of the people in world are against me. (laughter)  But why would we want to use up all our oil as fast as we can?  Why would that be smart?  Would we want to use up the topsoil of Iowa as fast as we can?  I don’t think so.  So I think our current policies are totally nutty.  And if you go on, when I was young, there were about 2 billion bushels of corn in the whole production of the country.  There are about 6 times as many bushels of corn (today), and a big chunk of that corn is being turned into motor fuel.  That is an utterly insane policy that happens because of the political power of the farm states in our weird system.  But nothing could be dumber than using of our topsoil to create corn to turn into motor fuel.  It’s really dumb.  Yet it’s there and nobody has any power of changing it.  It’s weird, the whole oil subject is weird.  It’s weird that companies prosper by producing less and less of their main product in physical terms, and it’s weird that a whole nation could do something as dumb as turn a big percentage of the corn crop into motor fuel by edict of the government.  So it’s a weird subject.  But the oil’s totally essential, the hydrocarbons.  Without the hydrocarbons, our great top soil doesn’t work very well.  The miracle grains are miracles if you use a lot of hydrocarbons, plus our good soil.  The miracle grains don’t work very well without the hydrocarbons.  It’s weird.  The current population of the earth is being fed by miracle grains and their miracle is they turn oil into food.  So you raised a weird subject, you must like weird subjects.

1:07:15

Question 14: Some of the greatest advancements to humanity seem to be the result of public-private partnerships.  The railroads, electrification, the technology revolution.  Now all those require some measure of rationality and foresight among politicians and business leaders.  Do you see any opportunities today in terms of the possibility for partnering for infrastructure or basic research or that sort of thing?

Charlie: Well the answer is yes.  I think one of the obvious needs is a really big national grid.  Which takes new government legislation and a lot of other things.  I think it’ll come, we should have it all ready.  It’s the failure of the government that we don’t have a wonderful electric grid.  But it will come and I think Berkshire Hathaway will be a big part of it when it happens.  But it’s easy to over-estimate the potential…why don’t we have a big electric grid that works already?  There are a lot of things that should happen but don’t happen, or happen very slowly.  I don’t think…calling it a public-private partnership sounds wonderful.  Everybody wants what my friend Peter Kaufman calls a “robust narrative”, that’s what people specialize in in America, robust narratives.  Public-private partnerships sounds like a robust narrative.  It sounds to me like a bunch of thieving bankers who get together with a bunch of thieving consultants. (laughter)  But it’s a robust narrative.

1:09:13

Question 15: You once said, when you acquire a company, your time horizon is typically forever, that being said, what did you recognize about General Electric before you got out?

Charlie: Well, we made an investment in General Electric in the middle of a panic because it was a decent buy as a security to be passively held.  It worked out for us fine.  General Electric of course is a very complicated and interesting subject.  It is interesting that a company so well regarded for acumen, education, technology, etc. etc. etc.  Could end up so ill-regarded as a result of a long period of sub-par performance.  People didn’t expect it.  Of course people are saying what caused the failure of performance at General Electric?  My answer would be partly, life is hard and there’s some accident in the world.  That’s part of it.  And part of it I would say that the system at General Electric where you rotate executives through different assignments as though there are so many army officers building up a resume to see if they can be promoted to be generals.  I don’t think that works as well as keeping people in one business for a long time and having them identify with the business the way Berkshire does.  So I would say to some extent, what’s happened in the case that…maybe there should be a little less of this corporate management in the style of the U.S. Army.  And maybe people should do actually a little more of Berkshire style where by and large people spend their whole careers in one business.  (link 1, 2)

1:11:47

Question 16: You served for many decades on a variety of boards, including for-profit sector and also the non-profit sector.  Could you give us any lessons you learned from serving on a board and touch on the criteria you consider for hiring and when necessary removing executives.

Charlie: Well, I don’t think I could do that in one short burst of pomposity.  Each situation is different, but I would say this, that If you asked people with long experience in management what their mistakes were looking backward, the standard response is, somebody who should have been removed wasn’t for way too long.  So I think that general lesson is true practically everywhere.  And in all contexts.  But beyond that, I don’t think I can…it’s too broad a question for me.

1:13:13

Question 17: Are you concerned at all about the rising level of government debt to GDP at the same time that we’re running large deficits late in the economic cycle.

Charlie: Of course I’m concerned about the rising level of government debt.  This is new territory for us, and new territories probably has some danger in it.  On the other hand, it is possible that the world will function more or less pretty well, even with a very different pattern of government behavior than you and I would have considered responsible based on history to date.  Of course if you look at the inflation we got out of the last hundred years when the announced objective of government was to keep prices stable.  Now the announced objective is 2% inflation.  Well what the hell’s going to happen?  Well the answer is, we don’t know.  But isn’t the way to bet that it’s going to be…inflation over the long-term is way higher than 2%?  I think the answer is yes.  But I think that we have learned from what has happened in the past that macro-economics is a very peculiar subject and it doesn’t work like physics. The system is different in one decade, than the system that was present in the last decade.  Different systems have different formulas, but they don’t tell you when systems have changed, and when the formulas have to change. (link 1, 2)

So I don’t expect the world to go totally to hell because…well, look at what happened in Germany after World War I.  They had a hyper-inflation when the currency basically went to zero in value.  They really screwed up big time.  And what happened?…Well what happened was they recovered from it pretty quick.  And they did it by creating a new Reichsmark backed by the mortgages which they put back on the houses and properties of the people who had unfairly gotten rid of their mortgages at no cost.  And that new Reichsmark was working pretty well and Germany had pretty well recovered from that catastrophe and then along came the Great Depression.  And the combination of the Great Depression and the Weimar inflation really brought in Hitler.  Without the Great Depression I don’t think he would have come into power.  What happened…now you’ve got…by the late 30’s, what was the leading economic power in Europe?  It was Germany.  Cause Hitler in his crazy desire for vengeance and so on, bought a lot of munitions and  trained a lot of soldiers and so forth.  And the accidental Keyensianism of Germany under Hitler caused this vast prosperity.  So Germany was the most prosperous place in Europe in 1939.  So all that catastrophe, they recovered from.  So I don’t think you should be too discouraged by the idea that the world might have some convulsions.  Because there’s a way of recovering.  Now I’m not advocating the German system (laughter), but I do think knowing these historical examples creates what I call “mental ploys.” (link)  And you’d think that a country that destroyed (itself) in a silly war, destruction of your own currency, great depression, and by 1939 it’s the most prosperous country in Europe.  It’s encouraging.  I hope you feel better. (laughter)

1:17:24

Question 18: Since the mid-1990’s, the number of DOJ cases filed annually under the Sherman Act has collapsed from 20 to almost zero.  Over the same period, we’ve seen a dramatic increase in the ‘winner-take-all’ effect.  Where market share of the top five companies across almost all industries have surged, not just technology and media.  And the number of publicly traded companies has dropped close to 50%.  So for example, from 8,100 to 4,300.  Why do you think the DOJ has less active in enforcing anti-trust legislation over the past 20+ year and do you think the DOJ is likely to become more active and how do you think that will affect the financial markets?

Charlie: Well I don’t know whether the DOJ is going to become more active or not.  I am not terribly disturbed by the present state of the economy or the present state of concentration of economic power.  Wherever I see companies by and large are having plenty of competition.  And so I’m not…(inaudible)…on the theory that the whole world is wrong as it’s presently constituted.  There are companies now, that people were worried about them being too powerful like Kodak and they’re not even here anymore.  I think we have enough competition by and large.  I do not think the world is going to hell from lack of activity in the Justice Department.

1:19:02

Question 19: How did Ajit Jain build Berkshire reinsurance from scratch?

Charlie: Well it’s very simple.  He worked about 90 hours a week.  He was very smart.  He’s very honorable.  He’s very pleasant to deal with.  And he talked every night to Warren Buffett.  Just find somebody else like that.  But he won’t do as well because the game is harder now than it was then.  And that’s my answer to your question.

1:19:49

Question 20: Question regarding Warren Buffett.  In 2008 he wrote an op-ed article regarding the depths of the bear market, talking about how he (Buffett) had previously put his own money into treasuries, and in my mind he’s normally thought of as a buy and hold investor, but in this case, a lot of his money, almost all of it was in treasuries.  And I wanted you to speak to the value of holding money in a portfolio at the proper time.

Charlie: Well, it’s possible that there could be when a wise investor would be all in treasuries.  That is not an impossible event.  It’s virtually impossible for me.  I can imagine such a world, but I don’t think…I haven’t been in that kind of a world yet.  Generally speaking long-term treasuries are a losing (investment) over the long-pull.  And that’s my view.

1:21:05

Question 21: In 1999, Warren Buffett said that he could return 50% if he ran $1 million.  Give what you said about the investment landscape today being more difficult, what do you think that number would be today?

Charlie: Well I do think that a very smart man who’s patient and aggressive in combination, is willing to work hard, to root around in untraveled places like thinly traded stocks and other odd places.  I do think a person with a lot of shrewdness, working with a small amount of capital, can probably earn high returns on capital even today.  However that is not my personal problem at the moment.  And for me it’s hard.  And for Berkshire it’s hard.  And for the Daily Journal we don’t have any cinch either.  It’s disadvantageous to have securities in a corporate vehicle like the Daily Journal Corporation.  It’s an accident that we have them there.  We have them there because that’s where the money was.  The way it’s worked out, it’s not desirable if you’re a shareholder and you have a layer of corporate taxes between you and your securities that are indirectly owned.  And once you get public securities held in a public corporation taxable under sub-Chapter C of the internal revenue code, all kinds of factors, including income taxes affect your investment decisions.  And it’s much easier to invest in charitable endowment or your personal pension plan.  Generally speaking, I would say, if you’re shrewd enough with small sums of money, I think you can compound pretty well.  The minute you get bigger sums, I think it starts getting difficult.  It’s way more difficult for all you people sitting here than it was for me when I was in your position.  But I’m about to die and you have a lot of years ahead. (laughter)  You would not want to trade your position for mine.

1:23:40

Question 22: What would you advise me as a teacher to help my students become better thinkers and decision makers and also become happy in life?

Charlie: I did not pick that up.  You were trying to help me by hurrying up, that’s not the best system…(laughter)

Well, that’s a wonderful question.  I would say the minute you have the attitude you’ve already expressed, you’re already probably going to win at everything you want to win at.  You just keep trying to live a good life, and a constructive life, and to be rational, and to be honorable, and to meet the reasonable expectations of people who depend on you.  Of course you’re going to get ahead over time.  And of course the best way to teach is by example.  And of course the example works better when you win and if you behave right you’re more likely to win.  So I would say, you’re on the right track already.  All you have to do is keep at it.  With your attitude, you can’t fail.

1:25:32

Question 23: Good morning Mr. Buffett…Mr. Munger.

Charlie: I’m flattered to be called Mr. Buffett. (laughter)

Question 23 Continued: The most recent annual report for Berkshire, as in the past reports, the growth in book value was shown and over the past 52 years it has grown from $19 to $172,000.  Which represents a return of 19% a year.  Is a large part of that outsized percentage attributable to the leverage inherent in the insurance company, such that you can own an investment in the insurance company which returns say 14% and it becomes 20% to book value?

Charlie: Well obviously there was a little leverage buried in the Berkshire numbers.  Obviously the insurance business provided some of that.  It’s not over-whelming in its consequences.  There were years when it was helping.  There were years when Ajit made so much money that it was almost embarrassing.  And then he’d give the money to Warren and Warren would make 20% on the money.  So there were some years when some remarkable synergies between the insurance business and Berkshire Hathaway.  But basically the insurance business is not some cinch easy way to make money.  There’s a lot of danger and trouble in the insurance business and its more and more competitive all the time now as we’re sitting here.  Berkshire succeeded because there were very few big errors…there were like no big errors, really big. (link) And there were a considerable number of successes.  All of which would have been much harder to get under present conditions than they were at the time we got the results.  And there are very few companies that have compounded at 19% per annum for fifty years.  It’s (a weird) in net worth.  That is very peculiar.  I wouldn’t count on that happening again soon.  It certainly won’t happen at the Daily Journal.

1:28:07

Question 24: Question regarding margin trading for Charlie and Rick Gueren.  With the recent decline in the stock market, there were a lot of margin calls to customers.  I know back in your partnership days, there was a big bear market and a lot of big declines in your portfolio.  Would you care to comment on the productivity of margin trading?

Charlie: Well of course it’s dangerous when you have a margin account because the person whose giving you credit can wipe you out at the bottom tick just because he feels nervous.  And therefore of course, people like Berkshire just totally avoid any position where anybody else would start selling our securities because he felt nervous.  And of course there are a lot of people now that are pushing margin trading very, very hard.  And…the minute you got weird new instruments like these VIX contracts that triggered new selling because existing selling happens.  So you get a feedback effect that were a little decline becomes a big one and then a big one becomes and bigger one, and so on.  And it rapidly goes down a lot in a short time.  I’m afraid that under modern conditions the risk of what happened recently with the VIX is just part of the modern conditions.  And of course we’ll always have margin traders who want to push life hard and we’ll always have catastrophes.  Neiderhoffer (link 1, 2) was just wiped out by the VIX, and that’s the second time he’s been wiped out.  And he’s a very talented man.  Neiderhoffer was famous at Harvard.  His name became a verb.  He learned to what was called “to Neiderhoffer the curriculum”.  He was a great card player and a great squash player, and a good national champion, and he was a scholarship student.  He didn’t have much money.  So he had to get very high grades, and he didn’t want to do any work.  So he figured out how to “Neiderhoffer” the curriculum of Harvard.  He signed up for nothing but the toughest graduate courses in economics.  And the economics students in those advanced courses were doing a lot of the scut work for the professors, and so nobody ever gave them anything less than an A.  And for a while Neiderhoffer didn’t even go to class.  They thought they had a new John Maynard Keynes at Harvard.  And he was just signing up for courses where you couldn’t get a low grade.  Interesting story.  Interesting man.  Wiped out a second time.  He’s very brilliant.  He was a very talented man.  Pushing life that hard is a mistake.  It’s maybe a less of a mistake when you’re trying to get out of the mire of mediocrity and get your head a little above the crowd.  But when you’re already rich, it’s insane.  Why would you risk what you have and need in order to get what you don’t have and don’t need?  It really is stupid.

1:31:50

Question 25: Question about the U.S. high-speed rail system.  As you know the high-speed rail act was introduced back in 1965 when Berkshire had their first annual meeting.  What is your thinking, or outlook, or comments about the U.S. high speed rail system.  Including the one that’s being built here in California, as well as the possibility for a national high speed rail system.

Charlie: Well that’s a very interest question.  The high speed rail system which was aggressively create in China is a huge success and very desirable.  So it’s not like it’s intrinsically a dumb idea.  However in the…(inaudible)…we actually have in America, getting a big high speed rail system is really difficult, including having one even in California.  And I’m not at all sure that trying to have a high speed rail system in California was wise all factors considered.  But I’m not sure that it isn’t on the other hand.  Just put me down as skeptical, but not determinedly opposed.  And I know it will cost a fortune, that I’m sure of.  The trouble with it is that it’s competing with something that works pretty well called the airplane.  So, I can’t answer your question except as I have.  I know we need a big grid.  I’m not sure the United States needs a high speed rail system for passengers.  I would say that may have passed us by.

1:34:04

Question 26: Could you comment on whether you ever considered investments in Hershey’s or Tiffany’s over the long term and have offered attractive entry points?

Charlie: Well I’d be delighted to own either Hershey’s or Tiffany’s at the right price, wouldn’t you?  It’s just a question of price.  Of course they’re great companies.  But that’s not enough, you have to have great companies available at a price you’re willing to pay.  Hershey’s is a private company.  Nobody’s offering me Hershey’s.  I can buy the candy, but I can’t buy the company.

1:35:30

Question 27: I’m here with my 92 year old Grandma whose spent the past 50 years investing for our family.  As a college senior with a passion for value investing, it keeps me up at night knowing that I will eventually be entrusted with a portfolio she built for a lifetime.  Based on the successful decisions that you’ve made for your large family here today, what advice do you have in regards to seizing the few opportunities when I will have to act decisively for my family without jeopardizing her life’s work?

Charlie: Well of course I like any 92 year old person. (laughter)  Particularly if it’s a good looking woman whose also rich. (laughter)  And whose descendants admire her.  Instead of being eager to have her gone. (laughter)  I’d say you have a big winner there in your family.  Try to live your life so that you can be a big winner too.

1:36:54

Question 28: It looks like the A.I. will have a much bigger impact on society than the internet revolution, so would you mind maybe sharing some of your thoughts on how artificial intelligence will impact different industries in general and who it will impact the future of the human race?

Charlie: Well, that’s a nice question. (laughter)  The people who studied artificial intelligence don’t really know the answer to that question.  I’m not studying artificial intelligence because I wouldn’t be able to learn much about it.  I can see that artificial intelligence is working in the marketing arrangements of Facebook and Google, so I think it is working in some places very well.  But it’s a very complicated subject.  And what its exact consequences are going to be, I don’t know.  I’ve done so well in life by just using organized common sense, that I never wanted to get into these fields like artificial intelligence.  If you can walk around the shores and pick up boulders of gold, as long as the boulders keep being found and picked up, I don’t want to go to the placer mining sifting vast amounts of data for some little edge.  So you’re just talking to the wrong person.  And I’m not at all sure how great…I don’t think artificial intelligence is at all sure to create an economic revolution.  I’m sure we’ll use more of it, but what are the consequence of using artificial intelligence to become the world’s best (golden boy)?  There may be places where it works, but we’ve thought about it at Geico for years and years and years, but we’re still using the old fashion intelligence.  So I don’t know enough about it to say more than that.

1:39:16

Question 29: Questions about culture.  How can an outsider really know a company’s culture?  And for that matter, how can an insider, at the top of an organization, really be certain about the culture of the company beneath him?  And how would you go about assessing the culture of giants like Wells Fargo or General Electric?  What is it that you look at that helps you understand culture?

Charlie: Well, you understand culture best where it’s really down (low) in a place like Costco.  And there the culture is a vast and constructive force.  Which will probably continue for a very, very long time.  The minute you get into General Electric, partly decentralized, partly not.  Multi-business instead of one business.  It gets very complicated.  What is the culture of General Electric when the businesses can be so radically different?  Maybe headquarters can have a certain kind of culture.  And maybe the culture will be a little wrong.  And maybe it’s wrong to shift people around from business to business as much as they do.  Which I strongly suspect.  I do think…there are very few businesses like Costco that have a very extreme culture where everybody’s bought into.  And where they stay in one basic business all the way.  I love a business like Costco because of the strong culture and how much can be achieved if the culture is right.  But the minute you get into the bigger and more complicated places…I mean you can talk about the culture of General Motors or the culture of AT&T, it’s a very difficult subject.  What big businesses have in common by and large is that they get very bureaucratic.  That’s the one norm in culture is that they get very bureaucratic.  And of course it happens to the government too.  A big governmental body.  And basically I don’t like bureaucracy, it creates a lot of error.  I don’t have a substitute for it.  I don’t have a better way of running the U.S. government than the way they’ve been doing it.  But I basically don’t personally like big bureaucratic cultures and so I don’t think very much about big bureaucratic cultures.  I don’t know how to fix bureaucracy in a big place.  I would regard it as a sentence to hell if they gave me some company with a million employees to change the culture.  I think it’s hard to change the culture in a restaurant.  A place that’s already bureaucratic, how do you make it un-bureaucratic?  It’s a very hard problem.  Berkshire has solved the problem as best it can…of bureaucracy.  You can’t have too much bureaucracy at headquarters if there’s no bodies at headquarters. (laughter)  That’s our system.  I don’t think it arose because we were geniuses or anything.  I think partly it was an accident.  But once we saw what was working, we kept it.  But I don’t have a solution for corporate culture at monstrous places.

1:43:08

Question 30: What’s your current view of climate change today?

Munger: Well, I’m deeply skeptical of the conventional wisdom of the people who call themselves climate scientists.  I strongly suspect that they’re more alarmed than the facts call for.  And that they kind of like the fact that they can prattle about something they find alarming.  I am not nearly as afraid as the typical so called climate scientist is, and I think the difficulties of what they urge as a remedy are under-estimated by these people.  And besides, just because you’re smart enough…suppose you, by knowing a lot of physics and so forth, could actively figure out that climate change was a huge problem, you were right.  That would not automatically mean that you know how to fix it.  Fixing it would be a vast complicated problem involving geo-politics, political science, all kinds of things, that just because you understood the chemistry of climate say, you wouldn’t have any expertise as…So I think there’s a hell of a lot of non-sense being prattled on the climate change things.  But no, there’s no doubt that the CO2 does cause some global warming.  But just because you accept that doesn’t mean that the world is absolutely going to hell in a hand-basket.  Or that the seas are going to rise by 200 feet any time soon and so on.  So I’m deeply skeptical of a lot of these people, and yet I don’t want to be identified with the no-nothings who really are vastly ignorant and wouldn’t even recognize that CO2 does have some influence on temperature.  Now I’ve tried to offend everybody…(laughter)

1:46:02

Question 31: In an age that’s very different than the one you grew up in, if you’re a young guy like me with a lot of runway like Peter talked about, where would you focus your attention?

Munger: Well, I’d approach life a lot like Carlyle.  I would just get up every morning and do the best I could in every way and I’d expect over time to do pretty well.  And it’s not very hard.  I’d try to marry the right person instead of the wrong person.  Everything would be quite (trite).  I would guess that practically everybody your age in this room is going to do pretty well.  You’re not that mad at the world here.  You’re trying to figure out how to cope with it a little better.  You’re going to do alright.  People like that succeed.  But if you all came in here with placards, sure you were right on every subject and wanted to shout back?  You wouldn’t have such a bright future.  Those people are pounding their idiocy in instead of (shutting it out).

1:47:46

Question 32: Which cognitive biases are particularly at scale on a national scale these days?

Charlie: Well its hard, with so many cockroaches in the kitchen it’s hard to identify each…(laughter)  I would say every bias that man is prone to is always working.  That’s the nature of the system.  It’s amazing what people have come to believe.  And it’s amazing how polarized our parties are becoming.  And now you turn on TV, and you can even turn to channel A and you’ve got your kind of idiot, or you click channel B and you got the other fellow’s kind of idiot.  What they have in common is that they’re both idiots.  They’re playing to an audience that is mentally defective. (laughter)  Of course it’s a little disquieting.  I was use to a different world.  I liked Walter Cronkite.  This choose your idiot form of news gathering, I don’t much like.  What do you do?  I flip back and forth between idiot types. I will not stay with just one type of idiot. (laughter)  So that’s my system.  But you’re right.  It’s weird.  Now the world has always had weird idiots.  Hitler was an idiot…a smart idiot, but an idiot.  We’re always going to have crazy people and crazy people who follow crazy people. Part of what I like about that situation is…it gives you more incentive to think correctly yourself.  I find life works best when you are trying to stay rational all the time.  And I must say, these idiots are giving me more incentive.  I don’t want to be like any of them.  Don’t you feel that way when you turn on the TV and here’s one idiot mouthing this way, and the other one mouthing this way, and misrepresenting the facts?  I don’t want to be like either of them!  I don’t know whether we’re going to have more of what’s developed or whether we’re going to go back to something that’s more pleasant.  But it’s kind of interesting to watch, I will say that.

1:51:11

Question 33: What do you think of the critical challenges that business models relying heavily on advertising as a source of revenue in a digital age?

Charlie: Well if I’m following that correctly, you do live in an age where people using computer science to sift out correlations that might be predictive and then to try trading on those algorithms on an instant basis, in and out.  Where large amounts of money have been made, by say, Renaissance Technologies.  And there’s way more of that and its worked for those people.  And I don’t consider it a good development.  I don’t see any big contributions to civilization, having a lot of people using computer algorithms to out-trade each other on a short-term basis.  Some people think it creates more liquidity in the markets and therefore it’s constructive.  But I could just as soon do without it.  I would rather make my money in some other way than short-term trading based off of computer algorithms, but there is more of it, you’re right about that.  And by and large, the one thing they have in common is that they can’t take infinite amounts of money.  You try and file too much money into an algorithm and it’s self-defeating.  And thank God it’s self-defeating.

 1:52:51

Question 34: I was hoping to gain some insight regarding your and Warren’s discussions into airlines.  Whether or not it was a light-bulb that went off in a certain year.  Or whether it morphed over time.  Just trying to get an idea about when you got open minded about maybe investing into airlines and how you changed your mind.

Charlie: Well, we did change our mind.  For a long time, Warren and I (painted over) the railroad because there were too many of them, and it was too competitive, and union rules were too crazy.  They were lousy investments for about 75 years.  And then they finally…the world changed and they double decked all the trains and they got down to four big rail systems in all the United States in terms of freight and all of a sudden we liked railroads.  It took about 75 years.  Warren and I never looked at railroads for about 50 years, and then we bought one. (link)

Now airlines, Warren use to joke about them.  He’d say that the investing class would have done better if the Wright Brothers would never have invented flight.  But given the conditions that were present when the stock was purchased and given the conditions of Berkshire Hathaway where it was drowning in money, we thought it was ok to buy a bunch of airline stocks.  What more can I say?  Certainly it’s ok to change your mind when the facts change.  And to some extent the facts had changed, and to some extent they haven’t.  It is harder to create the little competing airlines than it was.  And the industry has maybe learned something.  I hope it works better, but I don’t think its…I think the chances of us buying airlines and holding them for 100 years is going to work that well.  I think that’s pretty low.

1:55:19

Question 35: Question about DJCO.  The auditor’s report discussed material weakness in segregated duties.  I was curious if that was something you could speak on.  If it’s something you’re fixing.  Or not if not, whether or not it’s rational.

Charlie: Well, all auditors are now paid to find some kind of weakness and then fix it.  So there’s very few companies that don’t have some little material weakness that needs fixing.  I am not that worried about the accounting at the Daily Journal.  Basically it’s more conservative than other people in our industry.  And basically we’re not trying to mislead anybody.  And basically we’ve got a couple hundred million dollars in marketable securities and we’re not mismanaging those, they just sit there.  So I don’t think we have big accounting problems at the Daily Journal.  I think it’s typical of the modern developments in accounting that the accountants have gotten…(inaudible)…and they’ve gotten new responsibilities and they’re amorphous.  Like “weakness”.  Well everybody has weakness, you, me.  And I don’t think there’s some wonderful accounting standard where all the accountants know what’s weak and what isn’t and exactly how much and how dangerous it is.  And so I am not much worried about the accounting at the Daily Journal.  But I think this business of…everybody in America is worried about somebody hacking in and getting a lot of data, and everybody has some weakness, meaning they’re all afraid of, and they’re right to be afraid of it.  You’ve got these amorphous terms.  I’m just doing the best we can, and taking the blows as they come.  Or the benefits too.  But I’m not worried about material weaknesses in accounting.

There was a guy name B.B. Robinson when I came to Los Angeles, and he had gotten out of the pools, the stock pools of the 20’s, as a young man with 10 or so million dollars, which was a lot of money to come out here in the 30’s.  When he got here with all this money, he spent his time drinking heavily and chasing movie starlets.  And in those days the bankers were more pompous and old fashioned.  And one of them called him in and said, ‘Mr. Robinson, I’m terribly worried about your drinking all this whisky and chasing all these movie starlets.  This is not the kind of thing our sound banks likes.’  What B.B. Robinson said to the banker, he said, ‘Listen.  My Municipal Bonds don’t drink.’ (laughter)  That’s basically the answer to the material weakness problem with the Daily Journal.  Our lovely marketable securities aren’t drinking.

1:58:38

Question 36: I believe you said that, If you’re not willing to put the work into investigating specific stock investments, that you should perhaps put your money into a passive index fund.  One of my advisers is very concerned about the move of capital into index funds for three reasons.  First he says, there’s an inadvertent concentration into (few) stocks because similar investments in different indexes.  Second, he thinks long term, the concentration of capital into preferred companies that are in the index fund…that they’re able to raise money easily despite poor performance.  And third, he’s also concerned long-term that the concentration of the management of these index funds into three institutions which is detrimental to the market place.  I’d appreciate your comments.

Charlie: I think that a lot of people who are in the business of selling investment advice, hate the fact that the indexes have been outperforming them.  And of course, they can’t say, “I hate it, because it’s ruining my life.”  But they say, “I hate it because it’s too concentrated.”  Well the index contains 75% of the market capitalization.  It’s hardly so small.  Index investing will work for quite a while when it’s so broad.  I don’t think it’s ruining the world or anything like that.  It is peculiar that we lived a long time without this.  I think it’ll keep running a long time forward, and I think it’ll work pretty well for a long time.  And I suspect most money-managers just hate it.  It’s making their life hard.  But you see I don’t mind if people are having a hard life.

2:01:05

Question 37: History doesn’t repeat itself, but it certainly rhymes.  And we’re seeing this mania in Bitcoin, that is often akin to the Tulip mania, and I’d like to see your views on how you and Warren navigated through these waters in your several decades of investing.  And what it says about the human condition that we tend to keep constantly falling for these things despite what history teaches us otherwise.

Charlie: Well you’re of course right to suspect that I regard the Bitcoin craze as totally asinine.  To create some manufactured currency…A different payment system could happen like WeChat in China.  It’s a better payment system than the one we have in America.  So something like that could happen.  But Bitcoin where they’re creating an alternative to gold…and then make a big speculative vehicle?…I never considered for one second having anything to do with it.  I detested it the moment it was raised, and the more popular it got, the more I hated it.  On the other hand, I expect the world to do insane things from time to time.  Everybody wants easy money.  And of course the people who are peddling things and taking money off the top for promoting the investment, they like it too.  And so these crazies just keep coming and coming and coming.  But who would want their children buying things like Bitcoin?  I just hope to God that doesn’t happen to my family.  It’s just disgusting that people would be taken in by something like this.  It’s crazy.  I’m not saying that some different payment system might not be a good thing like WeChat.  That could come and be constructive.  But Bitcoin is noxious poison.  Partly they love it because the computer science is quite intriguing to people with mathematical brains.  It’s quite a feat what they’ve done as a matter of pure computer science.  But, you know, I’m sure you can get terribly good at torture if you spend a lot of time at it. (laughter)  It’s not a good development.  And the government of China which is stepping on it pretty hard is right and our government’s more lax approach to it is wrong.  The right answer to stuff like that is to step on it hard, and it’s the government’s job.

2:04:30

Question 38: What are the qualities you look for in a life partner?

Charlie: In a life partner?  Well I’ve been quoted on that.  I think what you really need in a life-partner, if you’re constructed the way I am, is somebody with low expectations.

2:05:23

Well I think it’s 12 o’clock and that should probably do for this group.  I know you…I’m use to the groupies, but standing up for two hours?  I wouldn’t stand up for two hours to listen to Isaac Newton if he came back.  (laughter)  So I guess our meeting is adjourned.  I certainly wish you all well, you’re my kind of people.

End of Transcript

Thank you for reading. I hope you all thoroughly enjoyed the transcript. If you found any errors, kindly let me know and I will fix them.

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Sincerely,

Richard Lewis, CFA
White Stork Asset Management LLC
Partner, Investments

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Charlie Munger: Full Transcript of Daily Journal Annual Meeting 2017

This week I had the great pleasure of hearing Charlie Munger speak at the Daily Journal Annual Meeting for the second time.  For two hours Charlie  captivated the audience with an abundance of whit, wisdom, and stamina.  It was a fantastic performance.  He truly is 93 years young.

I transcribed the full event from my audio recording which you may find below.  At each question throughout the transcript, I provided a clickable link to the precise spot where the question begins in an excellent video recording of the event posted on YouTube.  If you’d like an audio recording of the event I recommend my recording on SoundCloud.  Furthermore, Charlie provided a handout to the attendees.  I scanned them into a PDF document which you can access here.

I would like to thank Mr. Munger for energetically entertaining our questions and graciously sharing his wisdom, insights, and time with all of us.

I hope you all enjoy!

(Note: You will find that I frequently summarized the questions to Charlie, but as for Charlie’s and Gerry’s answers to the questions, I translated them verbatim and as accurately as possible.)

Charlie Discussing the Daily Journal Corporation:

Charlie: I usually talk a little bit before we take the questions.  And the essence of what’s going on here of course is that we have a corporation that was in a branch of the newspaper business.  And our branch of the newspaper business like most newspaper businesses has gone to hell compared to what it was in its peak years, and almost every other newspaper business is going to hell with no pardon, they’re just disappearing.  What we have is this computer software business where we’re serving the same customers to some extent except now they’re all over the country, even some of them outside the country, with this…we were selling software to all these courts and public agencies whereas before we were giving information to lawyers and other people, and publishing public notices and our software business is of a type where it’s a long tough slog.  But we’re slogging very well and we really love the people who are doing it for us, we’ve got a lot of wonderful people in our software business; the implementers, and the computer programmers, and people who deal with the public agencies, and the ethos of the place is very admirable.  Everybody is trying to get ahead here by doing the work right and serving the customers right, and having a lot of financial wherewithal where money is never a problem, and doing what we’re suppose to do.  It’s a pleasure to, people like Rick Guerin and myself, to watch all these young people doing this and of course we were very glad to be able to do it when we should be dead. (laughter)

A lot of you people came into this because Berkshire was successful and Guerin was successful and for various odd reasons of history, and most of you are accidentally in the software business, and I am too because Guerin did it when I wasn’t paying much attention.  I don’t do this kind of venture capital stuff.  And he doesn’t either, but he did it here.  So if there’s anything wrong with what happens in our software business, you’re looking at a man who caused it all over here. (laughter)  I’ll take credit for any successes.  But if there’s failure you’re looking at the man here who got us into this.

It is amazing to me, some of the things that are happening in our software business.  We just are getting a contract from South Australia.  Now if anybody told me when I was young, that the Daily Journal Company would be automating the courts of South Australia, I mean, I hardly know where it is.  Anyway, it’s amazing what’s happening and it’s a fair amount of fun to watch.  Probably because we’re doing more winning than losing.  I’ve never been able to enjoy losses the way some people do.  I would much rather win.  And I really like to work with good people instead of the opposite.  And we’ve got a lot of good employees in our software business.  We’ve got a bunch of implementer in Utah who are really good at it and we really trust.  And who our customers like, and we’ve got all these computer programmers and so forth around here, and a game of service like that when it’s complicated, what you have to do is minimize your glitches and (crawl out of them very rapidly in a way that your customers trust you.)  Our people were good at that and they get better and they’re trying to get ahead by being good at the service, not by hiring some politician as a consultant.  Some of our competitors do that kind of stuff.  But we’re trying to slog our way out by doing the work right.

When I was a lawyer, there was a saying that I’ve always used, “The best business-getter any lawyer ever has is the work that’s already on his desk.”  And that’s the basic ethos of our software business.  If we just keep doing it right, I don’t think we have to worry about the future.  Not that we won’t have down drafts and our failures, but we are actually grinding ahead slowly in that software business.  And it’s very interesting because Guerin and I know practically nothing about it.  And Gerry didn’t come up as a software engineer, so we’re basically doing something that’s quite difficult, we’re judging people because we don’t understand what the people do.  That’s what Andrew Carnegie did.  He didn’t know anything about making steel.  But he knew a lot about judging whether the people he was trusting were good at making steel.  And of course that’s what Berkshire’s done if you stop and think about it.  We have a lot of businesses at Berkshire that neither Warren our I could contribute much to, but we’ve been pretty good at judging which people are capable of running those businesses.

But this is pretty extreme here.  The little Daily Journal building going into the computer software business.  It’s a long slow kind of business.  RFPs.  The first time we contact a customer until we start making money may be 5 years.  So it’s like deciding to start prospecting for oil in Borneo or something.  And they just keep doing that over and over again, and the money goes out and the effort goes out, and it starts coming in five years from now.  I love that kind of stuff, not when I think we’re taking territory, it doesn’t look good when we write it off and we don’t report wonderful numbers or anything.  But if it makes sense in the long-term, we just don’t give a damn what it looks like over the short term.  And we know we’ve collected a bunch of shareholders that share our ideas.  After all we’re running a cult not a normal company.  And I think most of you feel that you’re willing to wait.

I lived all my life with people who were into deferred gratification.  In fact most of them will never have any fun.  They just defer gratification all the way to end, that’s what we do.  And it does cause you to get rich.  So we’re going to have a lot of rich dead people. (laughter)  We can excite a lot of envy.  A lot of you when the people walk by your grave and there will be this nice grave with this nice monument and they’ll say, “God what a great grave, I wish I were under.”  But at any rate, deferred gratification really does work if what you’re doing is growing a business that gets better and better and getting yourself so that your grave can look nice to outsiders.  Guerin and I have never taken any money out of this company in all these years.  We don’t take salaries, we don’t take directors fees.  We’re a peculiar example.  I wish our example spread more, because I think if you’re wealthy and own a big share of a company, and you get to decide what it does and whether it liquidates or whether it keeps going, that’s a nice position to be in, and maybe you shouldn’t try and grab all the money in addition.  That’s my theory of executive compensation.  And some of the old-fashioned guys like Carnegie never took any salary to speak of.  Cornelius Vanderbilt didn’t take any, of course he owned the whole place, practically, and he would have considered it beneath him, he lived on the dividends like the shareholders did.  So there’s a lot of that old fashioned ideas here in the Daily Journal Company.

Charlie Begins Q&A:

Charlie: I’ll first take a bunch of questions about the Daily Journal, and after that we’ll take question on anything you want to talk about.

Question 1: At last year’s meeting you talked about the milestone of getting the L.A. court system here at Journal Technologies and I was wondering, in the last year, as it has gone by, what good milestones have happened and what bad things have happened.

Charlie: Gerry you take that one.  I’ll answer it (shortly), it’s going fine.

Gerry: We have three case types for Los Angeles.  One case type went live last April, another case type will go live this coming July, and the third case type about 10 to 12 months later after that.  We have to work with the Los Angeles schedule, after all they have a lot of people to train.  And that becomes and very important factor.  Training is critical because if the end users aren’t trained properly, virtually everything falls apart.  And so that’s the schedule.  We discussed it this morning.  We meet with the court about 3 miles from here virtually every day.  We have a good team from the court and I think they’re very excited about what they’re doing, and that’s critical to us that the court feels good about the system.

Charlie: One good thing about what we’re doing is it’s slow and it’s agony in the delays between the first customer contact and finally getting into a decent revenue stream.  But once you succeed, it’s very sticky business.  Very sticky business.  And the fact that it’s difficult to do means it’s difficult for people to change much.  So if you go slog through all this tough territory where it’s (slogging through), there’s a reward out there somewhere, and we’re not in a small business.  It has way more potential than the original print business we had giving information about the (cases).  It’s a big market.  And the people have no option but to charge ahead.  These courts and district attorneys, public defenders, all these people were serving…they’re over-whelmed with options…better systems and more software.  So it’s a huge market.  And the fact that it’s so often to grind through.  It means that the people who want easy gratification don’t come in.  If it seems slow and painful to you, we kind of like it that way.

Questions 2: Your thoughts on Tyler Technologies.  How do you think your competitive position versus Tyler is doing.

Charlie: Well Tyler is an extremely aggressive company.  They were bigger faster and so on.  I like our ethos of operation better than I like theirs.  If I were buying software, I’d rather buy ours than theirs.  Our system is to keep fighting the game.  I wish all the customers I had in life were like Tyler.

Question 3: The rate of revenue growth is going down a little bit, while expenses are going up.  Any major milestones in the next 3 to 5 years that you think you’d like to get that you think would really help things along.

Charlie: I’ll take your first question.  It looks like we’re proceeding slowly, but we bought a bunch of contracts, in effect, for money, and we knew they were going to end, so we’re amortizing the cost of those contracts.  But really it was an anticipated decline that we got big revenues up front for taking.  So we’re getting ahead, there’s a little blip in the figures.

(Response to second question) Every contract that’s significant is a major jump.  The business is so big they’re whole states.  I mean this is a huge business and everybody is just scrambling at the first parts of something that’s going to grow bigger and bigger and last and last.  As long as we’re doing the work right, why it’s likely to work out right.

Question 4: Can you comment on Wells Fargo?

Charlie: Well of course Wells Fargo had a glitch.  The truth of the matter is that they made a business judgment that was wrong.  They got so caught up in cross-selling and so forth and having tough incentive systems that they got the incentive systems so aggressive that some people reacted badly and did things they shouldn’t.  And then they used some misjudgment in reacting to the trouble they got in.  I don’t think anything’s fundamentally wrong for the long-pull.  Wells Fargo, they made a mistake.  It was an easy mistake to make.

The smartest man I ever knew made a similar mistake.  Henry Singleton, who was the smartest single human being I knew in my whole life.  And Henry Singleton of Teledyne also had very aggressive incentive systems, like Wells Fargo.  And his customer in many of his subsidiaries was the government.  And of course it’s not that hard to cheat the government.  But his very aggressive incentive systems, 2 or 3 out of 20 subsidiaries cheated the government.  So all of a sudden he’s got three scandals at once.  It wasn’t that Henry was trying to cheat the government.  He just got a little aggressive in applying the incentives and he got blindsided.

That can happen to anybody.  I don’t regard getting the incentives a little aggressive at Wells Fargo as a mistake.  I think the mistake there was, when the bad news came, they didn’t recognize it rightly.  They made a mistake.  But what happens in a tough system like capital, you make a mistake like that and pretty soon you’re gone.

Question 5: For Gerry or Charlie.  Congratulations for inverting and not doing things wrong in regards to Daily Journal.  What’s your insight into the Alemeda court system and the problems that Tyler’s having over them.

Charlie: No, but I’m not dissatisfied with it.  I don’t think I want to criticize Tyler any more than I have.  One of our customers, you’ll be sad to know is having some problems with pleasing a customer…You can see the salt tears running down my cheeks. (laughter)

Question 6: Question on software fees in terms of your revenue lines.  What portion of that business is recurring?

Charlie: That is so complicated that I’m not even going to try to answer it.  I’m just going to answer it in substance.  There’s a lot that’s reoccurring if we stay in there.

You can’t look at our financial statements and make very good judgments about what’s going to happen.  It’s the nature of our game that’s confusing.  It confuses us a little bit.  So we’re not holding back on purpose, it’s a very complex, confusing, system.  You’ve got all these RFPs.  It’s very complicated.

Question 7: You purchased the building in Logan, which I believe is used exclusively in Journal Technologies, but in accounting, it’s under the traditional business, I’m wondering why?

Charlie: Gerry I give you that one.  He says, why is Logan, somehow in the traditional business?  It shouldn’t be.

Gerry: The Daily Journal purchased the building and they own the building.  And Journal Technologies pays rent to the parent company for that and the amount of rent is not, what we would consider, material from that perspective.  And because it’s owned by the Daily Journal that’s how we originally classify it.  No real significant reasons.  All the expenses on the Journal Technologies books.

Charlie: That’s some quirk of accounting.  It doesn’t really matter.

Question 8: Follow up on the question of incentives.  You were explaining at Wells Fargo you don’t have a problem with aggressive incentives.  Can you expand on that a little more?

Charlie: Well how do you know they’re aggressive until you try?  They didn’t react enough to the bad news fast enough.  And of course that a very dangerous thing to do.  I don’t think it impairs the future of Wells Fargo.  As a matter of fact, they’ll be better for it.  The one nice thing about doing something dumb is that you probably won’t do it again.

Question 9: Question in regards to someone early in their career trying to figure out which of several paths to pursue.  Two thoughts that seem helpful for this purpose are 1) figuring out which work you have the possibility to become the best at and 2) ascertaining which line of work would most help society.  Do you think these ideas are the right ones to focus on, and if so, how would you go about answering them.

Charlie: Well, in terms of picking what to do, I want to report to all of you, that in my whole life I’ve never succeeded much in something that I wasn’t interested in.  So I don’t think you’re going to succeed if what you’re doing all day doesn’t interest you.  You’ve got to find something you’re interested in because it’s just too much to expect of human nature that you’re going to be good at something that you really dislike doing.  And so that’s one big issue.  And of course you have to play in a game where you’ve got some unusual talents.  If you’re 5 foot 1, you don’t want to play basketball against some guy whose 8 feet 3.  It’s just too hard.  So you gotta’ figure out a game where you have an advantage and it has to be something that you’re deeply interested in.  Now you get into the ethical side of life, well of course you want to be ethical.  On the other hand, you can’t be just dreaming how you think the world should be run and that it’s too dirty for you to get near it.  You can get so consumed by some ideological notion particularly in a left-wing university.  It’s like you think you’re handling ethics and what you’re doing is not working.  And maybe smoking a little pot to boot.  This is not the Munger system.

My hero is Maimonides.  And all that philosophy and all that writing, he did after working 10 or 12 hours a day as a practicing physician all his life.  He believed in the engaged life.  And so I recommend the engaged life.  You spend all your life thinking about some politician who wants it this way or that way you’re sure you know what’s right, you’re on the wrong track.  You want to do something every day where you’re coping with the reality.  You want to be more like Maimonides and less like Bernie Sanders.

Question 10: Is American Express value proposition more in terms of payment or service and rewards?

Charlie: Well I’m going to give you an answer that will be very helpful to you because you’re somewhat confused about what the exact future of American Express will be…and I want to tell you, I’m confused too.  I think that if you understand exactly what’s going to happen to payment systems ten years out, you’re probably under some state of delusion, it’s very hard to know.  So if you’re confused, all I can say is “welcome to the club”.  They’re doing the best they can, they’ve got some huge advantages that they’re…it’s a reasonable bet.  But nobody knows.  I don’t know if IBM is going to sell that much of Watson.  I always say I’m agnostic on the subject.  You’re talking about payment system 10 years out, I’m agnostic on that too.  I think if you keep trying to do the right thing and you play the game hard, your chances are better.  But I don’t think those thing are knowable.  Think about how fast they changed.

Question 11: Do you think that domestic natural gas, exploration and production, is a good business despite the capital intensity?

Charlie: Well that’s a different subject, I have a different feeling about the energy business than practically anyone else in America.  I wish we weren’t producing all this naturally gas.  I would be delighted to have the condensate that’s coming out of our shale deposits just lie there untapped for decades in the future and pay a bunch of Arabs to use up their oil.  But nobody else in America seems to feel my way.  But I’m into deferred gratification.  Oil and gas is not going away and I think it’s just as important as the top soil in Iowa.  If any of you said, “oh goodie, I found a way to make money, we’ll ship all our top soil from Iowa to Greenland!”  I wouldn’t think that was a very good idea.  And so I don’t think that hastening to use up all of our oil and gas is a good idea.  But I’m practically the only one in the country that feels that way.  There’s not enough deferred gratification in it to please me.  But I don’t see any advantage…I regard our oil and gas reserves just as chemical feed stocks that are essential in civilization. (Leave aside) their energy content.  I’d be delighted to use them up more slowly.  By the way, I’m sure I’m right and the other 99% of the people are wrong.

But no, I don’t know…The oil and gas business is very peculiar.  The people who success in most other businesses are doing way more physical volume than they did in the past.  But a place like Exxon, the physical volume goes down by two thirds, it’s just that the price of oil goes up faster than the physical volume goes down.  That is a very peculiar way to make money.  And it may well continue, but it’s confusing, we’re not use to it.

Question 12: As an 18 year old interested in many disciplines, I was wondering how you can thrive as a polymath in a world that celebrates specialization.

Charlie: Well that’s a good question.  I don’t think operating over many disciplines as I do is a good idea for most people.  I think it’s fun, that’s why I’ve done it.  I’m better at it than most people would be.  And I don’t think I’m good at being the very best for handling differential equations.  So it’s in a wonderful path for me, but I think the correct path for everybody else is to specialize and get very good at something that society rewards and get very efficient at doing it.  But even if you do that, I think you should spend 10 or 20% of your time into trying to know all the big ideas in all the other disciplines.   Otherwise…I use the same phrase over and over again…otherwise you’re like a one legged man in an ass-kicking contest.  It’s just not going to work very well.  You have to know the big ideas in all the disciplines to be safe if you have a life lived outside a cave.

But no, I think you don’t want to neglect your business as a dentist to think great thoughts about Proust.

Question 13: Question about Lollapalooza effects.  What current event is causing you concern and how can you use that inter-disciplinary approach to spot them?

Charlie: Well, I coined that term the “Lollapalooza effect” because when I realized I didn’t know any psychology and that was a mistake on my part, I bought the three main text books for introductory psychology and I read through them.  And of course being Charlie Munger, I decided that the psychologists were doing it all wrong and I could do it better.  And one of the ideas that I came up with which wasn’t in any of the books was that the Lollapalooza effects came when 3 or 4 of the tendencies were operating at once in the same situation.  I could see that it wasn’t linear, you’ve got Lollapalooza effects.  But the psychology people couldn’t do experiments that were 4 or 5 things happening at once because it got too complicated for them and they couldn’t publish.  So they were ignoring the most important thing in their own profession.  And of course the other thing that was important was to synthesize psychology with all else.   And the trouble with the psychology profession is that they don’t know anything about ‘all else’.  And you can’t synthesize one thing you know with something you don’t if you don’t know the other thing.  So that’s why I came up with that Lollapalooza stuff.  And by the way, I’ve been lonely ever since. (laughter)  I’m not making any ground there.  And by the way, I’m totally right.

Question 14: My question relates to a comment you made some years ago about Warren Buffett.  I think you said that he has become a significantly better investor since he turned 65, which I found a remarkable comment.  I was wondering if you could share information about that, that maybe we haven’t heard before.  I know you’ve commented he’s a learning machine and we all know the aversion to retail that came out of the Diversified episode, and so on.  I’d just be interested if there’s something that’s changed about his risk assessment or his horizons or any color there would be fantastic to hear.  Thank you.

Charlie: Well, if you’re in a game and you’re passionate about learning more all the time and getting better and honing your own skills all the time, etc. etc.  Of course you do better over time.  And some people are better at that than others.  It’s amazing what Warren has done.  Berkshire would be a very modest company now if Warren never learned anything.  He never wouldn’t have never given anything back. I mean any territory he took he was going to hold it.  But what really happened was, we went out into the new fields of buying whole businesses and we bought into things like Iscar that Warren never would have bought when he was younger. Ben Graham would have never bought Iscar.  He paid 5 times book or something for Iscar.  It wasn’t in the Graham play.  And Warren who learned under Graham, just, he learned better over time.  And I’ve learned better.  The nice thing about the game we’re in, is that you can keep learning.  And we’re still doing it.  Imagine we’re in the press…for all of a sudden (buying) airline stocks?  What have we said about the airline business?  We thought it was a joke it was such a terrible business.  And now if you put all of those stocks together we own one minor airline.  We did the same thing in railroads, we said “railroads are no damn good, you know there’s too many of them, truck competition…”  And we were right it was a terrible business for about 80 years.  But finally they got down to four big railroads and it was a better business.  And something similar is happening in the airline business.

On the other hand, this very morning I sat down in my library with my daughter-in-law and she booked a round trip ticket to Europe including taxes, it was like 4 or 5 hundred dollars.  I was like, “we’re buying into the airline business?” (laughter)  It may work out to be a good idea for the same reason that our railroad business turned out to be a good idea, but there’s some chances it might not.  In the old days, I frequently talked to Warren about the old days, and for years and years and years, what we did was shoot fish in a barrel.  But it was so easy that we didn’t want to shoot at the fish while they were moving.  So we waited until they slowed down and then we shot at them with shotgun.  It was just that easy.  And it has gotten harder and harder and harder.  And now we get little edges…before, we had totally cinches.  It isn’t any less interesting.  We do not make the same returns we made when we could run around and pick this low hanging fruit off trees that offered a lot of it.

So now we go into things…We bought the Exxon position…You know why Warren bought Exxon?  As a cash substitute!  You would never have done that in the old days.  We had a lot of cash and we thought Exxon was better than cash over the short term.  That’s a different kind of thinking from the way Warren came up.  He’s changed.  And I think he’s changed when he buys airlines.  And he’s changed when he buys Apple.  Think of the hooting we’ve done over the years about high tech, ‘we just don’t understand it’, ‘it’s not in our central competency’, ‘the worst business in the world is airlines’.  And what do we appear in the press with?  Apple and a bunch of airlines.  I don’t think we’ve went crazy.  I think the answer is, we’re adapting reasonably to a business that’s gotten very much more difficult.  And I don’t think we have a cinch in either of those positions.  I think we have the odds a little bit in our favor.  And if that’s the best advantage we can get, we’ll just have to live on the advantage we can get.  I use to say you have marry the best person that will have you, and I’m afraid that’s a  rule of life.  You have to get by in life with the best advantage you can get.  And things have gotten so difficult in the investment world that we have to be satisfied with the type of advantage that we didn’t use to get.  On the other hand the thing that caused it to be so enormously difficult was when we got so enormously rich.  And that’s not a bad trade off.

Question 15: At last year’s meeting you said Donald Trump was not morally qualified to be President, and now that he is President, do you still agree with that, do you think he’s qualified in any capacity?

Charlie: Well I’ve gotten more mellow. (laughter)  I always try and think about the good as along with what’s not good.  And I think some of this stuff where they’re re-examining options about the whole tax system of the country, I think that’s a very constructive thing.  When Donald Trump says he wouldn’t touch Social Security when a lot of highfalutin Republicans have all kinds of schemes for (rising) Social Security, I’m with Donald Trump.  If I were running the world I would have his exact attitude about Social Security.  I wouldn’t touch it.  So he’s not wrong on everything and just because he isn’t like us…roll with it.  Accept a little danger.  What the hell, you’re not going to live forever at any how.

Question 16: What was the most meaningful thing you did with your life?

Charlie: Well, I think the family and children is the most meaningful thing most people do with their life.  And I’ve been reasonably fortunate…I don’t think I’ve been a perfect husband. I’m lucky to have had as much felicity as I got.  And I always needed a certain amount of toleration from the fair sex.  I started wrong and I never completely fixed myself.  I can tell this group…you come here as a cult to talk to a cult-leader?  I want to take you back in history, you’ll see what an inferior person you’re now trusting.

When I was a freshman in Omaha Central High, there was a friend of the family, a girl my age.  She had gone off to summer camp the year before and she met a blonde goddess.  A voluptuous 13 year old.  And I was a skinny under-developed whatever and so forth. ‘You gotta take my blonde goddess to this dance’.  And so I wanted to impress this ‘blonde goddess’ and so I pretended to smoke which I didn’t.  And she was wearing a net dress and I set her on fire!  (big laughter) But I was quick whittled and I through Coca-Cola all over her and in due time the fire was out.  And that’s the last I saw of the blonde goddess.

And then I said, ‘well I’ve gotta make more time with the girls’.  And I wanted to get a letter at Omaha Central High.  Of course I was no good at any sport.  So I went down to the rifle range and learned they gave letters in rifle shooting.  And I was so skinny that I could shoot a 100 in the sitting position by sitting cross-legged and putting one elbow on each foot.  Try it, you’ll break your neck.  But I could shoot a hundred every time.  So I was a good rifle shooter and they gave me a letter.  But I was so skinny and short and underdeveloped that it went from one arm pit to the other.  And I walked down the hallway trying to impress the girls and they wouldn’t turn their head.  What they said was, ‘how did a skinny little unattractive runt like that get a letter?’

And then I had another experience.  There was a girl I still remember, Zibby Bruington.  She was a senior and a very popular senior.  And I was a nerd sophomore.  And somehow she agreed with me to go to a party in one of the out-buildings at the Omaha Country Club.  Perhaps because she liked one of my friends who was a big strapping fellow.  So I took Zibby to this party in my 1934 Ford, and it sleeted and got rainy, and so forth.  And I managed to stick the Ford in the mud and I couldn’t get out of it.  And Zibby and I had to walk for several miles through sleet.  That was the last I ever saw of Zibby Bruington.  And then my car stayed in the mud and I neglected to put in anti-freeze and the temperature went way down suddenly and the block broke!  Because it was too expensive to fix.  I lost my car and my father wouldn’t by a new one because my father said, ‘why should I buy a new car for someone whose dumb enough not to put anti-freeze in it?’  This is the person you’re coming all this way to see!

My life is just one long litany of mistakes and failure.  And it went on and on and on.  And politics!  I ran to be the president of the DSIC in grade school, The Dundee School Improvement Association.  I had the most popular boy in school as my campaign manager.  I came in second by miles.  I was a total failure in politics.  There’s hardly anything I succeeded at.  Now, I tell you all this because I know a nerd when I see one.  And there are a lot of nerds here who can tell stories like mine. (big laughter)  And I want to feel it’s not hopeless.  Just keep trying.

Oh yeah, Guerin wants me to repeat the story of Max Plank.  According to the story, Max Plank when he won the Nobel Prize was invited to run around Germany giving lectures.  And a chauffeur drove him.  And after giving the lecture about 20 times, the chauffeur memorized it.  And he said, ‘you know Mr. Plank, it’s so boring, why don’t you sit in the audience and I the chauffeur will give your talk.’  And so the chauffeur got up and gave Max Plank’s talk on physics and some professor got up and asked some terrible question.  And the chauffeur said, ‘Well I’m surprised that in an advanced city like Munich, people are asking me elementary questions like that.  I’m going to ask my chauffeur to answer that!’ (laughter)

While I’m telling jokes I might tell one of my favorite stories about the plane that’s flying over the Mediterranean.  The pilots voice comes on and says, ‘A terrible thing just happened.  We’re losing both engines, we’re going to have to land in the Mediterranean.’  And he says, ‘The plane with stay afloat for a very short time, and we’ll be able to open the door just long enough so that everybody can get out.  We have to do this in an orderly fashion.  Everybody who can swim go to the right wing and stand there.  And everybody who can’t swim go to the left wing and just stand there.  Those of you on the right wing, you’ll find a little island in the direction of the sun.  It’s two miles off.  And as the plane goes under, just swim over to the island, you’ll be fine.  For those of you on the left wing, thank you for flying Air Italia.” (big laughter)

Question 17: With regard to the proliferation of index funds, do you think there will be an issue with liquidity any time we go through another large crisis?  Do you think that will create large discrepancies between the price of the index fund and the value of the securities underneath?

Charlie: Well, the index funds of the S&P is like 75% of the market.  So I don’t think the exact problem you’re talking about is going to be a big problem because you’re talking about the S&P index.  But.  Is there a point where index funds theoretically can’t work a course?  If everybody bought nothing but index funds, the whole world wouldn’t work as people expect.  There’s also the problem…one of the reasons you buy a big index like the S&P.  Is because if you buy a small index, and it gets popular, you have a self-defeating situation.  When the nifty-fifty were the rage, JP Morgan talked everybody into buying just 50 stocks.  And they didn’t care what the price was, they just bought those 50 stocks.  Of course in due time, their own buying forced those 50 stocks up to 60 times earnings.  Where upon it broke and everything went down by about two-thirds quite fast.  In other words, if you get too much faddishness in one sector or one narrow index, of course you can get catastrophic changes like they had with the nifty-fifty in that former era.  I don’t see that happening when the index is three-quarters of the whole market.

The problem is that the whole thing can’t work perfectly forever.  But it will work for a long time.  The indexes have caused just absolute agony among the intelligent investment professionals.  Because basically 95% of the people have almost no chance of beating it over time.  And yet all the people expect if they have some money, they can hire somebody who will let them beat the indexes.  And of course the honest sensible people know they’re selling something they can’t quite deliver.  And that has to be agony.  Most people handle that with denial.  They think if we’re better next year…they just don’t want to think about that.  I understand that, I mean I don’t want to think of my own death either.  But it’s a terrible problem beating those indexes.  And it’s a problem that investment professional get didn’t have in the past.  What’s happening of course is the prices for managing really big sums of money are going down, down, down, 20 basis points and so on.  The people who rose in investment management didn’t do it by getting paid 20 basis points.  But that’s where we’re going I think in terms of people who manage big portfolios of the American Equities in the equivalent of the S&P.  It’s a huge, huge, problem.  It makes your generation of money managers to have way more difficulties and causes a lot of worry and fretfulness.  And I think the people who are worried and fretful are absolutely right.

I would hate to manage a trillion dollars in the big stocks and try and beat the indexes.  I don’t think I could do it.  In fact if you look at Berkshire, take out a hundred decisions, which is like two a year.  The success of Berkshire came from two decisions a year over 50 years.  We may have beaten the indexes, but we didn’t do it by having big portfolios of securities and having subdivisions managing the drugs, and subdivisions…and so, the indexes are a hell of a problem for you people.  But you know, why shouldn’t life be hard?  It’s what had to happen, what’s happened now.  If you take these people doing some of those early trading by computer algorithms that worked.  Then somebody else would come in and do the same thing with the same algorithm and play the same game.  And of course the returns went down.  Well that’s what’s happening in the whole field.  The returns you’re going to get are being pushed down by the progress of the sons.

Question 18: First question: What books or experiences were most formative to you in your early career? Second question: Where and how do you tell your most ambitious grandchildren to look for business opportunities.

Charlie: Well I don’t spend any time telling my grandchildren what business opportunities to look for.  I don’t have that much hope. (laughter)  I’m going to have trouble getting my grandchildren to work at all!  Anyway, I don’t think there’s an easy way to handle a problem of doing better and better with finances.  Obviously if you’re glued together and honorable and get up every morning and keep learning every day and you’re willing to go in for a lot of deferred gratification all your life, you’re going to succeed.  It may not be as much as you want.  But you’re going to success.  And so the main thing is to just keep in there, and be glued together, and get rid of your stupidities as fast as you can.  And avoid the bad people as much as you can.  And you’ll do reasonably well.  But try teaching that to your grandchildren.  I think the only way you’ve got a chance is sort of by example.  If you want to improve your grandchildren the best way is to fix yourself.

Oh books.  You cultist send me so many books that I can scarcely walk into my own library.  So I’m reading so many now because I never throw one away, I at least scan it.

I’ve just read this new book by Thorp, the guy who beat the dealer in Las Vegas.  And then he did computer algorithm trading.  And I really liked the book.    For one thing, the guy had a really good marriage and he seemed grateful for it.  And it was touching.  For another he was a very smart man.  He was a mathematician using a high IQ, to A) beat the dealer in Las Vegas and so forth and the B) use these computer algorithms to do this massive trading.  I found it very interest and since some of you people are nerds, and maybe you might like a love story.  I recommend Thorp’s new book.

It’s an interesting thing to do to beat the dealer in Las Vegas…wearing disguises and so on.  And Peter Kaufman told me a story about somebody he knows that did the same thing as Thorp did, but he did it more extreme.  He wore disguises and so forth.  He won four million dollars I think, in the casinos.  And that was hard to do because casinos don’t like playing against people who might win.  And then he went into the stock market where he made four billion dollars!  Again, clever algorithms.  You know, these people are mathematically gifted.  It’s still going on.  And I don’t think many of you are going to do it.  There can’t be many people who are mathematically gifted enough, manipulate statistics and everything else so well that they find little algorithms that will make them four billion dollars.

But there are a few.  And so some of them started just like Thorp.  And so Thorp’s book is interesting.  So I recommend it for you.

Question 19: Question on Filial piety.  In this generation, how can we fulfill our filial duties?

Charlie: I like filial piety.  They worship old men.  Rich old men.  That is my kind of a system. (laughter) But I think the idea of caring about your ancestors and caring about your traditions, I think all that stuff is a big part of what’s desirable.  I really admire the Confucians for that notion that it’s not a game that’s played just in one life.  It’s a game where you’re handing the baton off and you’re accepting the baton from your predecessor.   So if filial piety is your game, why I think it’s a very good thing.  Think about how rootless we’d be if we had no families at all, no predecessors, no decedents, it would be a very different life.  Think what we owe to people who figure out things in the past that make our civilization work.  So I’m all for filial piety and its close cousins.

Question 20: You’ve said, “any year in which you don’t destroy one of your best loved ideas is a wasted year.” It’s well known that you helped coached Warren towards quality which was a difficult transition for him.  I was wondering if you could speak to the hardest idea that you’ve ever destroyed.

Charlie: Well I’ve done so many dumb things.  That I’m very busy destroying bad ideas because I keep having them.  So it’s hard for me to just single out from such a multitude.  But I actually like it when I destroy a bad idea because I think I’m on the…I think it’s my duty to destroy old ideas.  I know so many people whose main problem of life, is that the old ideas displace the entry of new ideas that are better.  That is the absolute standard outcome in life.  There’s an old German folk saying, “We’re too soon old and too late smart.”  That’s everybody’s problem.  And the reason we’re too late smart is that the stupid ideas we already have, we can’t get rid of!  Now it’s a good thing that we have that problem, in marriage that may be good for the stability of marriage that we stick with our old ideas.  But in most fields you want to get rid of your old ideas.  It’s a good habit and it gives you a big advantage in the competitive game of life…other people are so very bad at it.  What happens is, as you spout ideas out, what you’re doing is you’re pounding them in.  So you get these ideas and then you start agitating them and saying them and so forth.  And of course, the person you’re really convincing is you who already had the ideas.  You’re just pounding them in harder and harder.  One of the reasons I don’t spend much time telling the world what I think about how the federal reserve system should behave and so forth.  Because I know that I’m just pounding the ideas into my own head when I think I’m telling the other people how to run things.  So I think you have to have mental habits…I don’t like it when young people get violently convinced on every damn cause or something.  They think they know everything.  Some 17 year old who wants to tell the whole world what ought to be done about abortion or foreign policy in the middle east or something.  All he’s doing when he or she spouts about what he deeply believes is pounding the ideas he already has in, which is a very dumb idea when you’re just starting and have a lot to learn.

So it’s very important that habit of getting rid of the dumb ideas.  One of things I do is pat myself on the back every time I get rid of the dumb idea.  You could say, ‘could you really reinforce your own good behavior?’  Yeah, you can.  When other people won’t praise you, you can praise yourself.  I have a big system of patting myself on the back.  Every time I get rid of a much beloved idea I pat myself on the back.  Sometime several times.  And I recommend the same mental habit to all of you.  The price we pay for being able to accept a new idea is just awesomely large.  Indeed a lot of people die because they can’t get new ideas through their head.

Question 21A: My perception is that the (oil and gas) industry itself has continuously gotten more complex and technical, and as the economy expands and you have more division of labor and specialization, it seems to me that it can be very hard for investors unless there’s more specialization.  (Charlie interjects)

Charlie: Of course.

Question 21B: Do you think that capital allocators are going to need to become more specialized going forward?

Charlie: Well you petroleum people of course have to get more specialized because the oil is harder to get and you have to learn new tricks to get it.  And so you’re totally right.  Generally, specialization is just the way to go for those people.  It’s just I have an example of something different.  It’s awkward for me because…but I don’t want to encourage people to do it the way I did because I don’t think it will work for most people.  I think the basic ideas of being rational and disciplined and deferring gratification, those will work.  But if you want to get rich the way I did, by learning a little bit about a hell of a lot, I don’t recommend it to others.

Now I’ve get a story there that I tell.  A young man comes to see Mozart, and says, “I want to compose symphonies.”  And Mozart says, “You’re too young to compose symphonies.”  He’s 20 years old and the man says, “But you were composing symphonies when you were 10 years old.”  And Mozart says, “Yeah but I wasn’t running around asking other people how to do it.”

I don’t think I’m a good example to the young.  I don’t want to encourage people to follow my particular path. I like all the general precepts, but I would not…if you’re a proctologist, I do not want a proctologist who knows Schopenhauer, or astrophysics.  I want a man whose specialized.  That’s the way the market is.  And you should never forget that.  On the other hand, I don’t think you’d have much of a life if all you did was proctology. (laughter)

Question 22: Warren and you are known for saying that if you worked with a small sum of capital, $10 million, Warren publicly said that he could guarantee that he could compound that at 50%  a year.  So my question is, can you provide some examples?  And I would kindly ask that you provide as many examples as possible, and be specific as possible.

Charlie: Well, the minute I hear somebody that really wants to get rich, at a rapid rate, with specifics.  That is not what we try and do here.  We want to leave some mystery so that you yourself can amuse yourself finding your own way.  You know the good ideas that I’ve had in my life are quite few.  But the lesson I can give you is a few is all you need and don’t be disappointed.  When you find the few of course, you’ve got to act aggressively.  That’s the Munger system.  And I learned that indirectly from a man I never met.  Which was my Mother’s maternal grandfather.  He was a pioneer when he came out to Iowa and fought in the Blackhawk Wars and so on.  And eventually after enormous hardship, well he was the richest man in town and he owned the bank and so on.  As he sat there in his old age, my mother knew him because she’d go to Algona, Iowa where he lived and had the big house in the middle of town.  Iron fence, capacious lawns, big barns.  What Grandpa Ingham use to tell her is, ‘there’s just a few opportunities you get in a whole life’.  This guy took over Iowa when the black topsoil in Iowa was cheap.  But he didn’t get that many opportunities.  It was just a few that enabled him to become prosperous.  He bought a few farms every time there was a panic you know.  And leased them to thrifty Germans, you couldn’t lose money with leasing a farm to a German in Iowa.  But he only did a few things.  And I’m afraid that’s the case…you’re not going to find a million wonderful ideas.  These people with the computer algorithms do it, but they have a computer sifting the who world.  It’s like placer mining.  And of course every niche they’re in, if somebody else comes in, the niche starts leaching away.  And I don’t think it’s that honorable to make a living that way.  I’d rather make my money in some other way than outsmarting the trading system so I have a little computer algorithm that just leaches a little out of everybody’s trade.  I always say that those people have all the social utility of a bunch of rats in a granary.  It’s not that great a way to make money.  I would say if you make your money that way that you should be very charitable with it because you’ve got a lot to atone for. (laughter) I don’t think it’s an ambition we should encourage.

The rest of us who aren’t just leaching a little off the top because we’re great at computer science, and that’s what this room is full of.  And if you’re not finding it harder now, you don’t understand it.  That’s my lesson.

Question 23: What’s your favorite industry and why is it your favorite?

Charlie: Well, my favorite industry is taking care of my own affairs. (laughter) And it’s fun it’s creative, it’s the job that life has given me, and I think that you should do the job well that life gives you.  A lot of the places where the industries are doing a great job for the world, it’s very hard to make money out of it.  Because these wild enthusiasms come into it.  I don’t have a favorite industry.

Question 24: Is there any current monkey-business in corporate America that worries you?

Charlie: Well the answer is yes, but not as extreme as Valeant.  That was really something.  That was really something.  I probably should have done that. (laughter)  But you people come so far, and since you’re cult members you like being here.  And I feel an obligation to tell you something sort of interesting and I just went straight into Valeant that year.  It was really pretty disgusting.  What’s interesting is how many high-grade people that took in.  It was too good to be true.  There was a lot wrong with Valeant.  It was so aggressive.  It was drugs people needed.  It was just…take the difference between Valeant and the Daily Journal Company.  When the foreclosure boom came, we had 80% of the foreclosure business in our area.  It’s a big area, Southern California and Northern California too.  It would have been very easy for us to raise the prices and make, I don’t know, $50 million more or something like that, when all these people are losing their houses.  A lot of them are very decent people.  It didn’t ever…the idea that just right in the middle of that we’d make all the money we could?  Which some of our competitors did by the way.  We just didn’t do it.  I don’t think capitalism requires that you make all the money that you can.  I think there are times when you should be satisfied based on...just ideas of decency And at Valeant they just look at it like a game like chess.  They didn’t think about any human consequences, they didn’t think about anything but getting what they wanted which was money and glory.  And they just stepped way over the line.  And of course in the end they were cheating.

But I don’t have a new one.  I got a lot of publicity over that Valeant thing.  I’m not looking for…I don’t want this room to have twice as many people next year.  And I don’t want me not to be here either. (laughter)

Question 25: My question relates to a talk you gave to the foundation of financial officers in 1998 here in California.  And in that talk, you were critical of the complexity and the expense of many foundation portfolios and you said specifically, “An institution with almost all wealth invested long-term in just three fine domestic corporations, is securely rich.”  And you gave as your example the Wicker Foundation and Coca-Cola.  So if you had a foundation today with let’s say a billion dollars, would you be comfortable with it being invested in just three stocks?

Charlie: Well, let’s take the foundation…I’ll change your question around (in the way that I want to answer it). (laughter)  Am I comfortable with a non-diversified portfolio?  Of course…if you take the Munger’s, I care about the Munger’s.  The Munger’s have three stocks.  We have a block of Berkshire, we have a block of Costco, we have a block of Li Lu’s fund, and the rest is dribs and drabs.  So am I comfortable?  Am I securely rich?  You’re damn right I am.  Could other people be just as comfortable as I who didn’t have a vast portfolio with a lot of names in it?  Many of whom neither they or their advisors understand? Of course they’d be better off if they did what I did.  And is three stocks enough?  What are the chances that Costco’s going to fail?  What are the chances that Berkshire Hathaway’s going to fail?  What are the chances that Li Lu’s portfolio in China’s going to fail?  The chances that any one of those things happening is almost zero.  And the chances that all three of them are going to fail?

That’s one of the good ideas I had when I was young.  When I started investing my little piddly savings as a lawyer,  I tried to figure out how much diversification I would need if I had a 10% advantage every year over stocks generally.  I just worked it out.  I didn’t have any formula, I just worked it out with my high school algebra.  And I realized that if I was going to be there for thirty or forty years, I’d be about 99% sure to do just fine if I never owned more than three stocks and my average holding period is 3 or 4 years.  Once I’d done that with my little pencil, I just…I never for a moment believed this balderdash they keep…why diversification…diversification is a rule for those who don’t know anything.  Warren calls them ‘know-nothing investors’.  If you’re a ‘know-nothing investor’ of course you’re going to own the average.  But if you’re not a know-nothing investor, if you’re actually capable of figuring out something that will work better, you’re just hurting yourselves looking for fifty when three will suffice.  Hell one will suffice if you do it right.  One.  If you have one cinch, what else do you need in life.

And so the whole idea that the ‘know-something’ investor needs a lot of diversification.  To think that we’re paying these investors to teach this crap to our young.  And people think they should be paid for telling us to diversify.  Where it’s right, it’s an idiot decision.  And where it’s wrong, you shouldn’t be teaching what’s wrong.  What’s gone on in corporate finance teaching is that people are getting paid for dispensing balderdash.  And since I never believed that it was a great help to me, it helps if you’re out in the market and the other people are believing balderdash and you know what the hell’s going on.  It’s a big help.  So of course you don’t want a lot…if you’re Uncle Horace who has no children has an immense business which is immensely secured and powerful.  And he’s going to leave it all to you if you come to work in the business.  You don’t need any diversification.  You don’t need any corporate finance professors, you should go to work for Uncle Horace.  It’s a cinch.  You only need one cinch!  And sometimes the market gives you the equivalent of an Uncle Horace.  And when it does, step up to the pie-cart with a big pan.  Pie carts like that don’t come very often.  When they do you have to have the gumption and the determination to seize the opportunity shrewdly.  I was lucky.  Imagine learning that from your dead great-grandfather, at a very young age.  But you know I spent my whole life with dead people.  They’re so much better than many of the people I’m with here on earth.  All the dead people in the world, you can learn a lot from them.  And they’re very convenient to reach.  You reach out and grab a book.  None of those problems with transportation. So I really recommend making friends among the immanent dead.  Which of course I did very early.  And it’s been enormously helpful.  Some of you wouldn’t have helped me.  But Adam Smith really did.

Question 26: Question on Irish economy and Irish banking.  Berkshire Hathaway was a shareholder in Irish banks pre-2008.  Could you comment on how the Irish economy and Irish banking system proceeds with the U.K. not being part of the European Union going forward.

Charlie: Well, that of course was a mistake, and it was a mistake we shouldn’t have made because both Warren and I know that you can’t really trust the figures put out by the banking industry.  And the people who run banks are subject to enormous temptations that lead them astray because it’s easy to make a bank report more earnings.  By a thing that any idiot could do which is make it a little more gamey.  And of course that’s dangerous.  And the temptation are very great.  So we shouldn’t have made that mistake, but we did.  And that’s a good lesson too, that even if you’re really good at something you will occasionally drift into a dumb mistake.  And now that’s the question about the bank.  They went crazy in Ireland…the bankers.  And we went crazy when we trusted the damn statements.  And it was a mistake.

Now what Ireland has done was very smart…in reducing all of these taxes.  Now they have English speaking people with practically no taxes.  And there’s a fair amount of charm and so forth in Ireland.  It’s not like it’s a terrible place to be.  They just sucked in half the world into Ireland where they got these…Gates went there very early with Microsoft, and so on.  And they took a place that was really a backward place that had a sort of internal civil war for 60 or 70 years, and bad opportunities, and they really brought in a lot of prosperity.  And they did that by this competitive lowering of taxes and so on.  So it worked for Ireland.  I think Ireland deserves a lot of credit for the way they advanced their country.  And of course they were going to have a thing where all the countries keep trying to reduce their taxes to suck in the foreign…but it won’t work for everybody.  But it did work for Ireland.  I think Ireland deserves a lot of credit, and of course they recovered very well from a very major collapse.  Irish are like the Scottish.   I always think that those Gallic’s are pretty unusual people.  And I’m very glad that I had a Scottish-Irish great-grandmother.

Question 27: My question is in regards to Lee Kuan Yew.  You’ve on several occasions spoken about the economic miracle that is Singapore and how it’s been transferred on by Deng Xiaoping to China.  What are your thoughts about India that’s going through a similar change with the prime minister who also idolizes his people and wants to create a similar sort of situation.  I’d like you’re thoughts on that.  Thank you.

Charlie: Well that’s a very intelligent question, and I’m not saying all the other questions weren’t. (laughter)  I regard Lee Kuan Yew…may have been the best nation builder that ever lived.  He took over a malarial swamp with no assets.  No natural resources.  Surrounded by a bunch of Muslims who hated him.  In fact he was spat out by a Muslims country.  They didn’t want a bunch of damn Chinese in their country.  That’s how Singapore was formed as a country, the Muslims spat it out.  And so hay, here he is, no assets, no money, no nothing.  People were dying of malaria.  Lots of corruption.  And he creates in a very short time, by historical standards, modern Singapore.  It was a huge, huge, huge success.  It’s such a success that there’s no other precedent in the history of the world that is any stronger.  Now China’s more important because there are more Chinese, but you can give Lee Kuan Yew a lot of the credit for creating modern China.  Because a lot of those pragmatic communist leaders, they saw a bunch of Chinese that were rich when they were poor, and they said, ‘to hell with this!’  Remember the old communist said, ‘I don’t care whether the cat is black or white, I care whether he catches mice.’  And he wanted some of the success that Singapore got and he copied the playbook.  So I think the communist leadership that copied Lee Kuan Yew was right, I think Lee Kuan Yew was right.  And of course I have two busts of somebody else in my house.  One is Benjamin Franklin, and the other is Lee Kuan Yew.  So, that’s what I think of him.

Now you turn to India.  And I would say, I’d rather work with a bunch of Chinese than I would the Indian civilization mired down, case system, over-population, assimilated the worst stupidities of the democratic system, which by the way Lee Kuan Yew avoided, it’s hard to get anything done in India.  And the bribes are just awful.  So all I can say is, it’s not going to be easy for India to follow the example of Lee Kuan Yew.  I think that India will move ahead.  But it is so defective as a get-ahead…the Indians I know are fabulous people.  They’re just as talented as the Chinese, I’m speaking about the Indian populace.  But the system and the poverty and the corruption and the crazy democratic thing where you let anybody who screams stop all progress?  It mires India with problems that Lee Kuan Yew didn’t have.  And I don’t think those Indian problems are always easy to fix. Let me give you an example. The Korean steel company, POSCO, invented a new way of creating steel out of lousy iron ore and lousy coal.  And there’s some province in India that has lots of lousy iron ore and lot of lousy coal.  Which is there’s not much use for.  And this one process would take their lousy iron ore and the coal and make a lot of steel.  And they got a lot of cheap labor.  So POSCO and India were made for each other.  And they made a deal with the province to get together and use the POSCO know how and the India lousy iron ore and lousy coal.  And 8 or 9 or 10 years later with everybody screaming and objecting and farmers lying down in the road, or whatever’s going on, they canceled the whole thing.  In China they would have just done it.  Lee Kuan Yew would have done it in (Singapore).  India is grossly defective because they’ve taken the worst aspects of our culture, allowing a whole bunch of idiots to scream and stop everything. And they copied it!  And so they have taken the worst aspects of democracy and they forged their own chains and put them on themselves.  And so no I do not like the prospects of India compared to the prospects of…and I don’t think India’s going to do as well as Lee Kuan Yew.

Question 28: What happened 1973 and 1974 when your investment firm lost over half?

Charlie: Oh, that’s very simple.  That’s very easy.  That’s a good lesson.  That’s a good question.  What happened is the value of my partnership where I was running, went down by 50% in one year.  Now the market went down by 40% or something.  It was a once in 30 year recession.  I mean monopoly newspapers are selling at 3 or 4 times earnings.  At the bottom tick, I was down from the peak, 50%.  You’re right about that.  That has happened to me 3 times in my Berkshire stock.  so I regard it as part of manhood.  If you’re going to be in this game for the long pull, which is the way to do it, you better be able to handle a 50% decline without fussing too much about it.  And so my lesson to all of you is conduct your life so that you can handle the 50% decline with aplomb and grace.  Don’t try to avoid it. (applause)  It will come.  In fact I would say if it doesn’t come, you’re not being aggressive enough.

Question 29: Regarding biases of human misjudgment.  How do you evaluate, handle, and manage people, knowing they might exhibit and suffer from biases that you are not?  And how have you and Mr. Buffett become such good judges of character and not just skills and abilities?

Charlie: Well I think partly we look smart because we pick such wonderful people to be our partners and our associates, even our employees.  And that’s going on right here.  Gerry Salzman is not normal.  He looks normal, but he’s a damn freak.  Gerry does things across 2 or 3 disciplines that are almost beyond human.  And he’s always been that way.  By the way he’s just another mid-westerner.  He’s come out of the soil back there.  So we’ve been very lucky to have his wonderful people.  I wish…I’m not quite sure…I think one thing we’ve done that’s helped us to get wonderful people, I always say the best way to get a good spouse is to deserve one.  And the best way to get a good partner is to be a good partner yourself.  And I think Warren and I have both done good with that.  But whatever the reason we’ve had these marvelous partners, and they make us look a lot better than we are.  You wouldn’t even be here if Gerry Salzman weren’t here.  We did not have a number two choice to run the Daily Journal.  And by the way that happens to me all the time.  We have an executive search or something.  The difference between the number one and number two is like going off a cliff.   And we really…we need one, but there aren’t three good ones to pick, where they’re all good and one’s a little better.  Every executive search I’ve have, it seems there’s one guy whose fine and everybody else is a pigmy.  I think good people are hard to find.  And people like Warren and I have had wonderful people who we’ve worked with all our lives time after time.  That’s one of the reasons Warren says he tap dances to work…you’d tap-dance too if you interfaced with people Warren interfaced with all day.  They’re wonderful people and they win all the time instead of losing.  Who doesn’t like winning in good company?  If you can duplicate that, why you’ve got a great future.  I think we were a little lucky.  And I can’t give you any luck.

Question 30: We have a Chinese platform that focuses content on people trying to invest capital outside of China.  They haven’t been able to invest (outside China) because of capital controls.  But that day will come.  Since they’re at least a half-century behind in terms of investing.  What would be the first thing that you would tell the Chinese person who wants to invest in the U.S.?  What should they do with their money when they’re making their initial investment outside.

Charlie: Well, you’ve made an assumption I don’t follow.  If I were a Chinese person of vast intellect, talent,  discipline, all the good qualities…I would invest in China, not the United States.  I think the fruit is hanging lower there.  And some of the companies are more entrenched.  So I don’t agree with your proposition.  I think they have a tendency to think, ‘we were backwards therefore when we get rich, we should go over and invest in America.’  I think it’s always a mistake to look for a pie in the sky when you’ve got a big piece of pie right in your lap.  And so if I were…at current prices, I think an intelligent person would do better investing in China.

Question 31: You’ve said, everyone should spend 10-20% on some big ideas.  What are one or two big ideas that you are talking about. Meaning, specialize, but spend time working on some big ideas.

Charlie: Well the big ideas, I think you should be intelligent in improving yourself.  You’re way better to take on a really big important idea that comes up all the time than some little tiny idea that you might not face.  I always tried to grab the really big ideas in every discipline.  Because, why piddle around with the little ones and ignore the big ones.  Just all the big ideas in every discipline are just very, very, very useful.  Frequently, the problem in front of you is solvable if you reach outside the discipline you’re in and the idea is just over the fence.  But if you’re trained to stay within the fence you just won’t find it.  I’ve done that so much in my life it’s almost embarrassing.  And it makes me seem arrogant because I will frequently reach into the other fellows discipline and come up with an idea he misses.  And when I was young it caused me terrible problems.  People hated me.  And I probably shouldn’t have been as brash as I was.  And I probably wouldn’t be as brash as I am now.  I haven’t completed my self-improvement process.  But, it’s so much fun to get the right idea a little outside your own profession.  So if you’re capable of doing it, by all means learn to do it.  Even if you just want to learn it defensively.  I do not observe professional boundaries.  My doctor constantly writes, PSA test, prostate specific antigen, and I just cross it out. And he says, ‘What the hell are you doing?  Why are you doing this?’  And I say, ‘Well I don’t want to give you an opportunity to do something dumb.  If I’ve got an unfixable cancer that’s growing fast in my prostate I’d like to find out 3 months in the future, not right now.  And if I got one that’s growing slowly, I don’t want to encourage a doctor to do something dumb and intervene with it.  So I just cross it out.’  Most people are not crossing out their doctor’s prescriptions, but I think I know better. I don’t know better about the complex treatments and so forth.  But I know it’s unwise for me to have a PSA test.  So I just cross it out.  I’m always doing that kind of thing.  And I recommend it to you when you get my age.  Just go cross out that PSA test.  Now the women I can’t help.

Question 32A: How would you invest in a money manager you like?  Through a limited partnership, that would flow through the taxes, and the other way is through a corporation that would pay taxes on the gains and the dividends.  So basically, the corporation would serve no other function though than paying taxes.  So I think you’d be crazy to say that those two ways are equally desirable. (Charlie interjects)

Charlie: You’re certainly right about that.  It’s plumb crazy, and it’s exactly the way people who buy Berkshire are investing.  It’s plumb crazy to have a big common stock portfolio in a corporation and pay taxes compared to a partnership that doesn’t.  And that’s just the way the Berkshire shareholders have invested and they have made, whatever it is, 25% a years since we were there.  But you’re right, it’s not the logical way to do it.

Question 32B: So my question is, if you have to decide, to invest in pool A or pool B, how would you decide on what method you would use to figure out what discount would make you indifferent to whether you would invest in the corporate tax-paying structure when it flows to the… (Charlie interjects)

Charlie: I think it is totally asinine to invest in a portfolio of common stocks through a corporate taxed under the internal revenue code under sub chapter c or something.  It’s totally asinine.  At Berkshire, the public securities keep going down and down as a percentage of the total value, so it doesn’t matter, we’re getting to be sort of a normal corporation.  But I don’t think anybody’s right mind should invest through a corporation in a puddle of securities.  In fact the disadvantage is so horrible.  And so, I wouldn’t even consider it.  In other words…and I regard it as a minor miracle that we were able to get where we did.  So of course you’d invest in a partnership.

Question 33C: So when anyone who invests in Berkshire has to decide the discount to put on a pool of securities that has a future tax lien on the gains…do you have any mental model for…

Charlie: Yeah, my model is to avoid it.  We don’t want to invest in a portfolio of securities in somebody else’s corporation.  You’re totally right.  Which you already knew by the way.

Question 34: What’s your new findings of China?  Also, what’s your take on Ray Dalio’s statement that the U.S. election could unleash a new animal spirit which could lead to a better U.S. economy?  Do you buy this theory?

Charlie: Well, I’m not sure I understood that completely, but I’ll do my best.  What I like about China is that they have some companies that are very strong and still selling at low prices.  And the Chinese are formidable workers and they make wonderful employees.  There’s a lot of strength in that system.  And the Chinese government really tries to help its businesses, it is not behave like the government of India which I don’t think runs it’s country right at all.  And so, that’s what I like about China.  Or course I have to admire taking a billion and half people in a state of poverty up that fast.  That was never done in the history of the world.  And I admire the…you go to China and all the bullet trains go right to the heart of the city…what they’ve done is just an incredible achievement.  And they’ve done it not by borrowing money from Europe the way we did when we came up.  They have taken a poor nation with a lot of poverty and what they did is save half their income when they were poor and drive their nation way up with a lot of deferred gratification.  So it was unbelievably admirable and unbelievably effective.  So I admire that part of the Chinese picture.  China has one problem.  The problem with the Chinese people is they like to gamble and they actually believe in luck.  Now that is stupid.  What you don’t want to believe in is luck, you want to believe in odds.  And China there’s some reason in the culture, too many people believe in luck and gamble.  And that’s a national defect.

Question 35: If the world changes a lot in my lifetime, by the time I’m closer to your age, what do you think will not change about what makes a good successful business?

Charlie: What will not change is that it won’t be that damned easy.  There will be lots of…people will die that you love.  You’ll have close breaks where it goes against you.  There’s a lot of trouble that’s sure to come.  And at the end you’ll know that it’s all over, and that’s the game.  It’s a very funny game when you know when you start you have to lose.  See a dog doesn’t have to do that.  We know from the start we can’t win.  (Somebody) said the law of thermodynamics ought to be restated.  You can’t win, you must lose and you can’t get out of the game.  So we all face this ultimate difficultly. But once you’ve accepted the limitations, you’ve got the problem, how to get through your allot and expand reasonably well.  And I don’t think that’s that hard to figure out.  Because if you do pretty well, considering what you started with an so forth.  And you stand at the end and you’ve done credibly, you’ve helped other people who needed help because you had the capacity and intelligence to do it, and so on, and so on.  Set a reasonable example.  It’s a pretty good thing to do and it’s quite interesting.  And the difficulties make it interesting.

And something else happens that is really weird.  We were talking about, in our director’s meeting that proceeded this meeting, you always get glitches in something as complicated as a new software program going into a big new area.  And you suddenly have reverses and troubles and you’re scrambling.  And what I said is, that I’ve noticed in a long lifetime that the people who really love you, are the people where you scramble together with difficulty and you’ve jointly gotten through.  And in the end, those people will love you more than somebody whose just shared in an even prosperity through the whole thing.  So this adversity that seems so awful when you’re scrambling through, actually is the sinew of your success, your affection, every other damn thing.  And if you didn’t have the adversity you wouldn’t have the bonds which are so useful in life that are going to come from handling adversity well.  The idea that life is a series of adversities and each one is an opportunity to behave well instead of badly is a very, very, good idea.  And I certainly recommend it to everybody in the room.  And it works so well in old age because you get so many adversities you can’t fix.  So you better have some technique for welcoming those adversities.

Question 36: Do you believe that the 0,6, 25 high watermark fees structure that the Buffett Partnership popularized is the fairest structure for both limited partners and the manager themselves?  And what fee structure did you employ during your partnership.

Charlie: Well, I did copy the Buffett formula more or less, and I do think it’s fair and I think it’s still fair.  And I’m looking at Mohnish who still uses it.  I think it is fair and I wish it was more common.  I basically don’t like it where they’re just scraping it off the top.  If you’re advising other people, you ought to be pretty rich pretty soon.  Why would I take a lot of advice from somebody who couldn’t himself get pretty rich pretty soon?  And if you’re pretty rich why shouldn’t you put your money alongside your investors?  And go up and down with them.  And if there’s a bad stretch, why should you scrape money off the top when they’re going down enough?  So I like the Buffett system.  But it’s like so many things I like, it’s not spreading very much.  My net influence in the world, even Warren’s, has been pretty small.  Imagine how much copying we have in our executive compensation methods.  It’s about three examples.  Yes, I think it’s a fine system.

Question 37A: You spoke earlier about natural gas and the shipping of natural gas, and that activity…  (Charlie interjects)

Charlie: If I were running the world as a benign despot, I wouldn’t be shipping any natural gas outside of the United States.

Question 37B: So to tap into that view, you’ve been active in two states big in agriculture, Nebraska and California produce.  What are your thoughts on the agriculture industry and subsidies?

Charlie: Well the interesting thing about agriculture is what’s happened in my lifetime.  Which is the productivity of land has gone up about 300%.  And if it weren’t for that there would be a lot of starvation on earth.  The ag. system is one of the most interesting things that has happened in the last 60 or 70 years.  And we literally tripled the (productivity) of the land.  And we did it all over the world.  And there was just a few people who did it, the Rockefellers, Borlaug, and so forth.  It was one of the most remarkable things in the whole history of the earth and we need another doubling, and we’re probably going to get it.  And it’s absolutely incredible how well we’ve done.  And it’s amazing how efficient our farmers are.  We don’t have much socialization in farming.  We’ve got a bunch of people who own the farms and manage them themselves.  There’s not much waste and stupidity in farming.  Now people complain that we’re using up the top-soil, which I think we are, and I think that’s more of a mistake.  I would fix that if I were a benign despot.  Leaving aside using up the topsoil too fast, I think farming is one of the glories of civilization.  So I think it’s been wonderful what’s happened in farming.

Now in terms of subsidies.  It matters to the farmers where they get their subsidies.  And there’s no question about the fact that we’ve protected our farmers with subsidies and the farmers we’re protecting are getting richer and richer because the farms are owned by fewer and fewer people.  Own more and more acres per person.  So it’s very peculiar that we’re subsidizing people who are already filthy rich, to use up our topsoil a little faster.  And create stuff which we turn into ethanol.  Which is one of the stupidest ideas the world ever…you know I’m a specialist in stupid ideas (links: 1,2), but I would say turning corn into gasoline is about stupid an idea.  I would almost rather jump out of a 20 story building and think I could fly than turn corn into motor fuel.  It’s really stupid.  And yet that’s what our politics does.  I’ve got no cure for the stupidity of politics.  If I (did) the world it would be quite different.  I think that’s pretty minor whether we have subsidies or not.  The main thing that’s happening that has enabled the present population of the world to stay alive is this agricultural revolution and this very good managing of our farmlands.  And the improving agricultural standards in the rest of the world.  It’s gone on quietly that we’ve hardly noticed it.  How many of you are just deeply aware of the fact that grain per acre has gone up by 3 or 4 hundred percent.  That’s a huge stunt.  And by the way, if you take those miracle seeds and don’t use hydrocarbons, the yields are lousy.  We’re feeding ourselves because we know how to turn oil into food.  That’s one of the reasons I want to hold onto the oil.  Something that can be turned into food is quite basic.  And so I don’t mind conserving the oil instead of producing every last drop as fast as one can.  It’s odd that my idea hasn’t spread to more of people.  I may have three or four other people who agree with me in this room.  But you’re a bunch of admirers, and in the rest of the world, I’m all alone. (laughter)

Question 38: You’ve talked on emotions, discipline, and facing adversity.  Can you flesh out more about the spiritual side of this.  How you deal with the struggles and life.

Charlie: Well, just because you don’t have a specific theology, and I don’t…you know when I was a little kid and my grandfather sent me to Bible school and they told me there was a talking snake in the Garden of Eden?  I was very young but I didn’t believe them.  And I haven’t changed.  It doesn’t mean I am not spiritual, it’s just, I don’t need a talking snake to make me behave well.  And I would say that the idea that came down to me, partly through my family, was that rationality is a moral duty.  If you’re capable of being reasonable, it’s a moral failure to be unreasonable when you have the capacity to be reasonable.  I think that’s a hair-shirt that we should all take on, even if we’re pretty stupid.  Because it’s good to be less stupid.  So I think rationality is a moral duty.  And we all have a duty to get better.  And of course we also have to adjust to the other people who are going through our journey with.  I think it would be crazy not to have a social safety net when you’re as rich and successful as we are.  Now I don’t think it has to be as dumb as the one we have, but of course we need a solid social safety-net.  And it’s a moral idea.  So I’m all for morality…without the talking snakes.

Question 39: What are your thoughts on the MLP structure?  And do you have any preliminary thoughts on the border adjustment tax?

Charlie: Let me take the last question first.  We do not know what the boarder adjustment tax is.  I don’t think the people proposing it know what it is.  And I don’t think Trump and the Republicans in Congress have agreed on anything.  So I think we’re just talking about…But do I think some deep revision of the tax system might be a really good idea?  The answer is ‘yes’.  Do I think we should rely on consumption tax more?  The answer is ‘yes’.  Do I really care if somebody piles up a lot of money and leaves it to some foundation.  That’s not my idea of a big evil.  If they do want to live high on their private airplanes and their three hundred dollar dinner checks, I’m all for taxing the people who are living high.  So I like the idea of bigger consumption taxes.  And I think there’s a lot to be said for a different kind of a tax structure.

Question 40: You highlighted this idea of ‘deferred gratification’ a lot today.  In what areas of life is it most valuable?  And where should you enjoy things now vs. grind away and invest in the future?

Charlie: Well, I don’t think you should use up your body by being stupid in handling it.  And I don’t think you should be stupid in handling your money either.  And I think there are a lot of things where the only way to win is to work a long time towards a goal that doesn’t come easily.  Imagine becoming a doctor.  That is a long grind.  All those night shifts in the hospital and so and so on.  It’s deferred gratification.  But it’s a very honorable activity being a doctor.  By and large our doctors are very nice people and they’ve been through a lot.  I tend to admire the life of a doctor more than I admire the life of a derivatives trader.  And I hope all of you do.  And I think deferred gratification in the way our doctors behave is a very good thing for all the rest of us.

Question 41: Question about the circle of competence.  How do you know its limits.  And does it get redrawn from time to time.  Does it always expand, or does it contract?

Charlie: Well of course you know some things that aren’t so, and of course if you’re dealing with a complex system, the rules of thumb that worked in the complex system in year 1 may not work in year 40.  So in both cases it’s hard.  The laws of physics you can count on, but the rules of thumb in a complex civilization changes as the civilization changes.  And so you have to live with both kinds of uncertainty and you have to work longer.  It’s not a bad thing.  It’s interesting.  We’re all the same here…who would want to live in a state of sameness, you might as well be dead.

End of Transcript

Thank you for reading. I hope you all thoroughly enjoyed the transcript. If you found any errors, kindly let me know and I will fix them.

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Sincerely,

Richard Lewis, CFA
White Stork Asset Management LLC
Partner, Investments

Links to additional Transcripts:

Wall Street Journal Recap: January 17-22, 2017

My full notes and analysis on the Wall Street Journal from the past week: January 17-22, 2017 (Week 3).  Please Enjoy.

Buffett & AIG

AIG paid Berkshire Hathaway $10 billion to bring “stability to their balance sheet” and gives them “greater certainty”.  (link)

Meanwhile, Warren Buffett has said, “We pay a high price for certainty.”  Howard Marks added to this comment, “People who want to buy bargains should prefer uncertainty.”

Translation: AIG paid a high price and Buffett got a bargain.

China & Autocatalytic Reactions

China’s economy achieved yet another year of “stable” GDP growth, but their growth comes at the expense of increasing disorder everywhere else in their economy.  This type of behavior is known as an “autocatalytic reaction.”, which is a mental model that I now use to think about China’s economy.

Autocatalytic Reaction: “Order can be created in a system by an even greater decrease in order of the systems surroundings…The order of the Earth’s atmosphere increases, but at the expense of the order of the sun. The sun is becoming more disorderly as it ages and throws off light and material to the rest of the universe.” (wikipedia)

China creates GDP Stability at the expense of Economic Chaos everywhere else.  Below are examples of China’s autocatalytic economy in action.

“GDP Stability”

  1. IMF Raises Growth Forecast for U.S. Economy (link)

“(China) is laboring to keep growth chugging along…the government used its long-worn playbook of state policies to stimulate growth.”

  1. China Hits Growth Goal On Big Does of Stimulus (link)

“Beijing is expected to double down on old growth drivers this year – including fiscal spending and the property market- to keep the economy stable in an important year of leadership change.”

“Beijing posted the lowest annual growth in a quarter-century, and economists say it only got there by relying heavily on short-term measures that are likely to delay much-needed reforms to bloated state-owned companies and the country’s inefficient financial system.”

“Economic Chaos”

  1. A Risky Twist on Repo Trade in China (link)

These “dai chi” agreements are outrageous…Used to temporarily move funds around in order to skirt government audits, as well as take on more risk.  Doesn’t this sound familiar to AIG and credit default swaps?

“A little-regulated practice that companies have used to borrow hundreds of billions of dollars and move risky assets temporarily off their book.”

“The risk is that dai chi agreements tend to be informal and often don’t leave a paper trail.”

“These transactions, by one estimate, may easily top $1 Trillion in value.  The practice is just one of the many unexpected risks that have sprouted up in China’s long credit boom.”

China’s credit boom has “helped send Chinese bond prices to a 14 year high in mid-August and pumped up markets for everything from iron ore to garlic.”

“Traders say the deals are so opaque that even estimates are hard to make.”

Banks sometimes use the dai chi agreements to move risky assets temporarily off their books during earnings periods or audits, the people said.  Brokers like Sealand typically use them to borrow quickly and flexibly-leveraging their investments many times over,”

  1. Copper Tethered to Dollars’ Moves (link)

Chinese investors are grasping for any investments to get their money out of China or the Yuan.  As a result, they are creating volatile and unusual behavior in Copper prices, among other asset classes.

“Metals and other commodities that are priced in dollars tend to fall when the dollar appreciates…But copper and the dollar have been moving nearly in lockstep recently, a phenomenon that many analysts attribute to rising appetite for copper among Chinese investors seeking to protect their wealth against the risk of a sharp Yuan depreciation against other global currencies, primarily the dollar.”

“In November, the correlation between copper and the WSJ Dollar Index reached its highest level since 2007.”

“In five hours on one day, we say (copper) prices trade in a range that would normally take a year” to play out.

  1. Bitcoin Trading Faces Greater Scrutiny in China (link)

China is trying to limit the ability of Chinese individuals and companies to move their wealth abroad, a trend that contributes to a depreciating Chinese yuan and risks destabilizing the broader financial system.”

Trump & China

If Trump stops China from dumping highly subsided products into our markets (link), I think he’ll unintentionally destroy the lynch-pin holding together China’s economy…highly subsidized factories.

To give more detail to this picture, this is what I imagine much of China’s economy looks like:

  1. China’s local governments fund themselves by land sales and real estate development. But the land is only valuable if there are people and jobs.
  2. The easiest way to create jobs is to subsidize industries which can generate LOTS of jobs, like steel production. Steel production creates jobs in mining, transportation, energy, engineering, and of course factory workers.
  3. With lots of people working, or soon to be working, demand for real estate skyrockets. This in turn creates more jobs because workers are needed to build all this new real estate.
  4. It might be ok if only a few cities in China used this model, but I believe this to be pervasive. As a result, China is creating WAY too much steel and other products.  With an oversupply of subsidized goods, they must dump them into U.S., and global markets for whatever prices they can get.

If the Trump administration stops China from dumping its highly subsidized products into the U.S., subsidized factories all over China will quickly implode and take entire cities with it.  Being so highly leveraged, China is not in a position to handle the impact of such an event.

This of course is just my hypothesis, and I welcome any disconfirming evidence.

“Retail Meritocracy” & Deteriorating Moats

It feels like we’ve entered a new area that I’d like to call “retail meritocracy”.  Brand names use to serve an important role in signaling both value and quality to consumers.  But with easy access to internet reviews and scores, brand name goodwill seems to be rapidly deteriorating for many companies.

Luxottica appears to be a good example.  Luxottica has a dominant position in the old world distribution and marketing platform of sunglasses and eyewear.  In this old model, floor space and brand names served as a solid barrier to entry.  But there’s been a trend towards commoditization of sunglasses and eyewear as consumers become more comfortable with buying off-brand names like Warby Parker.  Online reviews, ratings, etc. have weakened Luxottica’s competitive moat.

  1. Merger to Create Eyewear Giant (link)

“The merger joins two companies that previously risked stepping on each other’s toes as Luxottica expanded into lens manufacturing and Essilor moved into frames…both companies could shrink because of a harsher price competition for frames and lenses.”

  1. Why Golfers Covet the Costco Ball (link)

In another example of “retail meritocracy”, Kirkland brand golf balls became a hot selling items when it was discovered that they perform nearly as good as Titleist Pro VI golf balls.  “This is just a perception killer,”  The Kirkland golf balls retailed for $1.25/ball, while Pro VI’s retailed for ~$4/ball.

We  have entered a time of retail meritocracy where many brand-name-moats are being eroded more quickly than anticipated.

Know what’s being measured

It’s important to know what’s being measured.  Sometimes we forget.  Here are some examples:

  1. Private Prison Industry Gets Boost From Election (link)

A likely example of lying with statistics.

The DOJ found that private prisons were more dangerous than government-run facilities.

“Contractors criticized the report, saying it compared private and government-run prisons even thought they house different types of criminals.”

“The private facilities are dominated by lower-security, illegal immigrants who have committed crimes, a demographic in which gangs are prevalent.”

  1. Rocky Route for Rail Line (link)

“If you cut 30 minutes off, I’d be for it,”

Note: Nowhere in his comment does this frequent Amtrak traveler consider the $120 billion cost.

  1. Fed Officials Shift focus on Growth (link)

When the Fed and U.S. Government talk about the success of their economic programs they largely speak of 1) an increase in overall demand and 2) a reduction in unemployment.  When they say the economy is “healed”, they are likely measuring it by overall demand and unemployment numbers.

Global Growth Fuels Netflix Surge (link)

“The streaming video giant has prioritized growth over profit as it pursues its international rollout”

Success is being measured by user growth…which is the same metric used by Netflix’s competitors.  All of its competitors are foregoing profits for revenues

Oops! When Little Errors = Big Mistakes.

Two examples of little mistakes that lead to big errors.

  1. Student-Debt Picture Darkens (link)

The U.S. government WAY underestimated how many students have “defaulted on or failed to pay back their college loans.”

Previous numbers “overstated repayment rates for 99.8% of all colleges and trade schools in the country.”

“The new analysis shows that at more than 1,000 colleges and trade schools, or about a quarter of the total, at least half the students had defaulted or failed to pay down at least $1 on their debt within seven years.”

In 2015, the reported number was 347 colleges.  Today it stands at 1,029.

  1. Afghan Payroll Cut in Corruption Fight (link)

The U.S. military was paying 30,000 Afghan soldiers that didn’t exist!  That came out to $13 million per month.  Now, the U.S. military will only pay Afghan soldiers who were biometrically enrolled in the nation’s army.

The Growth Promise

Why does it seem that troubled companies always insist upon expanding into growth markets?  Why are they so eager to grow a business model with fundamental problems?  Examples include:

  1. Pearson Drops as Future Darkens (link)

“Pearson said its revenue fell 30% in the fourth quarter making for a full-year decline of 18% that it called unprecedented.”

“…which has put pressure on Pearson’s business even as it seeks new sources of growth in emerging economies such as Brazil and China.”

  1. Can Revlon Regain Some of Its Lost Luster? (link)

“One way Mr. Garcia intends to lessen Revlon’s reliance on the U.S. is by entering China.”

I’m Curious. Is this an Accounting Illusion, Real, or Both?

Railroad Mavrick Buoys Investors (link)

I’m curious about this case.  I wonder if Mr. Harrison’s operating efficiencies are real or are merely accounting related.  After all, he’s able to do what no one else in the industry is capable of doing, which should raise some questions.

“Each time the message was similar: Mr. Harrison has proved himself able to cut costs and improve operations and is a better executive than you current team.”

 Irrational Exuberance

On the backs of the second longest bull-market in history, artificially low interest rates have created intense competition among investors for any yield whatsoever.  Furthermore, ultra-low interest rates have incentivized land-lords not to sell, which has reduced supply and intensified competition further.

  1. Texas Billionaires Joined to Strike Deal (link)

Plano Texas’s raw land has gone from $8 to $10 a square foot a few years ago to $60 today.  Due to growing appeal to corporate tenants.

“The property attracted the attention of about 40 investors.”

Ultimately it was won by the investor able to secure a high loan to equity ratio.

It’s unusual for an investor group to be able to borrow such a high percentage of a deal’s value, as Mr. Ware’s group did.

Participants said it worked because the bank will get an equity like return if the group hits the “jackpot” with the new leasing and land development.

  1. Investors Pump In Cash But Supply Is Lacking (link)

Investors piling money in: “Investors are piling money into real estate funds, but fund managers are finding it challenging to spend it.”

Hunt for returns in an Ultra low interest rate environment: “The record level of dry powder comes as investors increasingly have turned to commercial real estate in a hunt for returnsUltra low interest rates at global central banks have made returns on offices and shopping malls look attractive compared with other asset classes such as bonds.

On par with 2005 to 2008: “Global fund managers have raised $446 billion for commercial property in the past four years, on par with the total raised from 2005 to 2008 in the run-up to the global financial crisis,”

Fierce competition for few properties: “With competition for deals fierce, “it has been much more challenging to invest,”…”There are very few forced sellers,”

Landlords aren’t willing to sell.  Their low debt levels and readily available bank financing have made it easy to hold on to properties longer in hopes of reaping bigger paydays later,”

Increasing demand: Deflation & Inflation

  1. ‘Rideables’ Could Curb Car Ownership (link)

Increased demand can have either an inflationary effect or a deflationary effect.  Which way it goes is largely dependent upon two factors:

1) The speed at which supply can expand to meet demand and

2) economies of scale.

In the case of electric vehicles, increasing demand has had a deflationary effect:

“…the rapid expansion of the market has led to demand for parts, making them in turn cheaper and more available, much like what happened with mobile phones.”

“batteries are getting cheaper at 4% to 8% a year, and that compounding over the last five years has had a massive impact” on the electronic-vehicle industry.

Meanwhile, increasing demand has had an inflationary effect on price of oil and gas service providers (link).

Significant Housing Developments

  1. Mortgage Lending Shift Spurs Worry Over Risk (link)

There’s been a big shift in the FHA lending market for single-family mortgage market over the past 10 years.

Topped $1 trillion:Bonds backed by certain risky single-family mortgages topped $1 trillion for the first time in November, crossing that threshold amid warnings about that corner of the U.S. housing market.”

Banks have all but stopped participating: “The result: In the first three quarters of 2016, banks accounted for 9% of mortgage dollars originated by the FHA’s top 50 lenders, versus 62% for all of 2010, according to Inside Mortgage Finance. Nonbank lenders accounted for 80% of mortgage bonds backed by single-family FHA loans in July 2016, versus 9% the same month in 2010…This is the biggest shift in mortgage lending since the savings-and-loans debacle in the 1980’s.”

“It’s too costly to originate”: “J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., the nation’s largest bank by assets, isn’t among the 50 largest FHA lenders.  In 2013, it was the third largest,”…”It simply is too costly and too risky to originate these kinds of mortgages,” Jamie Diamon wrote.

FHA share of the mortgage market has tripled: the FHA share of the overall mortgage market is larger than during the last housing boom.  In the years leading up to the housing bust, FHA loans accounted for less than 5% of annual mortgage volume.  Since the meltdown, the share has ranged from 11% to 15% of originations.

FHA loans under Ginnie Mae has Quadrupled since 2007: “That growth has boosted the amount of bonds Ginnie Mae backs. The $1 trillion of outstanding FHA single-family loans in November that it guaranteed compares with $272 billion at the end of 2007. Overall, Ginnie Mae now backs more than $1.7 trillion in bonds, which includes loans backed by other agencies such as the Department of Veterans Affairs as well as the FHA.”

Nonbank lending creates market risks: “The funding issue arises because nonbanks don’t hold deposits. So they rely on short-term financing, often from banks, mostly to originate new loans. That can dry up in stressed times.”

As Power Changes Hands, HUD Makes Swift Move (link)

The Trump administration seems likely to curb large housing affordability programs which make mortgages more accessible to lower income families, but at the same time distort free market dynamics.  This would likely put downward pressure on home prices.

Challenges Lurk in the Economy (link)

“The U.S. home ownership rate is near a 50-year low, and the average debt load for college students is rising.”

The Confidence Illusion

There’s a lot of certainty and confidence going on.  Investors are feeling much more confident, the fed is feeling much more confident, consumers are feeling much more confident, etc.  But should we trust them?  Caution would be the prudent advice.

The article, “Don’t Let Others Sway You When Making Investment Decisions” (link), points out that we can be heavily influenced by people with an intense belief in ignorant views.

“We’re biologically equipped with the potential to allow more-confident people to have greater sway over our own beliefs,”

“In a paper published in 2000, Prof. Shiller showed that confidence varies, often going up after the market rises and falling after it goes down.  The confidence of individual investors rose 4% in July 2008, for instance, right before the market got sucked into the black hole of the financial crisis.

“So you could visualize the stock market as a poltergeist or hobgoblin who takes a twisted delight in play pranks on the expectations of the investing public.”

1. Treasury Yields Resume Ascent (link)

Janet Yellen is viewing things positively.

“In a speech Thursday at Stanford University, Ms. Yellen said she doesn’t see the U.S. economy at risk of overheating and doesn’t expect growth to pick up much soon,”

But be careful to give too much weight to her comments.  Remember that after the financial crisis, Alan Greenspan wrote:

“In the run-up to the crisis, the Federal Reserve Board’s sophisticated forecasting system did not foresee the major risks to the global economy.  Nor did the model developed by the IMF, which concluded as late as the spring of 2007 that “global economic risks [had] declined” since 2006 and that “the overall U.S. economy is holding up well…[and] the signs elsewhere are very encouraging.” (link)

Service Providers with High Fixed Costs

  1. For Shale Drillers, Rising Oil Prices Also Come With Rising Costs (link)

Interesting story for a case study:

During a dramatic drop in oil prices, oil & gas companies get a sort of mini-bailout by their service providers.  These service providers effectively absorb some of the losses from oil & gas companies, thereby shielding them and making the decline more manageable.

But the effect is a two-way street.  When oil price rebound, service providers are quick to raise prices and dampen the benefits of rising prices.

Why does this happen?

The service providers have high fixed costs.  Upon declining oil prices, oil & gas companies cut demand for their services.  Because service providers have high fixed costs, they will continue to provide services at a loss, sometimes just as long as their variable costs are covered.

I believe you could say that, to some extent, the fixed costs of your service providers or suppliers act as a shield in bad times.  They will/must lower their service fees,  thereby making the hard times more tolerable.

What should we learn from this?

1) We should look at service providers and suppliers and determine the level of their fixed costs and variable costs.

2) Oil & Gas companies should really position themselves better to take advantage of a decline in oil prices.

Before the decline in oil & gas prices, the whole industry had positioned themselves aggressively.  When the crash came, no company was in a position to exploit the lower costs offered by service providers.  Or buy oil assets at discounted prices.

Instead, they all waited for a rebound in prices to start working again, at which point, they completely missed out on compelling market opportunities.

The problem with that strategy is that it’s hard to do.  But as Charlie Munger says, “It takes character to sit there with..cash and do nothing. I didn’t get to where I am by going after mediocre opportunities.”

Government Corruption & Lee Kuan Yew’s Advice

  1. Scandal Rocks Samsung (link)

“(President Park Geun-hye) was impeached last month over allegations that her confidante, Choi Soon-sil, sought to shake down the country’s biggest conglomerates for donations in exchange for political favors.”

There’s just so much corruption being exposed in governments around the world right now.  If you’re interested in learning more about the roots of corruption and how to stop it, I suggest reading the chapter “Keeping the Government Clean” from Lee Kuan Yew’s book, “From Third World to First”.  Here are a few great quotes:

“Human ingenuity is infinite when translating power and discretion into personal gain.” – Lee Kuan Yew

“A precondition for an honest government is that candidates must not need large sums of money to get elected, or it must trigger off the cycle of corruption.  The bane of most countries in Asia has been the high cost of elections.  Having spent a lot to get elected, winners must recover their costs and accumulate funds for the next election.  The system is self-perpetuating.” – Lee Kuan Yew

The Best Investment Quote of All Time is from…Napoleon?

Could the best investment quote of all time come from Napoleon?  Quite possibly.  It was in the unlikely place of Napoleon Bonaparte’s personal diary that I found one of the best investment passages I’ve read.  Bursting with investing wisdom, it would be understandable to mistake Napoleon for Warren Buffett.  Although he’s writing about the art of war, the insights apply to investing just as well.

Interpretation

Below I dissect Napoleon’s journal entry to ascertain its valuable investing insights.

Importance of mathematics & probabilities:

To be a good general a man must know mathematics; it is of daily help in straightening one’s ideas.  Perhaps I owe my success to my mathematical conceptions

Beware of forecasts.  Buffett & Munger don’t invest in a company if they can’t see its strength displayed through history:

a general must never imagine things, that is the most fatal of all.

Eliminate psychological biases & crude heuristics which skew one’s perception of reality:

My great talent, the thing that marks me most, is that I see things clearly;

Identify the main issues and ask the right questions:

it is the same with my eloquence, for I can distinguish what is essential in a question from every angle.

Practice Bayesian updating:

The great art in battle is to change the line of operations during the course of the engagement; that is an idea of my own, and quite new.

Keep it simple. Stick to the fundamentals and common sense: 

The art of war does not require complicated maneuvers; the simplest are the best and common sense is fundamental.  From which one might wonder how it is generals make blunders; it is because they try to be clever.  The most difficult thing is to guess the enemy’s plan, to sift the truth from all the reports that come in.  The rest merely requires common sense;

Stay curious.  Do a lot of reading & research lots of companies.  Eventually you’ll come across a good idea: 

it’s like a boxing match, the more you punch the better it is.

Know how to read financial statements: 

It is also necessary to read the map well.”

“La victoire appartient aux plus persévérants.”

Investment Lessons from a Master Sushi Chef

The best investment book I read this year didn’t come from a Wall Street whiz or hot shot finance professor, rather it came from Jiro Ono, a Master Sushi Chef. Yes, “the Jiro”, the one from the acclaimed documentary “Jiro Dreams of Sushi.”

While in Japan this past September I picked up his book titled “Jiro Philophosy” and was quite surprised. Unlike most investment books, Jiro doesn’t talk about investing at all. In fact, it isn’t even an investment book. Rather Jiro Philosophy simply describes Jiro’s personal work-ethic.

2016-12-17-19-25-01As I read this book, I quickly came to realize just how closely Jiro’s philosophy mirrors that of Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger, and Ben Graham. It was quite surprising to see that the same principles which lead to mastery in Sushi can also lead to mastery in investing.

As a result, I have distilled the book “Jiro Philosophy” down to its 12 core principles and relate each one to the investment philosophy of Buffett, Munger, and Graham.

1. Stick to the fundamentals. Stay grounded.

Jiro

If you stray from the fundamentals – say, trying to set yourself apart from other chefs – you will completely stray off track.  I believe that by adhering to the fundamentals and continuously striving to create delicious flavors, you will be able to be innovative.”

“If you continue to do things the right way, it’s a given that your sushi will turn out delicious.” 

Investing

stick-to-the-fundamentalsMarket manias and bubbles all have two things in common;  an abandonment of fundamental investment principles and an endless series of rationalizations.

Ben Graham understood the immense rationalization power of markets very well.  He experienced it first hand during the lead up to the great depression.  It was his understanding that as markets move higher, investors don’t become more reserved, but rather they invent knew valuation metrics to justify paying any price whatsoever.  As been Graham observed, “We can find no evidence that…investors as a class have sold their holdings because PE ratios were too high.”

Consequently, Ben Graham developed an immutable investment philosophy based on strict fundamental analysis to keep investors from “completely straying off track”.  And much like Jiro Ono, investors who have stuck to Ben Graham’s fundamentals of investing have delivered “delicious” results.

With this, I’m reminded of Lou Manheim ‘s advice to Bud Fox in the movie Wall Street, “Stick to the fundamentals…good things, sometimes take time.”

2. Gain Mastery.

Jiro

“You’ve got to master some skills to reach the next stage.”

“You won’t advance to the next level all on your own.  You need to train properly up to a certain point.  In the case of Jiro, after a decade of training, a craftsman will have mastered everything from preparation to making sushi.  He will be ready to strike out on his own.”

Investing

Warren Buffett pursued and achieved mastery over Ben Graham’s investment philosophy before advancing to the next level.  Warren’s path to mastery took on the following steps:

  • Discovered Ben Graham’s book “The Intelligent Investor” at the age of 19.
  • Read Graham’s 700+ page book, Securities Analysis, at least 12 times.  
  • Attended Columbia so that he could study under Ben Graham.
  • Worked for Ben Graham at his investment fund.
  • Invested using Ben Graham’s investment principles at the Buffett Partnership.

3. Put Knowledge into Practice.

Jiro

“People will teach you new things and ideas, but if you don’t try them out you will not change.”

“No matter how good the teaching, unless you actually put it into practice, you won’t be able to progress.  You will only have the knowledge.  People passionate about their work are always trying to improve upon what they’ve made.  It’s enjoyable and rewarding.”

“Because of this, we can keep trying new things every day.”

Investing

Throughout his life, Warren Buffett has shown an amazing willingness and ability to put knowledge into practice.   This includes applying the teachings of Ben Graham as well as the four hour educational interview he had with GEICO executive Lorimar Davidson in 1950.

Much of Warren’s success simply boils down to seeking out the best knowledge and putting it into practice.  Warren recommends you do the same thing:

“You need to fill your mind with various competing thoughts and decide which make sense. Then you have to jump in the water – take a small amount of money and do it yourself. Investing on paper is like reading a romance novel vs. doing something else. You’ll soon find out whether you like it. The earlier you start, the better.”

4. Improve upon what you’re taught.  Otherwise you will always be an apprentice.

Jiro

“Just doing as you’re taught is the same as being an apprentice.  I tell my young apprentices that they should think about how to achieve good flavor on their own, improve it and then experiment.  I always tell them if they don’t, they will be apprentices for life.”

Investing

Although Warren Buffett began his career as Ben Graham’s apprentice, he did not simply stick to his teaching.  Rather he modified and improved upon Graham’s teachings over time.  As Charlie Munger describes it:

“If we’d stayed with the classic Graham, the way Ben Graham did it, we would never have had the record we have. And that’s because Graham wasn’t trying to do what we did.”

5. Practice Beginner’s Mind. (Shoshin)

Shoshin (初心) is a concept in Zen Buddhism meaning “beginner’s mind“. It refers to having an attitude of openness, eagerness, and lack of preconceptions when studying a subject, even when studying at an advanced level, just as a beginner in that subject would. (Wikipedia)

Jiro

screen-shot-12-17-16-at-07-37-pm“That said, once they’ve become independent they should still pursue improvement just like an apprentice.

“Feeling you can still evolve is important.”

Investing

Both Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger are enthusiastic learners who enjoy the process.  In fact, Charlie has said that he and Buffett are “dissatisfied with what they know.”  As a result, they are always seeking to learn, adapt, and evolve.

Charlie further explains the importance of this mindset,

“Warren Buffett has become one hell of a lot better investor since the day I met him, and so have I. If we had been frozen at any given stage, with the knowledge we had, the record would have been much worse than it is. So the game is to keep learning, and I don’t think people are going to keep learning who don’t like the learning process.”

6. The way you do the small things reflects how you do the big things.

Jiro

Through Jiro’s Philosophy, he stresses the importance of the small things.  From cleanliness, to hot towels, to the preparation process, rice, etc.  All the smallest details are given the greatest care.  The way you do the small things reflects how you do the big things.

Investing

Likewise, Buffett has a keen eye for detail as displayed by the following two stories:

Story 1:

Buffett also liked Cathy’s attention to detail.  “When I asked her on the phone how many employees she had, she replied ‘504.’  I love this,” said Buffett.  “Not ‘about 500.’ I think she has 505 now and is doing considerably more business.  She won’t be happy until she has 100 percent market share.”  (From the book “The Women of Berkshire Hathaway: Lessons from Warren Buffett’s Female CEOs”)

Story 2:

The following is an excerpt from the Q&A session at the 2016 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting:

Warren Buffett: Yes, sloppy thinking in one area probably indicates there may well be sloppy thinking elsewhere. I have been a director of 19 public corporations. I’ve seen some very sloppy operations and I’ve seen a few really outstanding business operators, and there’s a huge difference. If you have a wonderful business, you can get away with being sloppy. We could be wasting a billion Dollars a year, at Berkshire, you know $640m after tax, that would be four percent of earnings, and maybe you wouldn’t notice it….

Charlie Munger: I would.

Warren Buffett: Charlie would notice it… It’s the really prosperous companies that well….the classic case were the tobacco companies many years ago. They went off into this thing and that thing, and it was practically play money because it was so easy to make. It didn’t require good management, and they took advantage of that fact. You can read about some of that in ‘Barbarians of the Gate’.

7. Listen to good advice.

Jiro

“I take customers’ advice when it makes sense.”

“Even when you think you are right often that’s not the case.  No matter what kind of business you are in, if you only work in an inflexible way, you won’t find success.”

“If (a customer’s advice) makes sense, I will adopt it, otherwise I will never evolve.”

Investing

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger have exhibited an open mind and willingness to listen to good advice throughout their careers.  In fact, if it weren’t for some timely advice they might not have bought See’s Candies.  As Charlie Munger recounts,

“[Munger’s friend] Ira Marshall said you guys are crazy — there are some things you should pay up for, like quality businesses and people. You are underestimating quality. We listened to the criticism and changed our mind. This is a good lesson for anyone: the ability to take criticism constructively and learn from it. If you take the indirect lessons we learned from See’s, you could say Berkshire was built on constructive criticism.

8. Preserve your main asset…You.

Jiro

screen-shot-12-17-16-at-07-50-pmIn his 40’s, Jiro recognized that his most critical asset as a Sushi Chef was the sensitivity in his finger tips.  As a result, he began wearing gloves in order to preserve the long-term integrity of his hands.  

This might seem like a mildly trivial matter, but for anybody looking to achieve and maintain success in their profession, follow Jiro’s example: Identify the physical or mental attribute that is necessary for success in your field and take measures to preserve it.

Investing

Warren Buffett identifies the most important trait of an investor as “emotional stability”.  As Warren explains,

“To be a successful investor, you don’t need to understand higher math or law. It’s simple, but not easy. You do have to have an emotional stability that will take you through almost anything. If you have 150 IQ, sell 30 points to someone else. You need to be smart, but not a genius. What’s most important is inner peace; you have to be able to think for yourself. It’s not a complicated game.”

Similar to Jiro’s practice of wearing gloves to protect his hands, here are some routines and strategies which Buffett uses to maintain emotional stability, inner peace, and independent thought.

  • An alert and fresh mind: 
    • Warren gets good sleep and takes naps when necessary
    • He plays bridge many hours every week.
  • A temperament uncorrupted by outside influences:
    • He Lives in Omaha
    • Maintains a Clear Schedule
    • Keeps a quiet office where he can think.
  • Health:
    • “My diet, though far from standard, is somewhat better than usually portrayed. I have a wonderful doctor who nudges me in your direction every time I see him. All in all, I’ve enjoyed remarkably good health — largely because of genes, of course — but also, I think, because I enjoy life so much every day.”

Furthermore, Warren explains the importance of preserving and enhancing yourself through life:

“Imagine that you had a car and that was the only car you’d have for your entire lifetime. Of course, you’d care for it well, changing the oil more frequently than necessary, driving carefully, etc. Now, consider that you only have one mind and one body. Prepare them for life, care for them. You can enhance your mind over time. A person’s main asset is themselves, so preserve and enhance yourself.”

9. Be a craftsman. Pursue work to satisfaction.

Jiro

“Pursuing work to satisfaction is the pride of a craftsman.  No matter how time consuming, I will leave no task to others.  I will do them all myself until satisfied.  Even as I get older, I still do all the work, even if it’s bothersome.  I feel very pleased when I develop and create something from a new idea of my own.”

Investing

Likewise, Buffett takes pleasure in doing all the investment analysis himself.  He does not have a team of analysts working for him.

10. Be passionate about what you do.

Jiro

“People who love their work passionately want to continue working.  I’m no exception.  Although I’m 90 years old, I’d like to keep on going.  That’s why I don’t find investing time in my work troublesome.”

Investing

At 86 years old, Buffett still tap-dances to work.  He derives great enjoyment from researching different companies.  He compares it to researching different species of animals.

11. Adapt to changing circumstances.

Jiro

screen-shot-12-17-16-at-07-41-pm“Since all sushi toppings are changing, sushi craftsman must now factor this in when working out flavors.”

“The oceans are quickly changing.  For example, the season for katsuo (skipjack tuna) now starts six months later.  But we have to serve the best of what’s in season.  Fish and shellfish were tastier in the past and it is difficult to find their intense flavors.  The next generation of sushi chefs will face challenges in trying to find ways to bring out and enhance fish flavors.”

Investing

Likewise, in investing you cannot wish for something which doesn’t exist.  You must play the hand that you’re dealt.

When Warren Buffett started investing, he could find net-net investments everywhere.  But the investment ocean quickly changed and he had to adapt to the circumstances.  Over the years, Buffett has invested in a broad range of investment classes including, bonds, common equity, preferred stock, warrants, options, commodities, and special situations.  He doesn’t wish for something that doesn’t exist, rather he adapts himself to whatever asset is on sale below his intrinsic value.

At the same time, Warren will never abandon his core principles and rationalize new investments.  During the “Nifty 50” stock market, he declared that he couldn’t find any cheap stocks and refused to invest.  Later Buffett refused to invest in tech stocks during the tech boom of the 90’s.  In each case Warren has been rewarded for his patience and sticking to the fundamentals.

This leads to a crucial point.  Although you must adapt to changing environments, you must also remember to stay true to the fundamentals.  As it says in rule number 1, “If you stray from the fundamentals…you will completely stray off track.”

So remember: Adapt, but do not abandon.

12. It’s never too early to prepare

Jiro

“It’s never too early to prepare.  You can start preparation way in advance.”

Jiro began working at a local restaurant from the age of seven.

Investing

Likewise, Warren Buffett recalls his youthful experience: “By the age of 10, I’d read every book in the Omaha public library about investing, some twice.”

Furthermore, Buffett said he read the 10Ks of IBM for fifty years before ultimately making an investment in the company.  That’s fifty years of “preparation.”

Jiro Philosophy: Distilled

jiro-philosophy

Haiku Review: Deep Value by Tobias Carlisle

Inspired by a recent trip to Japan, here are my 7 main insights distilled from Deep Value by Tobias Carlisle, in Haiku form.  Arigatou gozaimasu.

Japanese Painting

1. Risk: “A Bundle of Twigs Cannot Easily Be Broken”

Stocks perceived risky,

Find resilience when bundled.

Have fewer down years.

2. Return: Buy the “Ugliest of the Ugly”

Deep Value defies

Investment Intuition.

Ugly is Better.

3. Trust in Mean Reversion & Avoid Naive Extrapolation

Trust Mean Reversion.

Naive Extrapolation

Ignores the Base Rate.

4. Expand Your Time Horizon

Seeking to avoid

Short-term underperformance,

They’re captured by it.

5. Behavioral Biases: Your Intuition is Killing You

Three Crude Heuristics,

Lead us to poor decisions.

What feels right is wrong.

6. Use a Statistical Approach: Focus on Simple & Effective Techniques

Ben Graham’s approach:

Stick to a few Techniques and

Simple Principles.

7. Stay out of the Way: Overconfidence Leads to Reduced Performance

Our judgment misleads,

We find broken legs abound.

Stay out of the way.

number 7 japanese

Deep Value’s 7 Main Takeaways

Deep Value by Tobias Carlisle reads somewhat like an investment version of “Mom’s” classic question, “If your friends jumped off a cliff, would you?”  Wall Street is filled with people jumping off cliffs and the people who follow.  The question is, why would so many people consistently invest in a way that’s bad for their well-being?  The answer lies largely within the errors of our intuition.  Carlisle warns that, often times, “the incorrect decision feels right, while the correct decision feels wrong.”

If our investment intuition is so often wrong, then the first step to becoming a better investor should be to recognize that we are naturally wired to jump off investing cliffs.  The next step involves giving counter-intuitive ideas a chance.   After all, as Einstein said, “The definition of insanity is to keep trying the same thing while expecting a different result.”  Insanity in this case, is relying on our intuition to help us make wise investment decisions.deep-value-tobias-carlisle-6

Consequently, we can view Deep Value as a sort of counter-intuitive survival guide to overcoming our self-destructive investment tendencies.  (aka “How to stop jumping off of cliffs”)

Next to here you will find the summary of my seven main takeaways from Deep Value.  Please feel free to print it out and re-read these points whenever your intuition tries to lead you off a cliff.

Risk:” A Bundle of Twigs Cannot Easily Be Broken”

Within traditional finance, risk is commonly defined as “the currency by which we pay for returns”.  Meaning that if we want higher returns, we must bear greater risk.  This intuitively makes sense if the markets are efficient.  But Deep Value discredits this intuitive assumption.

Throughout the book, Carlisle focuses on two groups of stocks that exist at the opposite ends of the spectrum.  Value Stocks and Glamour Stocks.  Value stocks are considered risky investments.  They are typified as companies that you wouldn’t want to own.  They are often down and out companies that exist in unfavorable industries and have poor prospects.  Meanwhile, glamour stocks are considered safe investments.  These are companies that generally have high returns on capital, seemingly endless growth prospects, exist in favorable industries, and are widely admired. (i.e. companies you’d love to own)

On an individual basis, value stocks are indeed the riskier prospect.  Value Stocks, as defined here as net-nets, lose 90% or more in a single year 5% of the time, versus only 2% of the time for all stocks.

But the nature of value stocks changes dramatically when they are bundled together.  In fact, they have fewer down years than the market.  In a study, net-net stocks only had 3 down years in 26 versus 6 down years for the market.

This investment phenomena mirrors a quote by Tecumseh, Native American leader of the Shawnee.  He said, “A single twig breaks, but the bundle of twigs is strong.”  A value stock by itself is like a twig that easily breaks, but finds strength when bundled together.

twig-analogy

Return: Buy the “Ugliest of the Ugly”

If value stocks have less risk than glamour stocks, then traditional finance states that they should have lower returns.  But yet again, Carlisle proves this notion to be wrong.  In fact, he shows that value stocks generate superior returns to their riskier glamour stock counterparts.

Deep Value presents many studies which show that returns for value stocks are significantly greater than glamour stocks.  But perhaps most surprising is Carlisle’s case that the ugliest stocks provide the best returns.  The nature of this counter-intuitive element is steeped in Behavioral Finance.  Everyone in their pursuit of safety, shun companies that look risky, which creates bargains.

The ugliest of the ugly phenomena extends to countries as well.  The countries with the poorest recent performance outperform countries with the best recent performance.

solitude-poemThis investment bias towards glamour and value stocks is perfectly capture by a poem I encountered by Ella Wheeler Wilcox titled Solitude.  In it she wrote, “Be glad, and your friends are many; Be sad, and you lose them all”.

Furthermore, this poem explains why value investing is a successful strategy.  The very nature of investing in value stocks is contrarian because you’re willing to do what very few will.  Value Investors immerse themselves in grief, woe, gall, fasting, and pain.  As a result of these counter-intuitive actions, value investors  get counter-intuitive returns.

Put another way, value investors get pleasurable returns for hanging around companies in sorrow.  While typical investors get sorrowful returns for hanging around companies in pleasure.

Trust in Mean Reversion & Avoid Naive Extrapolation

Deep Value contrasts two starkly different predictive assumptions about the future.  The most commonly used assumption is naive extrapolation, whereby the past performance of a company is extrapolated out into the future.  The less commonly used assumption is mean reversion, whereby a company’s financial performance will  eventually revert towards the mean.

Carlisle demonstrates that, of the two methods, investors should rely on mean reversion.  The importance of mean reversion should not be understated.  Ben Graham identified mean reversion as the phenomenon that leads value strategies to beat the market.   Furthermore, Carlisle writes, “An appreciation of mean reversion is critical to value investment.”

Mean Reversion is built upon a fundamental economic truth that;

  1. Competition naturally eats away at high returns over time. “In most cases competition and other corrective forces work on the highly profitable business to push its return back to the mean.”
  2. Low returns will more often than not, revert towards the mean. “Stocks with big market price losses and historically declining earnings tend to see their earnings grow faster, and outperform the market.”

On the other hand, naive extrapolation makes the assumption that past results will generally continue undeterred into the future.  While this appears to be mathematically sounds, it ignores the “Base Rate”.  The Base Rate  shows that this simplifying assumption is not true for most companies.

As a results, predictions using naive extrapolation often disappoint, while predictions using mean reversion are the more likely outcome.  The chart below provides a good visualization of these two methods at work.

mean-reversion2

Mean reversion appears to have an element of Biblical faith to it.  It reminds me of a Bible Verse, Hebrews 11:1, which says, “Now faith is confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see.”  Likewise, value investors have confidence in what they hope for (anticipating mean reversion in both fundamentals and valuation) and assurances (base rate, invisible hand) about what they do not see.  Whereas most investors mistakenly invest based on what they see (historical figures), but shouldn’t expect (naive extrapolation).

Expand Your Time Horizon

To be a value investor, you must expand your time horizon.  Mean reversion often takes time.  In fact it can take 3-5 years, during which time, you may experience years of poor performance.  Most investors don’t have this kind of patience.  Wall Street generally isn’t kind to short-term underperformance.

Consequently, many fund managers will chase short-term performance at the expense of long-term success.  Quarter on Quarter and Year on Year is their focus.  But as Carlisle writes, “by attempting to avoid short-term underperformance, they are captured by it.”

Behavioral Biases: Your Intuition is Killing You

Behavioral Bias is really a dual sided topic.  First, you must understand the various Behavioral Biases which contribute to your poor investment decisions.  Secondly, you must recognize that even after understanding these biases, it remains difficult to overcome them.

Carlisle writes,

“Kahneman and Tversky found that we make decision about uncertain future events based on three heuristics…Each leads us to make poor decisions about uncertain events because it leads us to consider irrelevant evidence, and in so doing diverts us from considering the underlying probabilities about the events.”

The three biases as identified by Tversky & Kahneman are:

  1. Anchoring & Adjusting: Causes us to stick with our first impression, even when evidence arrives that conflicts with our view.
  2. Representativeness: We use stereotypes to make simplifying assumptions.
  3. Availability: Only consider things that are quickly brought to mind.

It has been shown that people still fall victim to these three biases despite working to prevent them.

“No matter how well trained we are, humans tend to have difficulty with probabilistic, uncertain, and random process.  Confronted with problems requiring an intuitive grasp of the odds in an unfamiliar context, even the best investors and behavioral finance experts flounder.  If mere awareness that our judgment is clouded by our nature does little to correct the errors we make, how then can we protect against them?

So then, what can we do about it?

Use a Statistical Approach: Focus on Simple & Effective Techniques

Carlisle offers a solution to this behavioral bias dilemma: Remove yourself from the equation.

You can accomplish this by using a statistical based approach.  Ben Graham found that the best investment approach is one that follows simple and effective techniques.

Tobias covers three value investing formulas in Deep Value which follow simple and effective techniques.  They are:

  1. Net-Nets by Ben Graham (http://www.libertyinvesting.com/benjamin-grahams-checklist/)
  2. The Magic Formula by Joel Greenblatt (www.magicformulainvesting.com)
  3. The Acquirer’s Multiple by Tobias Carlisle (http://acquirersmultiple.com/)

Net-Nets are excellent when you find them, but they are heavily exploited, illiquid, and there’s a limited opportunity set.  Meaning that you can’t grow the strategy beyond a certain size.

The Magic Formula attempted to derive Buffett’s investment strategy down into two elements, and has had great results.

  1. Quality of Business: ROIC = EBIT/(net working capital + net fixed assets).
  2. Attractive Price: Earnings Yield/Enterprise Value

The Acquirer’s Multiple, developed by Carlisle, is an evolution of the Magic Formula.  Carlisle finds that the Quality of Business element in the formula only serves to detract from overall returns.  He finds that the formula can simply be boiled down to “Attractive Price”, as defined as (Enterprise Value/Operating Earnings).

Stay Out of the Way

After Choosing your statistical approach, you may be tempted to alter the results using your subjective judgment, but this should be avoided.

self-reflexivity-2Carlisle demonstrates that the returns of the model are a ceiling from which we detract.  Not a base from which we add.  The reason being twofold:

  1. We are largely over-confident in our abilities.
  2. We find more broken legs than there really are.

In a sense, we want to de-correlate our thinking from that of the markets.  But when we introduce our subjective judgment, we begin using more intuition and thereby increase our correlation with the market.  Thus reducing returns.

Summary

The Deep Value strategy can be summarized in four steps:

  1. Create a simple & effective statistical model using counter-intuitive value investing insights, including mean-reversion.
  2. Remember, you are investing based on an expected group outcome, so don’t over-concentrate your portfolio in any one stock.
  3. Expand your time horizon to 3-5+ years.
  4. Recognize your limitations, and, for the most part, stay out of the way.

Despite many findings that demonstrate the soundness and relatively safe nature of a value portfolio, investment professionals largely shun value stocks.  The reason for their reluctance is largely centered around self-preservation.

Managers must defend their investments to clients who are usually emotional, impatient, and unsophisticated.  So if a manager invests in a group of poor companies which are undervalued, he’ll likely have to answer to his clients who see those investments as risky and imprudent.  Especially if there’s any prolonged period of underperformance.

On the other hand, it is much easier for a manager to appear prudent by simply investing in a portfolio of slightly overvalued glamour stocks that look safe.  Since the portfolio looks safe, clients will sleep well at night under the belief that the manager is acting prudently.  The manager too will sleep well because he has less stress and greater job security.  So be aware, appearances of prudence can be deceiving.

I recently came across an interview with Walter Schloss, the late great value investor, who gave an example of such a dilemma that he faced;

People have certain emotions, and they wanted to not lose money.  So we didn’t tell people what we owned, and one guy said, ‘You know Walter, I can’t stand it not knowing what we own.’  He was an old man, so I said, ‘Well we own some bankrupt bonds of the Pennsylvania Railroad.’  Which  actually turned out very well later, and he said, ‘I can’t be in your partnership knowing that, it makes me too upset.’  So he withdrew.  So people act emotionally, and if they know what you own, then they look at it and say, ‘Oh I don’t like that stock.’  Then they call you on the phone and say, ‘Well why do you own it?’  I don’t want to hear people complaining.  They trusted me with their money, and that’s what a lot of hedge funds do, they don’t disclose what they own.”